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From these results recommendations for future survey design are developed.
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and scope 
The use of economic valuation methods has become a regular instrument for the 
assessment of the desirability of public investment projects aiming at the 
improvement or conservation of environmental goods. This tendency reflects the 
understanding that the existence of environmental goods or amenities on the one 
hand has a beneficial impact on various functions in society as well as in the 
economy, however, on the other hand comes at the cost of forgone economic 
possibilities or at additional public funds to be expended for conservation or 
rehabilitation efforts. The improvement of urban air quality through a reduction 
of particle emissions or the conservation of natural areas by preventing 
industrial development, for example, require considerations regarding the 
expected benefits from such measures in relation to the costs to be incurred by 
society as a whole. Especially in times of increasing fiscal constraints it is of 
particular importance to possess reliable and transparent indicators for changes 
in society's well-being resulting from such environmental projects for the 
process of public policy decision making. The special properties of 
environmental goods, however, pose a number of problems for the measurement 
of benefits they generate for society. 
In principle, environmental goods belong to the so called non-market goods. 
Examples of such environmental goods are the possibility to breathe clean air or 
the knowledge of the existence of certain biological plant and animal species. As 
in the latter example, environmental goods often have the character of pure 
public goods characterized by non-excludability and non-rivalry in consump-
tion. For non-market goods a number of difficulties with respect to the assess-
ment of the benefits they provide to society are generally encountered. The 
assessment of such benefits becomes relevant in case projects are carried out 
that go along with changes in the quality or the quantity of environmental goods 
provided. As is well known in the case of market commodities for which 
excludability from consumption holds the minimum benefit an individual 
derives from the consumption of such a good can easily be inferred from its 
price. An individual will only consume a commodity if the benefit from con-
suming it makes up at least for the costs of purchasing it, otherwise he would not 
be willing to pay the price asked. The absence of market prices for environ-
mental commodities, therefore, constitutes the main difficulty of assessing the 
benefits derived from their existence or consumption, or, in case of a public 
project resulting in a change of their quantity or quality, of assessing the change 
of benefits to society. 
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The aim of assessing such social benefits from a project producing or 
conserving an environmental good is the determination of some figure that 
enables a comparison of derived benefits against incurred costs. Since costs are 
in general conveniently measured in monetary terms it has proven useful to 
develop methods that are able to express the economic value of the provision of 
environmental goods in monetary units, as well. From this perspective it is not 
surprising that methods for the valuation of environmental goods were 
developed much in analogy to established methods of market-good valuation 
where the price of the good serves as the measuring rod of benefits. The most 
prominent and most widely used method for the assessment of changes in social 
well-being due to changes in environmental goods is the Contingent Valuation 
Method (CVM) (see Mitchell and Carson 1989 for a detailed review of the 
method). 
This method constitutes the particular focus of this study. In principle, it aims 
at the elicitation of households' utility changes from some envisaged or planned 
environmental project. Its main feature is the creation of a hypothetical market 
which functions in analogy to a real market in which economic agents are given 
the possibility to purchase the environmental good under consideration. The 
CVM is based on surveying a representative sample of a population that is likely 
to be affected by some proposed environmental change scenario. During these 
interviews which can be carried out as face-to-face, mail or telephone interviews 
the selected respondents are confronted with a specific scenario of a change in 
the level of an environmental good and, e. g. in the common case of an 
environmental improvement, are then asked a monetary amount they would be 
willing to pay for this improvement to actually take place. In the case of a 
proposed environmental deterioration respondents would either be asked their 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) to prevent the deterioration and stay in the present 
state or, alternatively, their willingness-to-accept-compensation (WTA) for their 
loss in well-being if the deterioration actually took place. The WTP (or in the 
case of a perceived deterioration the WTA) is generally interpreted as the 
economic agent's Hicksian Compensating Variation (CV), a theoretical measure 
for individual welfare changes which represents the maximum amount of money 
which could be extracted from an agent so that he is not worse off after the 
change than before. 
The main advantage of the CVM, however, the simulation of a market for 
environmental goods where in fact no such market exists, is at the same time the 
method's weak point. Usually, in a market households reveal their preferences 
by making a purchase decision and paying for the purchased good in return. As 
stated above, it can therefore be inferred that the value they attribute to the 
purchased good is at least what they have paid for it. At the same time, in a 
market households usually participate actively, i. e. they play an active part in 
searching for commodities they desire, acquire information regarding their 
2 
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characteristics and also decide about the time when they purchase these goods. It 
is obvious, therefore, that the decision situation constructed in a CVM interview 
is quite different from what a respondent is used to when purchasing real 
commodities. He plays no active role in a CVM interview, rather he is 
approached by an interviewer at a time he cannot determine and has to make a 
decision whether or how much to pay for an environmental good that he usually 
has not much knowledge of. Furthermore, if he feels that he needs more 
information to make a well-reflected decision he cannot postpone that decision 
to some later point in time when he will have. acquired sufficient information. 
The only consolation to a respondent in such a situation is that he is not required 
to give up money right away but that the cost of the project will come from 
some increased tax, higher prices or mandatory payments into a project-specific 
fund in the future. A WTP statement in a CVM interview, thus, resembles only 
moderately the situation of a purchase decision in a real market. 
Still, despite these shortcomings of the simulated market of a CVM interview 
as compared to a real market this method emulates such a market situation as 
closely as possible. The alternatives to the CVM would be to use only the 
various existing indirect valuation methods like the travel cost and the hedonic 
pricing methods that rely on real market actions but can capture only the use 
values of environmental goods or to revert entirely to expert valuations. As 
shown in the literature, these alternatives are not attractive. However, the above 
mentioned distinctions between real and simulated markets need to be addressed 
when interpreting the WTP statements of CVM respondents as measures of their 
welfare changes resulting from a change in an environmental good. Certainly, 
one of the consequences is not to take the rationality of such WTP statements as 
given but to scrutinize in detail whether this necessary assumption of rationality 
is sufficiently fulfilled in practical CVM surveys. Numerous theoretical and 
practical studies regarding the Contingent Valuation Method have revealed that 
the rationality of respondents is indeed a problem and that reduced rationality 
leads to systematic distortions or biases of CVM results. Famous biases 
reflecting problems of reduced rationality are among others the embedding 
effect, anchoring effects, social desirability effects caused by the presence of an 
interviewer and framing effects, just to name a few. 
In theory, a rational response to a WTP question in a CVM interview requires 
that the respondent correctly perceives the proposed environmental change 
scenario including the consequences for his personal life, that he evaluates this 
scenario in the light of his personal preferences and states a WTP that reflects 
his evaluation in monetary terms. Ideally, his WTP statement should neither 
depend on the format of the WTP elicitation question, i. e. whether he himself 
states an amount or has to accept or reject a proposed amount, nor on the 
payment vehicle or the interview form. In short, the WTP response should not 
depend on the specific question format or interview procedure, i. e. it should be 
3 
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procedure invariant. In practice, however, it was often demonstrated that such 
procedural invariance is elusive. So far, a number of explanations for an often 
perceived irrationality of CVM responses have been proposed. However, it 
appears that until to date little is known about the thought processes that actually 
take place inside a respondent's head when confronted with a WTP question for 
an environmental change scenario. 
One key problem with this task for respondents in a CVM interview appears 
to be that they are confronted with a decision situation which is unfamiliar to 
them. Often, two aspects of unfamiliarity are encountered: first, respondents 
might be unfamiliar with the particular good to be valued, i. e. they might have 
heard of the good or of the issue but have no or only little personal experience 
with it. Unlike with market goods, where a respondent could always be given a 
sample product to try out its features and functionality and gain some initial 
experience to get an idea of its utility, this is usually not possible with 
environmental goods. As a consequence, the respondent remains in a state of 
uncertainty with respect to the utility that he will finally receive from the 
proposed environmental change. The expected change in utility will, therefore, 
be just an estimate or vague expectation. Second, respondents might be 
unfamiliar with the task of assigning a monetary value to something they have 
never associated with money before because they consider it a public property as 
is the case with most environmental goods and amenities. Decisions about the 
provision of environmental goods and trade-offs between environmental quality 
and other economic amenities are usually taken on a higher political or 
administrative level. 
In practice, CVM respondents face an additional difficulty: in a typical CVM 
interview situation, at least in a face-to-face or telephone situation, the 
respondent will initially be given some considerable amount of information and 
is then expected to state his WTP within a very short period of time, usually on 
the spot. A typical CVM face-to-face interview usually lasts between 20 and 40 
minutes, and during this little time the respondent needs to assimilate the given 
information, assess it in the light of his own personal context, generate an 
expectation of what this new proposed situation would feel like, put this in 
relation to the loss of possible market consumption resulting from the required 
payment and, finally, answer a number of personal questions. Typically, the 
time span between the point at which the respondent first realizes that most 
likely the interview will require him to make a monetary consideration and the 
point where he is actually asked to state his WTP is very short. Thus, little time 
is available to process rather large amounts of new information and to assess the 
consequences of an environmental change scenario in monetary terms. The 
cognitive burden in a CVM interview may be quite large and prevent the 
respondent from fully processing the given information, a situation which is 
expected to put bounds on the respondent's rationality of decision making. 
4 
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In a world of perfect rationality where individuals are perceived as rather 
abstract utility maximizers with unlimited cognitive abilities these cognitive 
burdens play no role since once the scenario information is given the individual 
should be able to state a WTP conforming to his personal preferences. In the real 
world, however, CVM respondents will be limited by their personal cognitive 
capacities and capabilities and will, thus, find the task of evaluating the scenario 
information and stating a WTP rather stressful. Moreover, they perceive that the 
decision cannot be postponed, there will be no second chance to express their 
valuation for the proposed project. Respondents will search for ways of how to 
best deal with the complex decision situation in which they are required to 
consider and process large amounts of new and often unfamiliar information in a 
short period of time. Are respondents willing and able to consider all 
information provided thoroughly or will they rather try to find ways to avoid the 
employment of too many cognitive resources? What are respondents' strategies 
to cope with such situations? 
Recent research on human information processing and reasoning conducted in 
the field of cognitive psychology suggests that while people certainly aim at 
making good and rational decisions they try to make these decisions using as 
little cognitive effort as possible. Some tasks and decisions require the use of 
analytical information processing characterized by sequential and logical 
reasoning, i. e. on conscious thought. For many other tasks, however, the 
individual has learned that good or at least satisfactory outcomes can be 
achieved also by limited information processing, e. g. by relying on analogies to 
previous situations or habits or by focusing only on parts of the available 
information and thereby neglecting information considered to be less important 
for the task at hand. Often, key words or "heuristic cues" contained in the 
formulation of the task or the information provided lead to an activation of a 
particular strategy to save cognitive resources. Such strategies are often termed 
"heuristics", i.e. rules of thumb using simplified information processing in order 
to circumvent cognitively effortful analytical thinking. For the individual, the 
importance of the task as well as the structure of the information provided 
decide on the cognitive processes to be employed to solve the task using the 
least amount of cognitive resources. Such behavior characterized by 
economizing on cognitive resources can, therefore, be characterized as 
"economy of cognition". Since this behavior will rarely achieve optimal 
outcomes the rationality concept underlying such limited information processing 
resulting in suboptimal decisions is termed "bounded rationality", contrasting 
the idealized world of perfect rationality. 
Consequently, in the real world respondents in a CVM survey must be 
expected to often deviate from the perfectly rational response behavior 
mentioned above and to employ strategies of information processing to 
economize on their scarce cognitive resources, instead. Therefore, it appears 
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necessary to perceive respondents as boundedly rational information processors 
and decision makers. This new perspective on the rationality of respondents 
allows to analyze and explain the often inconsistent results in CVM surveys. 
The focus on information processing opens a whole new toolbox for analyzing 
respondents' use of cognitive resources and, thus, may shed light on ways 
respondents become victims of their own reasoning and thinking. Biases in the 
CVM may be the result of respondents' strategies to cope with a complex 
decision situation by finding appropriate ways to limit the amount of cognitive 
resources to be invested into decision making. Respondents may use their real-
world experience that it is often sufficient for achieving a satisfactory outcome 
to focus their attention on the most prominent features of a problem or to avoid 
particularly unwanted outcomes etc. It is reasonable to expect that people's ways 
of information processing and decision making in a CVM interview are 
influenced by those experiences of what usually works well. For the analysis of 
CVM responses, however, this perspective has not yet been adopted. 
Furthermore, it is to be expected that people differ in their ways to process 
complex information and make decisions. Some respondents may be more 
capable to analyze large amounts of information and evaluate a complex 
environmental change scenario while others are struggling with such a task and 
feel overloaded. Such respondents will be more likely to employ strategies that 
make the decision problem simpler and, thus, may be more susceptible to exhibit 
the kinds of inconsistent response behavior often found in empirical CVM 
studies. Recent research in the field of cognitive psychology supports this 
expectation that individual differences exist in the kinds of information 
processing generally used. Therefore, the concept of bounded rationality to be 
adopted here is quite multi-faceted in contrast to the usual assumption of perfect 
rationality. It incorporates a continuum of people's information processing 
strategies when facing complex tasks ranging from rather analytical to various 
kinds of spontaneous and simplified reasoning. The adoption of the perspective 
of boundedly rational respondents in CVM surveys, therefore, promises an 
explanation of different kinds of response behavior that allows new insights into 
the problems of this method, i.e. where systematically distorted responses might 
be rooted. Such insights may help to improve the performance of the CVM. 
The objective of this study, therefore, is to scrutinize respondents' rationality 
in CVM surveys by contrasting the concept of bounded rationality as the main 
paradigm of behavioral economics and cognitive psychology against the concept 
of perfect rationality. The particular interest of this scrutiny is to analyze the 
explanatory power of this alternative rationality concept for often found 
inconsistent response patterns in CVM surveys. Furthermore, it shall be 
attempted to derive recommendations of how the design and the administration 
of CVM surveys could be improved so that the decisions taken in the simulated 
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market for environmental goods better resemble decisions taken in the real 
world. 
1.2 Further outline of this study 
The further outline of this study is organized as follows: After this introduction, 
chapter 2 will first present the theory of environmental economic valuation and 
the variety of empirical methods for measuring the value of environmental 
changes found in the literature. This chapter forms the basis of the study since it 
describes in detail how the assumption of perfect rationality in environmental 
valuation is implemented both in theory and in the empirical practice. The 
second part of chapter 2 will address the violations of perfect rationality and 
review the literature regarding the main empirical findings concerning the 
various procedural biases of the CVM. Some behavioral explanations for the 
occurrence of these biases and inconsistent response patterns will be discussed, 
as well. The last part of chapter 2 will focus on the open debate on preference 
uncertainty of respondents mentioned above. Various approaches of dealing 
with preference uncertainty and correcting benefit estimates for this uncertainty 
will be presented and discussed. In summary, chapter 2 presents the state-of-the-
art of environmental valuation research. 
The third chapter deals with the emergence of the concept of rationality in 
economics and offers a classification of alternative rationality concepts that have 
been developed more recently. First, the history of the rationality postulate 
starting from Adam Smith via Alfred Marshall will be briefly reviewed and the 
three rationality axioms forming the basis of the concept of instrumental or 
perfect rationality in neoclassical economics will be introduced. Subsequently, 
the behavioral norm of optimization forming the core of perfect rationality will 
be criticized in the light of experimental and empirical counter-evidence. 
Furthermore, extensions of the concept of perfect rationality leading to the 
overarching concept of bounded rationality will be explored. Some typical 
examples of decisions made under bounded rationality in contrast to perfect 
rationality will be highlighted, among others the famous conjunction fallacy first 
formulated by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky and the phenomenon of 
preference reversals. 
Since bounded rationality draws heavily on psychological insights on human 
information processing and decision making the main concepts of cognitive 
psychology will be addressed in so far as they are related to information 
processing in environmental valuation. Finally, specific models of dual 
processes of reasoning reflecting the concept of an "economy of cognition" will 
be discussed and their relation to information processing in environmental 
valuation will be highlighted. These models assume information processing as a 
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problem of allocating scarce cognitive resources to a variety of competing tasks. 
According to the theories underlying the dual-process models, during the 
evolution of the human brain two fundamental types of information processing 
have emerged, one fast and effortless suited for routine and repetitive tasks and 
one slow and more effortful but particularly suited to deal with novel situations. 
It is assumed that in a situation of scarce cognitive resources the human brain 
allocates each of these two types of processing to the competing tasks at hand. 
These cognitive psychological models shall form the conceptual basis for the 
development of an empirical survey instrument for the analysis of bounded 
rationality in environmental economic valuation surveys in chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 will then build on this literature review and the connection 
established between psychological models of reasoning and response behavior 
in CVM surveys in order to gain a more realistic perspective of the way 
respondents process complex information in CVM interviews where both time 
and the available information are limited in principle. As described in the 
preceding section, two aspects are of particular importance in this respect and 
shall be analyzed more thoroughly in this study: ( 1) how respondents deal with 
preference uncertainty, and (2) whether and to what extent respondents make 
use of an "economy of cognition" and, consequently, base their decisions in 
CVM interviews on simplifying heuristics instead of thorough analytical 
reasoning. 
In the first part of chapter 4 these two aspects will first be considered from a 
theoretical point of view. Regarding preference uncertainty, a modification of 
the traditional neoclassical model of preference orderings, fuzzy preferences, 
shall be taken up. This concept will be used to describe the uncertainty over 
preferences regarding environmental goods. Unfortunately, the practicability of 
this approach will turn out to be rather limited since it is technically not possible 
to derive proper value functions for environmental goods like e. g. the Hicksian 
Compensating Variation necessary for a quantitative representation of 
environmental values. Therefore, preference uncertainty will have to be 
analyzed in a more indirect way. Subsequently, information processing in CVM 
interviews will be addressed specifically from the perspective of bounded 
rationality and the limitation of respondents' cognitive capacities in the real 
world. From this discussion a specific set of research questions for the following 
empirical example shall be developed. The research approach for analyzing the 
occurrence and the consequences of boundedly rational information processing 
in CVM surveys is based on the dual-process models of reasoning developed by 
Epstein et al. ( 1996). On the basis of their Rational Experiential Inventory (REI) 
two empirical instruments for detecting, classifying and measuring the use of 
various types of information processing will be developed to be employed in an 
empirical CVM study in northern Thailand. 
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In the second part of chapter 4 these instruments will then be used in an 
empirical CVM study regarding the social benefits of an improvement of 
household tap water quality in northern Thailand. The purpose of this empirical 
application is to test the usefulness of the developed instruments for the analysis 
of boundedly rational information processing and for the development of 
recommendations for an improvement of CVM survey designs. The empirical 
study underlying this test was conducted as part of a subproject within the 
international collaborative research group (SFB 564) funded by the German 
Science Foundation (DFG). 
Chapter 5 concludes the study with a summary and discussion of the 
possibilities and limitations of the concept of bounded rationality for a better and 
deeper understanding of CVM response behavior and for an improvement of 
CVM studies as a method for the economic valuation of environmental changes. 
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2 Environmental valuation 
2.1 Theory and practice of environmental valuation: state-of-
the-art 
2.1.1 Environmental valuation - why? 
Every economist who has ever mentioned his interest in the valuation of 
environmental goods to "normal" people has certainly been confronted one time 
or another with a notion ranging from disgust to simple lack of sympathy in 
return. The very concept of putting a value, let alone a monetary one, on the 
environment runs against the basic feelings of a considerable part of the 
population and is commonly directly associated with the well-known cold-
bloodedness of the economist profession. Often, however, some common 
ground can be found after heated discussions and the view toward economists' 
character might have been sustainably altered. In reality, it turns out that the 
valuation of the environment occurs quite often and naturally most of the time 
without the majority of the population taking serious offense. When roads are 
built, nature reserves are established, forestry and agricultural management is 
regulated or simply consumption decisions are made the associated 
consequences to nature and the environment are implicitly or sometimes 
explicitly taken into account and are, more or less, considered in relation to the 
decision to be made. Thus, valuation of the environment is a normal component 
of private and public decision making. It is not the task and interest of 
economists to downgrade the importance of nature but to make such valuations 
more explicit and transparent. This chapter will describe in detail the theoretical 
background of environmental valuation and will lay out how such a task can be 
performed in practice. 
As just mentioned, the environment enters decisions in many aspects of 
private and public life. For example, public projects carried out by government 
authorities are often explicitly or implicitly associated with consequences for the 
environment. Such consequences can be desired and positive, e. g. when a 
nature preserve is established or a wetland area is rehabilitated, or they may be 
negative as in the case of new highway construction cutting through an 
environmentally sensitive area. In a democratic society it is government's 
constitutional task to allocate scarce public funds to those activities that enhance 
the well-being of society so that only those activities should be undertaken for 
which public benefits at least outweigh the costs (cf. Hanusch 1994: 3). Thus, 
whenever beneficial effects for the environment are to be achieved by such 
projects it needs to be determined whether the resulting increase in society's 
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well-being is worth the investment of public money. Similarly, whenever 
negative environmental consequences are to be expected from some 
improvement of infrastructure, for instance, it needs to be determined whether 
the associated loss in well-being does not outweigh the convenience created by 
the project. Such benefit-cost considerations call for the use of compatible units 
of measurement in order to allow direct comparisons of created benefits versus 
incurred costs. The translation of generated utility into monetary units is, 
therefore, one of the tasks of economic valuation of environmental changes. 
The considerations in the preceding paragraph highlight the anthropocentric 
view of value that is inherent in the benefit-cost approach of economic 
valuation. Commodities or environmental amenities derive their value to society 
from the value they create for human beings. This anthropocentric view 
precludes the concept of an intrinsic value of nature as often propagated by 
environmentalists according to which nature in itself has a value regardless of 
the value human beings attribute to it (cf. Madariaga and McConnell 1987: 938). 
However, it is obvious that intrinsic value is just as well that: a value attributed 
to nature by human beings so it fits quite well into the anthropocentric 
framework of economics and a classification of values exists that incorporates 
all these notions of value in a consistent and operational way. It is obvious that 
the term "value" cannot be reduced to the value of direct consumption or the 
value of nature as a resource, e. g. wood in a forest, in production. Certainly, 
environmental goods carry value for human beings because they can directly 
consume them, e. g. breathing air, relaxing in natural outdoor activities or 
watching animals and plants in their natural environments. Additionally, many 
environmental goods like e. g. natural forests or wetlands contribute indirectly to 
human well-being through the environmental functions they perform. Forest 
ecosystems regulate the regional climate, absorb and transform pollutants, 
regulate the water cycle etc. In mountainous regions forests stabilize the 
mountain slopes which is a prerequisite for (permanent) human settlements in 
the valley bottoms. Wetlands regulate the water flow of rivers and can buffer 
periods of high rainfall and drought with all their effects on agriculture and 
human settlements ( cf. Loreau et al. 2002, Matthews et al. 2002, Ramirez et al. 
2002, Fromm 2000, Costanza et al. 1998, Barbier 1994 ). 
Apart from these common functions of environmental amenities that enter the 
utility functions of human beings either through direct consumption or indirectly 
through ecosystem services provided, human beings were found to care for the 
environment also for other reasons. Although a particular environmental 
amenity may not be consumed, e. g. visited, at present, an individual might 
value the option of doing so in the future giving rise to the concept of option 
value (cf. Weisbrod 1964). An option, however, whose use in the future remains 
vague like .e. g. the use of a biodiversity hotspot region for the development of 
pharmaceuticals in the future is commonly distinguished from the described 
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"pure" option value as "quasi" option value (cf. Arrow and Fisher 1974). In 
addition to this option value, Krutilla ( 1967) pointed to the existence value 
describing the utility derived from the pure knowledge of the existence of 
environmental goods, e. g. certain plant and animal species or entire ecosystems, 
that an individual will most likely never see himself but nevertheless perceives 
as important to preserve. Krutilla also introduced the bequest value referring to 
the utility one derives from leaving an intact environment, or at least a particular 
amenity, to future generations. Since these additional categories of value are 
clearly components of the well-being of society they must be considered as 
elements of the benefit-cost framework mentioned above. 
Therefore, in the environmental economics literature it is now common to use 
the concept of total economic value that considers all kinds of ways in which 
human beings derive value from an environmental good (cf. Nunes 2002: 4). 
This concept differentiates on a first level between use values and non-use 
values. Use values comprise the value derived from direct consumption (direct 
use values) and from ecosystem functions (indirect use values) as well as the 
"pure" option value. Non-use values that are also often termed passive use 
values comprise the existence value and the bequest value described above. 
Additionally, the "quasi" option value is usually classified as a non-use value, 
however, it might as well be considered a use value. Since this distinction is of 
no practical importance it shall not be elaborated on here. It can be argued that 
within the concept of total economic value the intrinsic values mentioned above 
are to some extent subsumed in Krutilla's existence value since it comes closest 
to the environment having a value regardless of its use to man. When, however, 
intrinsic values imply a complete lack of substitutability between environmental 
and produced goods such values cannot be dealt with in an economic approach. 
Figure 2-1: The concept of total economic value 















The concept of total economic value with its distinction in use values and non-
use values has important implications for the practical methods of environmental 
valuation. Before the presentation and discussion of these methods, however, the 
theory of environmental valuation and benefit-cost analysis in neoclassical 
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economics shall be dealt with in the following section in order to derive 
theoretically consistent measures of value that can then form the reference base 
for the methods of practical assessment. 
2.1.2 Environmental valuation and benefit-cost analysis in neoclassical 
economics 
The following section 2.1.2 is largely based on Ahlheim (2003) and Stephan and 
Ahlheim (1998). For the presentation of the theoretical foundations of 
environmental valuation let's for simplicity consider a public project aiming at 
some improvement of the state of the environment. Typically, such a project 
leads to a number of effects that are important from an economic perspective 
and, therefore, must be dealt with here since they affect the well-being of the 
households considered. The desired effect of such a project is the improvement 
of the environment which is denoted as i here, where k E {0, l}. Specifically, 
z0 stands for the state of the environment before the project, i. e. the initial 
situation, and z1 refers to the state after the project has been carried out. Since 
the financing of such a project usually requires government to raise additional 
funds, e. g. in the form of increased taxes, it is plausible to assume a change in 
the households' income levels when the project is implemented. Thus, I~ 
denotes household h's income in environmental state k. Additionally, it must be 
expected that the consumption of market goods xh = { xh, 1, xh,2, ••• , xh,N} changes 
since the improvement of the environment might lead to more consumption of 
some goods, e. g. hiking boots, and less of others, e. g. computer games, which 
has effects on the relative prices of market goods. Let, therefore, p~ denote the 
market price of commodity n in environmental state k. 
In cost-benefit analysis we are generally interested in the change of welfare, 
i.e. well-being, of society resulting from such a public project. We, therefore, 
aim at finding an indicator from which we can unambiguously tell whether 
society is better or worse off after the project implementation and financing. In 
democratic states, to which this theoretical approach refers, society is generally 
perceived as consisting of individual persons whom economics usually classifies 
in households since members of one household are for simplicity assumed to 
make consumption decisions with a joint budget. Thus, social welfare can be 
expressed formally as 
where a¼uh ~ 0 V h. (2-1) 
Therefore, the problem of the assessment of the welfare change resulting from 
the considered project can be divided into a first step of determining the changes 
14 
Oliver Frör - 978-3-631-75515-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 03:56:05AM
via free access
in utility of each household in society, the so-called identification problem, and 
a second step of aggregating all individual household changes in order to 
determine the overall welfare change, the so-called aggregation problem. Each 
of these problems will be dealt with in turn. 
Let us consider the household's direct utility function that depends on the 
consumption of market commodities, the vector xh, and the state of the 
environment z so that 
(2-2) 
It is assumed that the direct utility function is monotonically increasing in z so 
that environmental quality is indeed considered as a good. The change in utility 
of the household due to the implementation of the project can then be defined as 
the utility difference between the initial situation k = 0 and the situation k = 1 
after the implementation of the project 
LiU~1 = U~ - U~ = uh ( x~, z1) - uh ( x~, z0 ). (2-3) 
However, as mentioned above, along with an implementation of the 
environmental project and its financing by government, the consumption of 
market commodities must be expected to change due to changes in incomes, for 
instance. Therefore, it is more convenient to employ the indirect utility function, 
instead, which depends on prices, incomes and the state of the environment. The 
indirect utility function results from the maximization of the direct utility 
function subject to a given budget, prices and state of the environment. It 
symbolizes the maximum level of utility that can be attained given these 
parameters. 
vh(p,z\Ih) = max u(xh,z) s.t. lh=p·xh; z=zk 
X 
i.e. (2-4) 
The expression x • (p, zk, Ih) represents the Marshallian demand functions 
resulting from the described utility maximization problem of the household, i. e. 
the optimal consumption quantities of x given p, zk and lh. With this definition 
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However, it is well known that neither the direct nor the indirect utility functions 
are observable due to their ordinal nature. It is, therefore, necessary to define a 
measure of individual welfare £\h that is based on the theoretical expression in 2-
5 and that is in principle accessible to observation and can be computed using 
econometric techniques. In general, such a welfare measure needs to satisfy the 
so-called indicator condition according to which the measure must be able to 
unambiguously indicate whether an individual household is better or worse off 
after a change from situations k = 0 to k = 1, i.e. 
> > 
£\0h1 = O)h ( ut u~) = 0 <=> u~ = u~ . (2-6) 
< < 
In order to derive a welfare measure both satisfying the indicator condition and 
being observable in principle the concept of the expenditure function will be 
employed. Taking into account the existence of environmental goods the 
expenditure function defines the minimum expenditure that is necessary for a 
household to attain a given utility level U when prices p and the environmental 
state z are given, i. e. 
e(p,z,U}= min p·x, 
xeU(U) 
U(U) = { xi u(x,z) 2:: U}. (2-7) 
As desired, the expenditure function is strictly monotonically increasing in the 
utility level U since when prices and the state of the environment are given any 
increase in U is necessarily accompanied by an increase in expenditure for 
market goods creating this utility. Due to this strict association of money and 
utility level the expenditure function is termed "money-metric utility function". 
Since we are interested in measuring utility changes the expenditure function 
can be used to define utility differences in monetary terms as the difference 
between two expenditures necessary to attain two different and predefined levels 
of utility when prices and environmental state are kept constant. These utility 
difference measures are based on John Hicks (cf. Hicks 1939, 1942). In the 
literature two such measures feature very prominently differing only in the 
chosen level of prices and environmental state to be kept constant ( cf. Stephan 
and Ahlheim 1996: l 72t). In the situation under consideration where there is an 
initial state, i. e. before the project, and a final state, i. e. after project 
implementation, it is plausible to either choose the prices and environmental 
state at the initial situation or at the final situations as reference levels of the 
expenditure functions for the welfare measure. Choosing the initial level as 
reference gives rise to a welfare measure called Hicksian Equivalent Variation 
defined as 
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Evt = eh (p0 , z0 , U~ ) - eh (p0 , z0 , U~ ) 
= eh (p0 , z0 , U~ ) - I~ , (2-8) 
since the expenditure necessary to attain U~ at prices p0 and environmental state 
z0 equals just the income of household h in the initial situation I~ . As a 
monetary expression for the difference in utility between an initial situation and 
a final situation Evi1 can be interpreted in two directions. On the one hand 
Evi1 denotes the minimum amount of money that must be given to household h 
for his utility to remain unchanged ifhe were to forego an environmental project 
that would increase his level of utility from U~ to U~. In this case Evi1 is 
commonly interpreted as willingness to accept compensation (WT A). On the 
other hand Evi1 denotes the maximum amount of money that could be 
extracted from household h if the implementation of a project that would 
decrease his level of utility from U~ to U~ were prevented. In this case EVt is 
commonly interpreted as willingness to pay (WTP). In the first case, an 
environmental improvement, Evi1 would be positive whereas in the second 
case, an environmental deterioration, Evi1 would be negative. In case the final 
situation, i. e. k = 1, is chosen as reference level in the expenditure function, the 
Hicksian Compensating Variation is obtained which can be defined formally as 
cvi1 = eh (p1, z1, u~) - eh (p1, z1, u~) 
= I~ - eh (p1, z1, Un . (2-9) 
Again, the expenditure necessary to attain utility level U~ giv.en p1 and z1, 
eh (p1, z1, U~ ), equals just household h's income in the final situation I~. In 
analogy to the Equivalent Variation, the Compensating Variation can assume 
two states: in case it assumes a negative value, i. e. cvt < 0, it denotes the 
minimum amount of money that must be given to the household to compensate 
him for a loss in utility from U~ to U~, commonly interpreted as WTA. In case 
cvi1 > 0, however, the Compensating Variation stands for the maximum 
amount of money that could be extracted from the household and still leave him 
as well off as before if the environmental project were to be implemented. This 
latter case where cvi1 is commonly interpreted as WTP is most frequently used 
in environmental valuation since it describes the natural situation where a 
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household is asked to give up some monetary equivalent for an environmental 
improvement to occur. Thus, in the following, only the Compensating Variation 
will be used as a measure of utility differences resulting from environmental 
changes. 
In its formulation in 2-9 cvi1 can still not be computed since while the 
household income I~ is observable the expenditure term eh (p1, z1, U~ ) refers 
to a hypothetical situation since it denotes expenditure necessary to attain the 
initial level of utility under the final situation of prices and environmental state. 
Such an expenditure is entirely abstract and can, therefore, not be elicited from 
the household. In order to render the expression for cvi1 observable it is 
necessary to transform it into three separate utility differences by adding zeros to 
equation 2-9 (cf. Stephan and Ahlheim 1996: 175f) yielding 
cvi1 = eh (p1, z1, u~) - eh (p0 , z0 , u~) + 
eh (po' ZO' U~ ) - eh (pl' ZO' U~ ) + 
eh (p1, z0 , U~ ) - eh (p1, z1, U~ ) . 
The notation of the augmented expression in 2-10 can be simplified to 
cv 01 - cv1° 1 + CVp01 + CVz01 h - h h h• 
(2-10) 
(2-11) 
i.e. the Compensating Variation for the utility change from U~ to U~ can be 
separated into three expressions referring respectively to the change in utility 
from changes in household incomes, CVI~1, the change in utility from the 
changes in prices, CVp~1, and the change in utility from the change in the 
environmental state, CVz~1• The advantage of such a separation into single 
utility changes is that there exist methods of measurement for each of them. 
CVI~1 simply refers to the change in the income level of the household, i.e. I~ -
I~. This income change is in principle observable from household census data. 
For the computation of CVp~1 there exists a well-established procedure of 
measurement (cf. Vartia 1983) which is based on an approximation procedure 
aiming at computing an integral over Hicksian demand functions when only the 
respective Marshallian demand functions are known ( cf. Ahlheim and 
Wagenhals 1988). With this procedure any level of accuracy can be achieved 
depending only on the effort expended. Finally, the expression CVz~1 is the one 
being most important for environmental valuation since it represents the utility 
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change that is generated for the household by the change of the state of the 
environment alone. In theory, this expression represents the integral over the 
shadow prices for the environment between the initial state (without the project) 
and the final state (after project implementation). Since, however, these shadow 
prices are not observable from household data, other methods have been 
developed for an approximate computation of this measure in practice. These 
methods aim at the elicitation of individual households' WTP for the project 
under consideration since, as mentioned above, the CV for a utility increasing 
project is commonly interpreted as the WTP for that project. 
In a next step, the problem of aggregating the individual welfare changes 
needs to be addressed since it is the aim to derive a valid measure for changes in 
social welfare. An environmental economic policy maker would hardly be able 
to recommend the implementation of a public project on the basis of countless 
figures of individual WTP. The aggregation of individual welfare measures, 
however, poses a fundamental theoretical problem in economics since it 
involves interpersonal comparisons of utility which is not compatible with 
ordinal utility theory. In addition, it was demonstrated by Arrow's Impossibility 
Theorem (cf. Arrow 1950) that no social preference ordering can be constructed 
on the basis of individual preferences that fulfills certain desirable conditions. 
Therefore, it is necessary to revert to weaker forms of aggregation for practical 
purposes. In reality, a policy maker would like to base the decision concerning 
some publicly funded project on the assessment of whether society as a whole 
will be better or worse off after the implementation of the project. Such an 
assessment can at least be approximated by determining whether it is possible 
for the winners of such a project to compensate the losers and still not be worse 
off than without the project. This criterion for preference aggregation is known 
as the Hicks-Kaldor potential Pareto criterion (cf. Cullis and Jones 1998: 29). 
Despite its theoretical shortcomings it has been widely accepted as one possible 
and transparent way of deriving a social benefit-cost measure from measures of 
individual welfare change. Using the derived measure of individual welfare 
changes on the basis of the Hicksian Compensating Variation above yields the 
following expression for the Hicks-Kaldor criterion in our case: 
> > 
H H H H 
I,cvi1 = ICVl~1 + ICVp~1 + ICVz~1 = 0 • W 1 = w0 (2-12) 
h=l h=l h=l h=l 
< < 
where W\ k E { 0, 1} denotes social welfare at situation k. Separability of the 
three components of the individual welfare measure cvi1 implies that the 
aggregated CV can simply be obtained by summing the individual components 
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over all households. For further discussion of the Hicks-Kaldor criterion in the 
literature see e. g. Johansson ( 1994 ). 
In practical applications, however, it will not be viable to apply the Hicks-
Kaldor criterion fully as specified above. In order to compute a numerical value 
for the social value of an environmental project it would, thus, be necessary to 
know the income changes of all households, to estimate the entire demand 
system of society and the utility changes resulting from the environmental 
improvement using suitable empirical methods. Therefore, in practice, a simpler 
approach is usually chosen that relies on a comparison of the costs necessary to 
implement the project versus the aggregated individual benefits from the 
intended environmental improvement yielding the following benefit-cost 
expression 
H 
BC01 = ICVz~I - q1. Y, 
h=I 
(2-13) 
where y denotes the vector of the quantities of input factors necessary for the 
implementation of the project and q I denotes the vector of the respective factor 
prices. If BC01 is positive the implementation of the project under consideration 
is recommended, if it turns out to be negative the proposed project should be 
scrapped. For the conditions under which this approximation of the benefit-cost 
measure is reasonable see Hanusch (1994: 57) and Ahlheim (2003: 27ft). 
Therefore, the focus of empirical methods of environmental valuation is directed 
H 
on the assessment of the term L CVz~1 , i. e. on the assessment of household's 
h=l 
WTP for the project under consideration as a common interpretation of the 
Compensating Variation in practice. The methods currently available for this 
task shall be described and discussed in the following section. 
2.1.3 Methods of environmental valuation 
Since the theoretically correct assessment of the individual welfare change 
CVz~1 by computing the integral over the compensated shadow price function 
of environmental states is not possible in practice it is necessary to employ 
empirical methods that allow to deduce the value that households attribute to a 
particular environmental change from data that are observable from these 
households. As mentioned above, willingness to pay for an environmental 
improvement or for preventing an environmental deterioration is usually 
considered as a suitable proxy for the associated utility change of the household 
due to the economic trade-off involved in the decision of how much money, i.e. 
market consumption, should be sacrificed in return for an environmental good. 
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This consideration gives rise to two fundamentally different approaches for the 
elicitation of WTP. The first approach makes use of the weak complementarity 
between some market goods and environmental goods and bases WTP 
elicitation on households' observed consumption behavior of these goods. This 
implies that the value of the environmental good is assessed indirectly through 
the consumption of its complementary market goods. Therefore, the methods 
relying on observed market behavior of such goods are usually called indirect 
methods of environmental valuation. Alternatively, since they require the 
households to reveal their preferences for environmental goods through the 
consumption of market goods they are often called revealed-preference 
methods. Weak complementarity between a market good and an environmental 
good exists whenever consumption of a good is positively associated with an 
environmental good, i. e. when ceteris paribus the existence, the level or the 
quality of an environmental good leads to a higher consumption of those market 
goods or if prices of market goods are positively influenced by the 
environmental good (cf. Stephan and Ahlheim 1996: 154, Maler 1974). 
However, the indirect methods can only assess that part of the value attributed 
to the environment which is directly associated with its use since the use of the 
environment determines the consumption of the market goods that are related to 
it by weak complementarity. Therefore, the indirect methods are only of limited 
use for environmental valuation. When it is expected that an environmental good 
creates considerable non-use values as described in 2.1.1 the so-called direct 
valuation methods have to be employed. These methods are based on direct 
questioning of households concerning the value they attribute to some 
environmental improvement. The idea of the direct methods is to simulate a 
market situation for environmental goods where the household is given the 
opportunity to "buy" the environmental good in question. From the household's 
behavior in this simulated, or hypothetical, market situation his willingness to 
pay for the environmental good in question can be inferred. Since these methods 
rely on households' direct statements of value in a hypothetical situation rather 
than on true market behavior, they are often called stated-preference methods. 
Since the research in this study focuses on stated-preference methods they will 
be discussed in greater detail in 2.1.3.2. For completeness sake, however, a brief 
overview of the most prominent revealed-preference, or indirect, methods shall 
be given here. 
2.1.3.1 Indirect methods 
The three most prominent indirect valuation methods are the travel cost method, 
the hedonic-pricing method and the averting behavior method. The travel cost 
method (TCM) dating back to Clawson (1959) is usually applied if the use value 
of some recreational site, e. g. a natural park or a lake, is to be valued. Its basic 
21 
Oliver Frör - 978-3-631-75515-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 03:56:05AM
via free access
premise is that this value can be inferred from the expenditures on consumption 
goods related to the use of the recreation site and the time invested for using it. 
Certain market goods like e. g. transportation, hiking equipment, bathing suits, 
barbecue equipment etc. are necessary for and closely associated with the use of 
the site under consideration for recreation. The minimum value of the site for a 
specific household would then equal the expenditures for the associated market 
goods plus the valuation of the time spent for travel and recreation. However, in 
practice it proves to be difficult to determine the share of the expenditure on 
market goods that is exclusively related to the use of the specific site, e. g. 
bathing suits can also be used at other sites. Equally, the value of time is not so 
straightforward since in most cases the opportunity cost of time in people's free-
time cannot simply be equated to foregone earnings in their jobs. Most people 
do not work on weekends and on holidays anyway, so that it seems impossible 
to value time in monetary terms in this case. Nevertheless, the travel cost 
method is still often used due to its computational simplicity, sometimes even in 
conjunction with direct valuation methods. 
The main idea underlying the hedonic-pricing method (HPM) dating back to 
Ridker ( 1967) is the assumption that the price of a market commodity that is 
weakly complementary to an environmental good contains as a part the value the 
consumer attributes to this environmental good. In other words, the consumer is 
willing to pay a higher price for a certain market commodity if it is positively 
associated with an environmental good. The standard example is the supposed 
influence of environmental amenities like e. g. a scenic view or a natural 
recreation area on property values or rents in the housing market ( cf. Rosen 
1974, Bartlik and Smith 1987, Freeman 1993, Palmquist 2004 for detailed 
reviews of theory and practical applications of the hedonic-pricing method). The 
same, but opposite, influence on property values can be observed for 
environmental disamenities like e. g. the proximity to environmentally 
hazardous sites ( cf. Kohlhase 1991, Cameron 2006 for the influence of 
Superfund sites in the USA on regional property values). From the variation of 
property values of houses with the same characteristics differing only in the 
environmental attribute (scenic view, distance to hazardous sites etc.) the share 
of the commodity's price pertaining to the environmental attribute can be 
determined and, under certain conditions, a WTP for an environmental change 
can be computed (cf. Horowitz 1984). However, there exist a number of 
theoretical concerns that question the validity of WTP estimates derived from 
the hedonic-pricing method ( cf. Freeman 1993: 680f, Palmquist 1991 ). 
While, in principle, it is argued that indirect methods can only assess direct 
use values, the hedonic-pricing method could also, in special cases, elicit 
indirect use values and even non-use values like the existence value. The 
indirect use value of ecosystem services, for example the protection of 
settlements from landslides in mountainous regions by natural forest 
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ecosystems, should be reflected in the variation of property values in areas 
endangered by such catastrophic events. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume 
that the existence value of dolphins might, at least to some part, be contained in 
the higher price that some consumers are willing to pay for canned tuna where 
the tuna fish were caught with dolphin-friendly nets as opposed to regular nets 
harmful to dolphins. Clearly, these represent only special cases since such 
market commodities as in the dolphin-tuna case will hardly be found to exist for 
many environmental goods. 
Finally, valuation of environmental goods on the basis of the averting 
behavior method (ABM) makes use of the costs incurred and expended for 
preventing a negative influence of an environmental good on the well-being of a 
household. The value of a change of the state of an environmental good from its 
actual state of being harmful to a state in which no harm for households would 
be felt can, therefore, be approximated by the costs that households incur to 
prevent this harmful influence. A typical example where such averting behavior 
is comparatively easy to assess is the valuation of an improvement of water 
quality, especially in developing or emerging countries where household tap 
water is often of minor quality. Households can prevent catching water-borne 
diseases from buying bottled water, drilling wells or installing filters all of 
which are associated with an increase of household expenditure for drinking 
water (cf. Abdalla et al. 1992, Um et al. 2002). It can, however, be argued that 
these costs simply measure people's valuations of their health, i. e. of not 
catching such diseases, so that other aspects associated with an improvement of 
water quality are not taken into account. 
Due to the obvious shortcomings of the indirect valuation methods in the 
context of environmental goods, especially since they are unable to consistently 
assess indirect use and non-use values, direct methods of measurement have 
become the preferred alternative for this task. These methods will be described 
and discussed in greater detail in the following section since the most prominent 
of them, the Contingent Valuation Method, forms the basis of the present 
research approach. 
2.1.3.2 Direct methods 
The aim of direct methods for an economic valuation of environmental goods is 
to gain access to a direct statement of households concerning the value of the 
specific environmental good under consideration. The advantage of such a direct 
approach is that the characteristics of the environmental good to be valued can 
be exactly specified so that use values as well as non-use values can be 
conveniently assessed. The underlying idea of these methods is to treat an 
environmental good (which is usually not traded in markets) in analogy to a 
market commodity by creating the illusion of a market where households are 
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given the opportunity to purchase the environmental good and thus express, i. e. 
directly state, the value they attribute to it. From these purchase decisions in the 
hypothetical market the WTP of the population for the good in question can then 
be estimated. Naturally, such an "experiment" will in practice not be conducted 
with all households of a population affected by a particular environmental 
project. Rather, a representative sample of the population is selected which is 
subjected to this hypothetical market and from whose hypothetical purchase 
decisions the value pertaining to the entire population is inferred. Thus, the 
direct methods rely on household surveys. In these hypothetical market 
situations the interviewed respondent is led to believe that the environmental 
good will only be made available if the households within the population make a 
contribution to the financing of the good. Therefore, the crucial aspect of any 
direct valuation method is the credibility of the market situation, otherwise the 
respondents, being aware that their responses will have no effect in reality 
anyway, have no incentive to give truthful value statements. 
In the literature three types of direct valuation methods can be found where 
the most widely used method is the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM). A 
variant of the CVM is the Participatory Valuation Method which, unlike the 
CVM, is based on group interactions in conjunction with a hypothetical market 
situation. A third type, the so-called Attribute Based Choice Modelling 
(ABCM), breaks down full environmental change scenarios as employed in the 
CVM into its single components in order to assess values for every single 
element of such a change scenario. The three methods will be dealt with in tum. 
The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) 
The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) is the most basic of the direct 
valuation methods. It has been widely applied in practice so that considerable 
experience has been gained w. r. t. its performance and validity. As mentioned 
already in chapter 1, a number of open issues still exist in this respect to the 
resolution of which the present study wants to contribute. The basic idea of the 
CVM was first proposed by Ciriacy-Wantrup (1947: 1189) in a theoretical paper 
on the collective value of soil-conservation practices: "How then can demand 
schedules for collective extra-market goods be obtained? Individuals of a sample 
or of a social group as a whole may be asked how much money they are willing 
to pay for successive additional quantities of a collective extra-market good." 
Since Ciriacy-Wantrup's basic idea the CVM was employed for the assessment 
of the value of many such "extra-market goods", especially environmental goods 
like the preservation of species, the establishment of nature preserves, national 
parks or recreational areas, the preservation or rehabilitation of whole 
ecosystems (e.g. wetlands, tropical rainforests) etc. (cf. Bateman and Willis 
2001 and Ahlheim and Fror 2003 for reviews of empirical CVM studies). 
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In general, the CVM is based on interviews with a representative sample of 
households from a population considered to be affected by some environmental 
project. The interviews are based on a standardized questionnaire which assures 
that the course of the interview is identical for all respondents and that 
comparable responses will be obtained for subsequent statistical analysis. A 
typical CVM interview follows a number of steps where the main aim is the 
elicitation of the respondent's WTP for the project in question. In principle, it is 
also possible to use the willingness to accept compensation (WT A) in CVM 
studies e. g. in order to value an environmental damage or deterioration. 
However, WTA was found to be less suitable in practice than WTP (cf. Ahlheim 
and Buchholz 2000, Kolstad and Guzman 1999, Morrison 1997, Shogren et al. 
1994 for discussions of WTP vs. WTA). In a first step the basic idea of the 
survey is introduced so that the respondent knows what the interview will be 
about. A number of warm-up questions will be asked in which the respondent 
gets acquainted with the interview situation and relaxes from the suddenness of 
the task. Subsequently, questions are asked concerning the relation the 
respondent has with the environmental good that is to be valued, e. g. prior 
experience with the good, problems that are associated with the present state of 
the environment and worries w. r. t. the future state of the particular 
environmental good. These questions set the stage for the description of the 
valuation scenario that follows in the second step. 
The presentation of the scenario to be valued is a crucial element of the CVM 
procedure. Here, the respondent is provided with the information on the basis of 
which he is supposed to give his direct value statement. Usually, the scenario 
starts with a description of the actual state of an environmental good, the status 
quo forming the reference point for the change of the state of the environmental 
good. In an environmental improvement scenario the respondent is then told that 
it is intended to change the state of the environment leading to an improvement. 
It should be described in detail what this improved state will look like, what it 
entails, which measures are undertaken to achieve it and who is in charge and 
responsible for its implementation. The scenario presentation necessarily 
contains a lot of information since some respondents might have more prior 
information on the good than others so that it should be tried to create some 
common level of information for all households. However, the description 
should not be too long in order not to overload the limited capabilities of 
respondents to perceive and process information. Ideally, the scenario 
presentation should be based on various media: spoken language by the 
interviewer, written text and graphical material for illustration. 
Foil owing the scenario presentation the next step sets the stage for the 
contingent market, i. e. the payment scheme is explained. Respondents are told 
that if the environmental project were to be implemented contributions of the 
individual households would be required for financing it and that otherwise, i. e. 
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if the WTP of the population falls short of the amount required for the project 
implementation, the project will not be put in place (implementation rule). The 
choice of the payment vehicle is of high importance for the behavior of 
respondents. Many CVM studies employ the increase of some tax as payment 
vehicle since it conveys to the respondents that every household will actually 
contribute to the financing of the project. However, it has to be verified in 
pretests prior to the main survey that no aversion toward taxes exists in the 
population which might lead the respondents to reject the project simply because 
they are skeptical toward government and object any tax increase in general 
regardless of its purpose. Such behavior would seriously distort estimated WTP 
and, indeed, this payment vehicle bias was found in many studies early on (cf. 
Brookshire et al. 1980, Daubert and Young 1981 ). Alternative payment vehicles 
consist of mandatory contributions to publicly managed funds or direct increases 
of amenity-related costs like entrance fees to recreation areas, water prices etc. 
A versions toward these alternative vehicles might exist as well so that careful 
investigations in pretests are paramount. It is crucial, however, that respondents 
not be given any incentives to strategically misreport their WTP as might be the 
case for voluntary contributions. Here, respondents would see no harm in 
overstating their WTP if they are not forced to commit themselves to this 
payment. Therefore, it must be specified precisely in the payment rule how the 
contribution to the project that the household will subsequently state will 
actually be collected in case the project is implemented as a result of the CVM 
study. 
The next, and most important, step is the WTP elicitation question itself. A 
number of different question formats have been proposed in the literature and 
tried in empirical CVM studies. The controversy of which question format is 
most suited, i. e. produces as little undesired biases of WTP estimates as 
possible, is still on-going since every idea of improving an existing and 
problematic question format was found to solve some problems and create 
others. In early studies an open-ended (OE) format was used where respondents 
were simply asked which amount of money they would at maximum be willing 
to pay if the project were implemented as described. This format, however, 
turned out to be rather difficult to answer and the results achieved with this 
format were largely unsatisfactory (cf. Mitchell and Carson 1989: 97t). Since 
respondents are to the most part both unfamiliar with the environmental good in 
question and, usually, not accustomed to put a monetary value on the 
environment they seem to have problems to express the envisaged utility 
increase from the proposed project in a money figure. This uncertainty seems to 
result in many responses of zero as is commonly found in studies using the 
open-ended question ( cf. Smith et al. 1983 ). 
An improvement of the open-ended question format was seen in the so-called 
payment card (PC) format which consists of a list of payment intervals ranging 
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from zero to some cut-off value at the upper end of the payment card. 
Respondents are asked to select the interval of proposed payment amounts (bids) 
that contains their individual WTP for the project. While this format is open-
ended in principle (the respondent can actively select intervals containing any 
amount from zero to infinity) the given monetary figures and the upper cut-off 
value were thought to help respondents to express their felt utility change in a 
monetary figure. The interval structure of the payment card also allows some 
uncertainty since the naming of precise figures of WTP is avoided. Additionally, 
the cut-off value serves as an indication to respondents where, from the 
perspective of the project organizers, an "absurd" WTP begins. The main 
controversy with respect to the PC format concerns the existence of a range bias 
and a centering bias induced by the choice of particular cut-off values on the 
payment card. A range bias occurs if the WTP estimate is found to depend 
significantly on the cut-off value whereas the centering bias describes the 
phenomenon that the center of the payment card, i. e. between zero and the cut-
off value "attracts" the respondents so that those intervals are chosen 
significantly more often. Since the center of the payment card depends on the 
cut-off value these two biases are closely related. While Arrow et al. (1993) 
argue that significant range bias and centering bias are expected to occur in 
studies employing the PC format, Ryan et al. (2004) and Rowe et al. (1996) 
detect no such biases. It is shown in the latter study, however, that WTP 
estimates are significantly distorted downward if the cut-off value is chosen too 
low, i. e. when a considerable share of respondents have a higher WTP than the 
cut-off on the payment card. In the CVM survey underlying the research of this 
study no significant range and centering biases were detected in the PC data (see 
chapter 4). 
A fundamental change of WTP elicitation formats was achieved by 
introducing closed-ended question formats (cf. Bishop and Heberlein 1979). The 
basic idea of this dichotomous choice (DC) format is to intensify the analogy to 
market commodities where a consumer in a store (usually) is confronted with 
the simple choice to buy the commodity at the offered price or leave it in the 
store and spend his money on other commodities. Under the DC format in a 
CVM setting, then, respondents are confronted with a "price" (bid) for the 
proposed environmental project which they can either accept in case their true 
WTP is larger or equal to this price or reject in case their true WTP is smaller 
than the offered bid. In comparison to the OE and the PC format the information 
content obtained from the answer of one single respondent is much lower in the 
DC format since it is only known whether the respondent's true WTP lies above 
or below the proposed bid. In practice different subsamples of respondents 
receive different bids which allows an econometric estimation of WTP on the 
basis of observed acceptance rates of different bids (see 2.1.4 for details). 
Therefore, the sample sizes for the DC format must be larger than for the OE or 
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PC formats. Furthermore, the econometric models for an estimation of WTP are 
more complicated and rest to a larger extent on distributional assumptions of 
WTP in the population. The econometric procedures for the estimation of WTP 
from DC and PC data will be described in section 2.1.4. 
In order to improve the statistical efficiency of the DC format the double-
bounded dichotomous choice format was developed ( cf. Hanemann et al. 1991, 
Kanninen 1993) that extracts more information out of each respondent. In 
contrast to the single-bounded DC format (SBDC) described in the previous 
paragraph, in the double-bounded version (DBDC) a follow-up question 
depending on the response to the first bid offered to the respondent is added. In 
case the respondent accepts the first bid the respondent will be asked an even 
higher bid which he can either accept or reject. In case the first bid was rejected 
the second bid of the follow-up question will be lower. Thus, the intervals of the 
respondent's WTP are narrowed down which increases both the complexity of 
the statistical model ( see 2.1.4) and the efficiency of the welfare estimate. 
However, a number of procedural problems are associated with the DC 
elicitation format. Empirical studies have revealed the existence of a starting 
point bias, i. e. a systematic influence of the amount of the (first) bid on the 
WTP estimate (cf. Desvousges et al. 1993, McFadden and Leonard 1993, 
Cooper and Loomis 1992, 1993, Kanninen and Kristrom 1993, Boyle et al. 
1998: 74 ). The findings of these studies suggest that in a situation where 
respondents are rather unfamiliar with the good as well as the valuation task to 
be performed they search for a hint of what the good might "reasonably" be 
worth and, thus, interpret the proposed bid as a "reasonable" cost estimate which 
makes the project seem acceptable (cf. Frykblom and Shogren 2000), especially 
when they are rather uncertain about the value such a project has for them. 
A second explanation of the widely observed starting point bias is the so-
called "yea"-saying phenomenon according to which respondents say "yes" in 
general to any bid level regardless of the true value they attribute to the project. 
Such "yea"-saying was found in the SBDC format by Boyle et al. (1998) and in 
the DBDC format by Kanninen (1995) and Holmes and Kramer (1995), Herriges 
and Shogren (1996), Alberini et al. (1997), Blarney et al. (1999) and many 
others. Whereas "yea"-saying alone would result in an upward bias of WTP the 
counter-acting effect of anchoring on the first bid was found to be strong 
resulting in a downward bias of the DBDC format in comparison to the SBDC 
format (cf. DeShazo 2002). Respondents who had already accepted the first bid 
presented to them were found to reject the second, higher bid much more often 
than respondents who were, in a different questionnaire version, confronted with 
this higher bid as their first bid. Thus, respondents perceive the follow-up bid as 
an attempt of the interviewer to bargain over a deal already accepted in the first 
bid and, as a result, feel reluctant to accept again. The analogous effect when the 
first bid was rejected, i. e. showing a higher tendency to accept the lower follow-
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up bid than when this lower bid is the first bid, was not found to be as strong. 
DeShazo (2002) explains this asymmetric anchoring effect with prospect theory 
( cf. Kahneman and Tversky 1979) according to which people are loss averse, 
i. e. inclined to reject a higher follow-up bid perceived as a loss in comparison to 
the first bid, and risk seeking, i. e. trying their luck even further when offered 
the lower follow-up bid. Due to these consistent shortcomings of the DBDC 
format DeShazo (2002) developed a DC format where the respondent is asked a 
follow-up bid only in case he has already rejected the first bid. It was shown, 
and could be replicated in the empirical example underlying this study (see 
chapter 4 ), that this DeShazo format yields WTP estimates practically identical 
to those of the SBDC format while being statistically more efficient due to the 
larger amount of information extracted per respondent as a result of the lower 
follow-up bid. 
Cooper et al. (2002) attribute the anchoring effects found in DeShazo (2002) 
to the surprise that respondents feel when a follow-up bid, especially a higher 
one, is presented to them. The authors propose to modify the DBDC format by 
announcing to the respondent prior to the WTP question a range in which the 
project costs will most likely lie. Respondents are then either asked a bid at the 
upper end of that range and asked a follow-up bid, the amount of the lower 
bound of the announced range, whenever the first bid was rejected. Or, 
alternatively, the lower amount is asked first, followed by the upper bound of 
the range in case the first bid was accepted. Cooper et al. (2002) call this format 
the one-and-one-half-bounded DC (OOH). However, it was shown by Bateman 
et al. (2004b) that this approach is itself highly vulnerable to the specific range 
presented to the respondents so that strong anchoring effects cannot be avoided 
by this format, either. Thus, at the moment the DeShazo format seems to be the 
most desirable format out of the set of possible DC formats. 
In empirical comparisons between WTP results obtained from open-ended 
formats like the OE or the PC format with those from the DC formats many 
studies report systematic differences ( cf. Ready et al. 1996, Herriges and 
Shogren 1996, Boyle et al. 1996, Frew et al. 2003, Ryan et al. 2004, Champ and 
Bishop 2006). The WTP estimates from open-ended formats are consistently 
below those from dichotomous choice formats. While the controversy w. r. t. the 
"correct" question format cannot be settled by such a comparison due to the lack 
of a valid reference point on which the performance of the formats can be 
compared the consistent findings of starting point bias and anchoring effects in 
the DC format and only few proofs of statistically significant range biases ( cf. 
Whynes et al. 2004) in the PC format put considerable doubt on 
recommendations to use the DC format in order to make use of its direct analogy 
to the purchase of market goods. In case the DC format is chosen for a study, the 
literature suggests that it is very advisable, however, to avoid bids in the upper 
tail of the expected WTP distribution. The bid design, i. e. the choice of the 
29 
Oliver Frör - 978-3-631-75515-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 03:56:05AM
via free access
different bid values should be based on pretests using open-ended formats in 
order to avoid bid designs that are already biased upwards (cf. Kanninen 1993, 
Boyle et al. 1998). 
After the WTP elicitation question the interview proceeds to the final step 
where a number of attitudinal, socio-economic and demographic questions are 
asked. The purpose of the elicitation of this kind of information is threefold: 
first, the socio-economic and demographic information about the sample can be 
used to check whether the WTP estimates are gained from a representative 
selection out of the entire population and, thus, forms a suitable basis for the 
computation of an aggregated welfare estimate. Second, these variables can be 
used in econometric models as explanatory variables, i. e. as variables that are 
systematically associated with the observed WTP. This analysis can serve as a 
plausibility test of the WTP responses obtained in the survey since there exist a 
number of a priori expectations w. r. t. the association of some of these variables 
with WTP. For example, it is reasonable to expect that WTP increases 
systematically with the level of household income, often also with education and 
the level of worry w. r. t. the environmental good under consideration. If these 
prior expectations are verified in the dataset the credibility of the validity of the 
WTP is reinforced. Third, the found systematic relationships between socio-
economic and demographic variables and WTP represent an important 
information for policy makers who will be able to assess which group of the 
population would benefit most from the planned project and which group(s) 
might be expected to lose. These considerations are very important for practical 
environmental policy. 
Apart from personal interviews at a household's home, a number of 
alternative interview forms have been proposed for CVM interviews like mail 
surveys, telephone interviews or mall-stop interviews in large shopping malls or 
streets. Mall-stop and telephone interviews are usually regarded less reliable 
than personal and mail surveys. Mall-stop samples are hardly representative in 
the first place and there is usually very little time available for the interview so 
that a thorough consideration of the proposed scenario cannot be expected. 
While it is easier to obtain a representative sample in telephone interviews the 
possibilities for a detailed presentation of the valuation scenario are scarce since 
neither written nor graphical material can be employed. Thus, currently only 
face-to-face and mail interviews are judged to lead to fairly reliable WTP 
estimates. Nevertheless, CVM studies using mail surveys (MS) are often 
considered less reliable than studies using face-to-face interviews (FtF) due to 
low return rates associated with self-selection of respondents returning the 
questionnaires ( cf. Whitehead et al. 1993 ), limited possibilities to convey a 
complex valuation scenario to the respondent and less possibilities to force 
respondents to strictly follow the standardized order of questions in the 
questionnaire (cf. Cameron et al. 1999, Ethier et al. 2000). On the other hand, 
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however, MS have a number of advantages that make their employment 
attractive: respondents are much more likely to respond truthfully to personal 
questions so that the problem of social desirability and interviewer biases, a well 
known problem of FtF surveys, can be avoided ( cf. Krysan 1994 ). Also, 
respondents can take as much time as they need to think about the proposed 
scenario and their answer to the WTP elicitation question ( cf. Dillman 1978). 
Last but not least, mail surveys are generally considerably less expensive than 
FtF surveys. As a result of the described procedural shortcomings of both 
interview forms widely divergent estimates of project benefits for FtF surveys as 
compared to MS are reported in the literature where FtF surveys are usually 
regarded as the interview form leading to more reliable results (cf. NOAA 
1994). Recent findings of the comparison of the performance of face-to-face 
versus mail surveys are reported for a CVM study in Thailand of which the 
empirical research of this study is a part (cf. Ahlheim et al. 2007). 
After this detailed description of the general CVM procedure and the 
discussion of its main practical problems two further direct methods of 
environmental valuation shall be briefly described in the following sections. 
The Participatory Valuation Method (PVM) 
One of the main criticisms of the CVM often voiced in the literature is that 
respondents in the traditional face-to-face CVM setting have little time to 
perceive and process the information of the valuation scenario, have no 
possibility to acquire additional information if they feel it is necessary and lack 
the chance to discuss their views with other people in order to reflect on the task 
at hand more thoroughly. This criticism is based on the view that in most CVM 
studies respondents will not have clearly defined preferences for the 
environmental good to be valued that they are able to readily express in 
monetary terms. Rather, it is sometimes argued that preferences for more or less 
unfamiliar goods or goods that are usually not perceived to have value in 
monetary terms need to be constructed by the respondent during the valuation 
task ( cf. Payne and Schkade 1999, Bettman et al. 1998, Payne et al. 1992 ). This 
view contrasts the prevailing notion in the valuation literature that well-defined 
preferences for environmental goods exist which simply need to be unveiled by 
a suitable valuation method. If preferences are not so readily available and the 
construction of preferences is initiated only when respondents are confronted 
with a specific valuation task great care must be laid into this construction 
process in order to avoid manipulation of the respondents into one direction or 
another. Several authors have proposed valuation techniques based on the 
interaction of respondents in group meetings, so-called participatory valuation 
techniques (cf. Macmillan et al. 2002, Philip and Macmillan 2005). 
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Usually, this Participatory Valuation Method (PVM) is based on the CVM 
(see, however, Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley 2006 and Powe et al. 2005 for 
participatory valuation techniques in the ABCM setting presented below). 
Unlike the traditional individual-based interviews groups of respondents, e. g. 
10 to 15 people, are formed that meet for two or more moderated sessions. The 
purpose of these sessions is to provide respondents with the opportunity to 
actively learn more about the valuation scenario, to ask questions and obtain 
more information on the issue at hand if they wish and to enable them to share 
their opinions and views on the project so that they can reflect and deliberate on 
the proposed environmental project as deeply as possible. In this process, expert 
information should be presented, ideally from different sources and angles in 
order to avoid undue manipulation of the participants. At the end of the sessions, 
participants are given a CVM questionnaire containing the WTP elicitation 
question that they can fill out in private and anonymously. 
While this approach to environmental valuation seems very promising since it 
enables respondents to invest great effort into the detection of their "true" WTP 
for the project a number of critical issues need to be addressed briefly. From a 
practical point of view this method requires a lot of effort for the organization 
and moderation of the group meetings. The overall sample size will necessarily 
remain limited so that the WTP estimates are rather inefficient from a statistical 
point of view. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the preferences toward the 
specific environmental project will really represent the preferences of the 
general population should the project be implemented since the general 
population will hardly ever attain the level of information on the project that the 
participants of the group meetings had when stating their WTP (cf. Ahlheim and 
Fror 2003). Thus, the PVM is clearly not sufficient as a stand-alone technique 
for assessing environmental values but it appears to be a promising tool for 
complementing the traditional survey methods based on representative samples 
of respondents. 
Attribute Based Choice Modelling (ABCM) 
Unlike in the CVM the respondents in a survey employing Attribute Based 
Choice Modelling (ABCM) are not simply confronted with the task of valuing a 
project scenario in relation to some status quo but can make choices among 
various alternative combinations of valuation scenarios. The ABCM which is 
closely related to Conjoint Analysis commonly employed in marketing research 
is based on Lancaster's (1966) characteristics theory of value according to which 
the value of a commodity is determined by the specific combination of the 
characterics, i.e. the attributes, which in conjunction define that commodity. An 
environmental good, therefore, is seen to consist of a number of attributes, e. g. 
area of a nature preserve, endangered plant and animal species, water quality of 
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the rivers etc. Combining these attributes with different levels yields a set of 
possible environmental goods to be valued. The aim of the ABCM is the 
valuation of the aggregate environmental goods in relation to the status quo as 
well as of the single attributes of which the good consists. In practice, 
respondents are successively presented a number of choice sets consisting 
usually of two alternative combinations of attributes as well as the status quo. 
Each of the two alternatives contains a cost attribute which states the monetary 
amount that the respondent would have to pay if that particular alternative were 
implemented. The respondent is then asked to select between the three 
combinations presented, i. e. the two project alternatives and the status quo. 
From the successive choices among different such choice sets both a WTP 
estimate for every possible combination of attributes as well as for discrete 
changes of the levels of the attributes can be obtained. 
The ABCM has already been applied in many empirical valuation studies ( cf. 
Stevens et al. 1997, Garrod and Willis 1997, Adamowicz et al. 1998, Foster and 
Mourato 2000, Haefele and Loomis 2001, Hanley et al. 2001). The ABCM 
approach is certainly a valuable extension of the CVM technique whenever it is 
possible to create meaningful environmental goods by combinations of different 
attribute values. The advantage of this method is the simultaneous valuation of a 
number of alternative project scenarios which allows a policy maker who is not 
already committed to some fixed and unchangeable environmental project to 
determine among an entire set of possible projects the one that exhibits the most 
favorable ratio of social benefits to costs of the project. Thus, the ABCM, 
whenever applicable, seems a powerful tool for environmental policy making. 
Summarizing the discussion of practical methods of environmental valuation 
it becomes obvious that rationality plays quite a different role for direct methods 
in comparison to indirect methods. Since indirect valuation methods are based 
on people's observed market choices where money is actually expended for 
environmental goods the assumption of rational, i. e. utility maximizing, 
behavior is already implied. In neoclassical economics it is generally presumed 
that people can be trusted when it comes to deciding which goods will generate 
the highest utility for the available budget. 1 At the same time it must be assumed 
that before purchasing a good people have gathered information about the good 
they consider sufficient for making that purchase decision. In simulated markets 
as generally used in the context of direct valuation methods, however, the 
situation is different. First, economic choices of respondents are not real, i. e. 
people do not sign a binding contract to purchase an environmental good for 
money. However realistically a payment scenario may be crafted, statements of 
WTP will merely remain announcements of what respondents would pay for an 
environmental good in case they would have to do so in the future. Second, 
1 Sometimes, however, this assumption is questioned as will be discussed in chapter 3. 
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respondents cannot search actively for the information they require to make a 
good WTP statement, they are left with what is provided to them in the course of 
the interview. These two distinctions show that it cannot be taken for granted 
that choices made in the course of a CVM, PVM or ABCM interview are 
perfectly rational since the very context of the interview, i. e. degree of realism, 
elicitation question format, type and quality of provided information etc., bears 
the potential to influence stated WTP. Such biases of WTP as already briefly 
discussed in the preceding section shall be addressed in more detail in 2.1.5 
below. 
2.1.4 Statistical estimation models for the CVM 
The aim of this section is to provide a brief overview of the statistical estimation 
approaches commonly used for the analysis of CVM response data. These 
comprise models for the estimation of WTP as the main objective of the CVM 
and for the estimation of the determinants of WTP used for plausibility tests and 
as information for policy makers. This overview is based mainly on Haab and 
McConnell (2002) with some useful modifications in notation as well as on 
Hanemann (1984) and Hanemann et al. (1991) where further details w. r. t. the 
estimation of dichotomous choice models can be found. 
For the open-ended question format the estimation of WTP is very simple 
since direct and precise figures of WTP are obtained from each respondent. 
From these responses mean WTP can be computed as the arithmetic mean over 
all individually stated WTP figures. Mean WTP serves as the basis for an 
aggregation of WTP to the whole population affected by the project under 
consideration by simply multiplying this estimate by the number of households 
affected. For the mean WTP 95%-confidence intervals as a measure for the 
estimation error can be computed using the standard textbook procedures ( cf. 
Griffiths et al. 1993: 143). Similarly, the median WTP can be directly obtained 
from the open-ended responses indicating the WTP stated by at least 50% of the 
households. Median WTP indicates the amount for which exactly 50% of the 
households would have voted in a referendum on the proposed project and 
would, therefore, serve as a useful figure for environmental policy makers in 
case households were obliged to pay this amount as a result of project 
implementation. In general, median WTP was found to be considerably lower 
than mean WTP for open-ended data since, as mentioned above, the answers are 
not symmetrically distributed and exhibit a spike of responses at "zero". In 
addition, very high WTP statements contribute to the tendency of higher means. 
Due to the regularly observed mass of "zero" responses regression models using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation for the analysis of determinants of WTP 
would yield biased parameter estimates of the explanatory variables (cf. 
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Maddala 1983). Thus, censored regression models like the tobit model are 
commonly used for an analysis of WTP determinants ( cf. Tobin 1958, Halstead 
et al. 1991 ). 
The estimation of WTP from dichotomous choice and payment card 
responses, however, is more complicated since responses are given only in the 
form of intervals of WTP. Since these responses are to be interpreted as the 
result of a rational, i. e. utility maximizing, choice it is necessary to derive a 
suitable statistical model from an economic model of utility maximization. 
Therefore, the derivation of the model starts with the following consideration. If 
a utility maximizing respondent h agrees to pay a monetary amount A in return 
for an environmental project proposed in a CVM interview the following weak 
inequality must hold 
(2-14) 
where v h ( ·) denotes the household's indirect utility function when market 
prices are held constant and sh denotes the vector of the household's socio-
economic and demographic characteristics as well as personal attitudinal 
variables. Thus, the household will only agree to pay Ah if he is at least as well 
off with the project as without it but not having to pay Ah. Since v h ( •) is not 
observable and its true functional form is unknown this expression has to be 
separated into a deterministic term v h ( ·) that represents the researcher's model 
of household h's preferences and a stochastic term E~: 
(2-15) 
The deterministic part of v h ( ·) is based on the observable characteristics of the 
household, including his income I~, the particular environmental state zk and the 
household's behavior w. r. t. the WTP question, i. e. whether he accepts or 
rejects the proposed bid. The error term E~ represents all unobservable 
characteristics of the household, e. g. personal and only privately known 
situational factors or preference uncertainty (see below). For the observer vh ( •) 
is, therefore, a random variable so that utility as specified here belongs to the so-
called Random Utility Models (RUM) for which a well-developed framework of 
statistical analysis exists (cf. McFadden 1974). For the analysis ofCVM interval 
data it is useful to derive an expression for the probability to accept the proposed 
bid, i. e. to say "yes" to the WTP question, using the above random utility 
specification: 
Pr{yesh} = Pr{vh(z\Ih -Ah,sh) ;;:: vh(z0 ,Ih,sh)} 
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= Pr{vh(z1,Ih -Ah,sh) + e~ ~ vh(z0 ,Ih,sh) + e~} 
= Pr{vh(z1,Ih -Ah,sh)- vh(z0 ,Ih,sh) ~ e~ - e~} (2-16) 
Thus, in other words, the probability that household h experiences no loss in 
utility if he has to pay Ah for the environmental project is simply the probability 
that the difference of the observable utility change is at least as great as the 
difference of the unobservable error terms. 2-16 shows the necessary rationality 
assumption inherent in this formulation of the statistical model. A respondent's 
"yes"-response implies that he is able to perfectly observe whether he will be at 
least as well of with the project as without it. Whenever a rational response is 
not guaranteed, however, i. e. whenever the response is not in congruence with 
the respondent's "true" utility difference, the statistical model will necessarily 
fail to estimate this "true" WTP. 
Defining the utility difference Li vh = vh ( z1, Ih - Ah, sh)- vh ( z0 , Ih, sh), 
17 = e~ - e~ and FT\ ( ·) as the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of 17 the 
probability to accept the bid can be written as 
(2-17) 
i. e. the larger the deterministic utility difference Li v h the larger the probability 
that this difference exceeds the error term 17 and the larger the probability to 
accept the proposed bid A. In order to operationalize this expression for an 
estimation model of WTP both the deterministic component Li v h and the 
stochastic component F Tl ( • ) , i. e. the distribution of the error term 17, must be 
specified. A simple and commonly employed specification of the utility 
difference Li v h is the linear utility model 
Livh = v~ - v~ = (a1 +~(Ih-AJ - (a0 +~Ih) (2-18) 
(2-19) 
where a = a 1 - a O subsumes the observable characteristics sh. A more detailed 
explanatory model will be used below. Alternative specifications for the utility 
difference where the influence of household income on WTP is modeled more 
realistically have been proposed (cf. Hanemann and Kanninen 1999), however, 
in this study the commonly employed simple model specified in 2-19 will be 
used throughout. 
36 
Oliver Frör - 978-3-631-75515-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 03:56:05AM
via free access
The stochastic specification depends on the assumption of the distribution of 
the error terms E~ • The assumption of independently and normally distributed 
errors leads to F11 ( d \\ ) = <t> (d vh) where <t> ( •) denotes the standard normal 
cumulative distribution function resulting in a probit model for WTP estimation. 
In the probit model, errors are assumed to be distributed standard normal with a 
mean of 0 and variance cr2 of 1, i.e. E~ ~ N (0, 1). Since the errors E~ are 
N (0, cr2) distributed the parameters a and ~ need to be normalized to ! and ! 
for statistical estimation. Thus, in the probit model the probability to say "yes" 
becomes <t>(-;-¾Ah). The same applies to the commonly used logit model 
where the assumption of an independent and identical extreme value distribution 
of errors leads to the logistic distribution F11 ( d vh ) = (l-e-6 "h r 1• Since the 
standard normal and the standard logistic distributions differ merely by the latter 
assuming higher probability density in the tails of the distribution there is only a 
slight difference between probit and logit models in practice. For further 
specification of the stochastic part of the model assuming asymmetric 
distributions and taking account of the fact that WTP should be strictly non-
negative see Hanemann and Kanninen (1999). 
From the parametric specification in 2-19 a welfare measure based on WTP 
can be obtained directly by assuming that d v h = 0 exactly if Ah = WTPh, thus 
for the probit and the logit model it must hold thatO = a - ~ WTPh so that 
(2-20) 
Due to the symmetry of the standard normal and standard logistic distributions 
the resulting welfare measure represents both mean and median WTP. 
Alternative specifications of the stochastic part of utility based on asymmetric 
probability density distributions lead to different expressions for the welfare 
estimate where the mean and the median differ. 
For the estimation of the parameters a and ~ in expression 2-20 it is 
convenient to use the Maximum Likelihood technique now commonly available 
in econometric software packages like LIMDEP (cf. Greene 2002). For the 
single-bounded dichotomous choice interval data the log-likelihood function 
using the probit model is specified as 
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where Y esh indicates whether household h has accepted (Yesh = 1) or rejected 
(Yesh = 0) the proposed bid Ah. For the DeShazo interval data where 
information on three WTP intervals is obtained the log-likelihood function 
becomes 
In L( a, P IA~rsi, A~ollow) = I Yesh • in[ <t>(! -¾ A~rst )] 
h=l 
+ No Yes . In[<t>(g_ - ! A follow) - <t>(g_ - ! A first)~ 
h crcrh crcrh1 
(2-22) 
where A~rst denotes the first bid, A~ollow denotes the (lower) follow-up bid and 
No Yesh and NoNoh indicate the sequence of responses to the first and the 
follow-up bids. The Log-Likelihood function for the payment card interval data 
can be specified in a similar way since the selection of a specific bid interval 
[ A~ow, A~P ]on the payment card implies that the respondent accepts the bid 
amount of the lower bound of the interval A~ow and (approximately) rejects the 
upper bound A~P. The log-likelihood function therefore becomes 
lnL(a,PIA~w,A~P) = Iln[<t>(!-¾A~w)- <t>(!-¾A~P)]. (2-23) 
h=l 
The maximization of the respective Log-Likelihood functions yields the 
parameters a and p from which the mean and median WTP can be directly 
computed according to 2-20. Since the welfare estimate is computed as the ratio 
between two parameter estimates each of which has its own standard error of 
estimation the computation of the 95%-confidence interval as a measure for the 
variance of the WTP estimate is not as straightforward as for the open-ended 
WTP described above. For CVM interval data a number of simulation 
approaches for the approximate computation of confidence intervals are 
available in the literature ( cf. Cooper 1994 ). The present study will employ the 
approach of Park et al. ( 1991 ). In their bootstrap approach a large number, e. g. 
1000, of values for WTP are simulated by randomly drawing values of the 
parameters a and P on the basis of their estimated variance-covariance matrix. 
From these simulated WTP values the 95%-confidence interval can easily be 
obtained by discarding the lower and upper 2,5% of these values, respectively. 
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Finally, the determinants of WTP can be analyzed by augmenting the simple 
utility difference model in 2-19 where the vector shi , j = { I, 2, ... , J}, consisting 
of the households' J socio-economic, demographic and observable attitudinal 
variables is included in the model so that 
(2-24) 
where <pi denotes the parameter (row) vector of the J observed variables of the 
(column) vector shi- From the signs of <pi and the estimated levels of 
significance of these parameters the positive or negative associations of the 
explanatory variables found to be statistically significant can be assessed as the 
determinants of WTP. In practice, it is necessary to limit the number of 
explanatory variables in such a regression model in order to obtain efficient 
estimates of the significant variables. Therefore, the statistical method of factor 
analysis has proven to be very useful to aggregate the large amount of variables 
assessed in the course of a CVM interview to a smaller number of factors 
carrying the information of the single variables. This method of dimension 
reduction, thus, allows to include most of the ample information on the 
households contained in shi· A practical example of the employment of the 
methods described in this section will be given in detail in an empirical example 
underlying this study in chapter 4. 
2.2 Rationality problems in environmental valuation 
As mentioned briefly earlier it must not be taken for granted that responses to 
valuation questions in surveys employing direct valuation techniques like the 
CVM, PYM or ABCM are given on the ground of full rationality of 
respondents. The formulation of the statistical models for the evaluation of DC 
and PC elicitation formats in CVM shows that from the perspective of the 
respondent a rational valuation requires that the response to the WTP question 
be in congruence with the true difference in utility the respondent expects to 
experience as a result of the proposed environmental project. However, due to 
the setting of a simulated market for environmental goods, in practice there are a 
number of critical issues within direct valuation interviews where the method is 
prone to produce wrong, i. e. irrational, valuation estimates. 
It is the aim of this study to highlight rationality problems that occur in 
environmental valuation using direct valuation methods, focusing specifically on 
the CVM, and to add to an explanation of the psychological mechanisms of their 
occurrence in order to recommend survey designs to mitigate such problems. 
Therefore, the following section will scrutinize where CVM responses go wrong 
regarding the postulate that they should reflect full rationality of respondents. 
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Many of these problems were described and investigated in the literature, where 
they are commonly known as biases. 
2.2.1 Biases in Contingent Valuation 
Regarding the elicitation question format in CVM biases like the payment 
vehicle bias, starting point bias and the range bias have already been addressed 
in detail in the preceding section. These biases reflect problems with 
respondents' rationality since rational responses would require that respondents 
are not influenced by these rather technical characteristics of the survey. Apart 
from these, there are a number of further effects discussed in the literature that 
are considered to exhibit systematic and distorting influences on WTP in the 
sense that the rationality of these responses is questionable. Some authors ( e. g. 
Sugden 2005) consider these biases to result from so-called preference 
anomalies where these are defined as "patterns in responses that are inconsistent 
with standard economic assumptions about preferences". The existence of such 
anomalous behavior in CVM has often raised great concern w. r. t. the validity 
of the method, yet for a number of these effects suitable remedies have not yet 
been found by CVM researchers, so far. 
Social desirability effects 
Social desirability refers to a systematic effect on stated WTP caused by the 
presence of an interviewer, whether physical or on the phone. Often the concern 
is expressed that respondents especially in face-to-face interviews feel that they 
have to please the interviewer who, as they presume, expects the respondent to 
support the environmental project and accept the proposed bid or state a high 
WTP. This effect can be seen in close relation to the "yea"-saying behavior in 
DC questions mentioned above. Even for telephone surveys Ethier et al. (2000) 
show the existence of social desirability by comparing the responses to personal 
questions between telephone and mail survey modes. 
In general, it is expected that social desirability would result in an upward 
bias of WTP (cf. Leggett et al. 2003). The recommendation of the NOAA panel 
( cf. Arrow et al. 1993: 4611) is to test for such effects by either providing 
respondents with the possibility to state their WTP anonymously and deposit it 
in a ballot box or even to mail their WTP from their homes after the personal 
interview has finished. In chapter 4 results are presented showing a direct 
comparison of anonymous versus non-anonymous administration of the WTP 
question in a face-to-face CVM survey. 
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Hypothetical bias 
The hypothetical bias describes respondents' tendency to overstate their WTP in 
situations where they do not have to fully commit to pay the accepted bid or the 
stated amount (cf. Bohm 1972, Cummings et al. 1986). In CVM interview 
situations respondents simply state that they would pay the amount, however, 
they are in general not made to pay that amount during the interview but 
envisage to incur these costs at some distant time in the future which renders the 
monetary payment considerably less real. 
Hypothetical bias was found in a number of empirical studies comparing 
stated WTP with real payments, e. g. in the situation of intended and real 
purchase of private goods ( cf. List and Shogren 2002, Blumenschein et al. 1998, 
Johannesson et al. 1998, Foster et al. 1997). However, the direction of the bias is 
controversial in the literature. While Harrison and Rutstrom's (1999) literature 
review detect positive hypothetical biases ranging from 2% to as much as 
2600% Carson et al. (1996a) find the opposite effect in studies comparing 
valuations from stated and revealed preferences. In practice, there are a number 
of ways how hypothetical bias can be mitigated or corrected for. First and most 
important, the payment mechanism must be credible so that respondents believe 
in the consequences of their statements and that the perceived payment will take 
place in the immediate future. Respondents must be led to believe that they act 
in a real market. For example, it was shown by Polome et al. (2006) that 
respondents' WTP was significantly larger when it was mentioned that the study 
was actually part of a referendum. Second, it has proven useful to use "cheap 
talk" (Cummings and Taylor 1999, Menges et al. 2005), i. e. telling respondents 
about the problem of strategic responses and free riding and asking them not to 
do it in the valuation task at hand. Finally, as already suggested by the NOAA-
Panel (cf. NOAA 1994) with its "divide by 2" rule some authors propose to use 
calibration factors to adjust hypothetical valuations based on the experience 
gained with real valuations (cf. Fox et al. 1998, Macmillan et al. 2002). Since 
these valuation differences, however, seem to depend crucially on the kind of 
good to be valued it is elusive to detect generalizeable rules ( cf. Hanley and 
Shogren 2005). 
Embedding and warm-glow-of-giving 
Perhaps the most contested bias in the environmental economics literature is the 
phenomenon known as embedding, scope sensitivity, part-whole bias or, under a 
slightly different perspective, warm-glow-of-giving. All these terms refer to the 
common suspicion among CVM critics ( cf. Hausman 1993) that respondents' 
stated WTPs do not actually refer to the specific environmental improvement 
proposed in the scenario of the CVM interview but to some symbolic meaning 
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that respondents personally associate with the scenario. For example, it was 
found in a classic study by Desvousges et al. (1993) that WTP to save 2000, 
20000 or 200000 migratory birds from dying in oil holding ponds was roughly 
identical where differences were not significant ( cf. Diamond et al. 1993 for 
similar examples, Schkade and Payne 1994 for a replication of the Desvousges 
et al. 1993 study). It would have been expected that WTP increases significantly 
with the number of birds saved since more birds saved should create a larger 
change in utility than less birds saved, especially when those differ by orders of 
magnitude. 
On a slightly different line of research using part-whole scenarios, it was 
found that the sequence in which two different improvement levels, where one, 
the "part", was a subset of the other, the "whole", were presented for valuation to 
the respondent had an influence on the WTP stated for these improvements ( cf. 
Bateman et al. 2004a). WTP for the "part" was significantly higher when it was 
valued first than when it was second in a sequence and the "whole" was valued 
first. Thus, it was concluded that the obvious insensitivity to scope found in 
Desvousges et al. ( 1993) and the significant sequencing effects must be due to 
respondents substituting the specific scenario with some environmental good on 
a "higher level" like e.g. "supporting the environment in general" where the 
specific quantitative scope (or scale) of the scenario is not explicitly the basis for 
their valuations. In such cases WTP estimates obtained from CVM surveys are 
widely considered to be meaningless unless one aims at the assessment of this 
"general" environmental sentiment. 
Other studies, however, were able to confirm the theoretically expected 
sensitivity to scope (cf. Carson 1997, Veisten et al. 2004, Barreiro et al. 2005, 
Bateman et al. 2005, Alberini and Chiabai 2005) so that the question of why 
insensitivity to scope occurs sometimes and sometimes not needs to be 
addressed. Heberlein et al. (2005) take a new perspective on this old dispute by 
suggesting to consider two additional types of scope, the affective scope and the 
cognitive scope, when characterizing the respondent's perception of the whole 
and the part. Affective scope exists if the respondent likes the whole more than 
the part, cognitive scope exists when the respondent knows more about the 
whole than about the part. Both of these statements are not necessarily true and 
depend, as is shown in their study, on the character of the good to be valued. 
Thus, when a respondent likes the part more than the whole or knows more 
about the part than about the whole one would expect either no sensitivity to 
scope or even a negative one. Heberlein et al. (2005) showed that this was the 
case in a CVM assessing the value of either 300 or 800 wolves in a region, 
where respondents clearly liked the part more than the whole (nevertheless a 
positive WTP was elicited for the preservation of wolves). Similar results were 
obtained for an environmental good like biodiversity where the part, i. e. local 
plant and animal species, are often better known and more cared for than the 
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whole that often remains rather abstract. The authors conclude to put less 
emphasis on scope sensitivity and suggest not to perform it as a standard validity 
test since it is both expensive and often misleading. 
Similarly to embedding, the warm-glow-of-giving effect (cf. Andreoni 1989, 
1990), also termed impure altruism, refers to the motive of a good feeling from 
having contributed to some good cause, e. g. the improvement of a public good 
like the environment. Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) criticize that due to impure 
altruism CVM studies often do not provide valuations of the specific public 
good but that they rather indicate the "purchase of moral satisfaction". Some 
authors like e.g. Nunes and Schokkaert (2003) even try to correct CVM datasets 
for this effect by separating "true" value statements specifically referring to the 
environmental good in question from the warm-glow valuations. While CVM 
critics generally argue that WTP statements based on the warm-glow-of-giving 
do not reflect their true values for the environmental goods and, therefore, 
should not be counted as benefits of that good, other authors ( cf. Randall and 
Hoehn 1996, Harrison 1992) hold the view that warm-glow-of-giving must be 
counted as a part of the utility generated from the specific scenario since those 
respondents who feel this "glow" by contributing to the project will experience 
an increase in utility nonetheless. Thus, no final conclusion has been reached in 
the literature so far as to whether a warm-glow response can be considered a 
rational response or not. 
Budget constraint bias 
Furthermore, concern has been raised in the literature as to the role of 
households' budget constraints for stated WTP. Critics argued that households 
often fail to consider that their WTP statement would reduce their budget 
available for the consumption of market goods. WTP, therefore, reflects only a 
valid economic tradeoff if the effect of the WTP statement on the available 
budget is taken into account. Not considering one's available budget should, 
thus, clearly violate the rationality assumption. Therefore, one of the important 
recommendations of the NOAA-Panel was to explicitly remind respondents of 
their available household budget ( cf. Arrow et al. 1993 ). It is argued, however, 
by Ahlheim (1998: 211) that the budget constraint should only be taken into 
account by respondents in those situations where the households would actually 
have to pay for the environmental projects. In most cases in reality it would not 
be feasible to increase taxes for an environmental project so that financing 
would rather be achieved by reallocation of presently available funds. In these 
cases household budgets would not be reduced so that the budget constraint 
reminder in CVM interviews would distort households' value assessments. 
The budget constraint, however, actually seems to play a crucial role in 
households' considerations of WTP and might even lead to systematic 
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underestimations of WTP. It has been found in many empirical studies that 
household WTP tends to decrease with household size whereas it would be 
expected that the utility change from some environmental improvement project 
increases with the number of people living in a household. However, it is 
obvious that the household budget is relatively tighter for larger households 
since the free disposable income usually decreases with the number of people 
living in one household. It is shown in Ahlheim and Lehr (2001) that in such a 
case the principle "a dollar is a dollar" which is generally applied in cost-benefit 
analysis for the aggregation of single household benefit estimates leads to a 
systematic underestimation of aggregate WTP since ceteris paribus the same 
dollar in a large household refers to a larger absolute sacrifice in the 
consumption of market goods than in a small household. In order to correct for 
the ensuing estimation biases the authors propose a method based on household 
equivalence scales ( cf. e. g. Lewbel 1989) taking household sizes into account. 
Biases due to risk and uncertainty 
The literature on environmental valuation knows many empirical studies 
examining individual valuations of a reduction of risk of harmful consequences 
due to environmental states. In such studies, respondents are typically asked 
their WTP for a measure that would reduce their risk of morbidity or mortality 
from a present state by a specified percentage ( cf. Jones-Lee et al. 1993, Baron 
and Greene 1996, Jones-Lee and Loomes 1997, Beattie et al. 1998, Carthy et al. 
1999). In the literature on choice under risk and uncertainty, however, it was 
shown that people often violate the standard axioms of expected utility theory 
leading to a variety of anomalous behavior like the famous Allais paradox ( cf. 
Allais 1953) and the Ellsberg paradox ( cf. Ells berg 1961) where people were 
frequently found to make inconsistent choices between lotteries ( cf. Machina 
1987, Thaler 1992, Kahneman et al. 1982, Eichenberger 1992 for detailed 
compilations and discussions of anomalies). This observed behavior puts the 
assumption of rational responses in decisions made under risk and uncertainty 
into question and is, therefore, highly relevant for CVM response behavior 
where environmental outcomes are not certain. 
In CVM studies the commonly observed anomalies in decisions under risk 
and uncertainty have been found to play an important role. Especially in the 
context of environmental problems it was observed that people's subjective 
views of environmental and health risks differ substantially from objective risks 
as assessed by scientific experts or policy makers. People tend to evaluate 
environmental and health risks which are usually characterized by low 
probability paired with high severity in case of occurrence in a "bimodal" way: 
"they either ignore the risk completely or overreact" (cf. Hanley and Shogren 
2005: 22). Both of these possible reactions are not in line with the expected 
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utility criterion which requires people to think about the probability of 
occurrence and the severity of an event simultaneously. As Machina (1987) 
observed people tend to separate odds and consequences of an event and focus 
on the element that seems more "attractive" to them. Some focus on the low 
probability of occurrence and thus ignore the harmful event altogether which 
would lead to an underprovision of protection against harmful events. Others 
focus on the consequences of its occurrence and fail to take into account that it 
is rather unlikely to occur so that they exhibit overly cautious behavior termed 
"plan for the worst, hope for the best" by Sunstein (2002). A cost-benefit 
analysis where people exhibit predominantly this latter behavior would lead to 
biased benefit estimates and thus to an overprovision of protection against 
harmful events. 
Another anomaly widely known as preference reversal occurs frequently 
when evaluating lotteries (cf. Lichtenstein and Slovic 1973, Sugden 1999). Seidl 
(200 I: 621 f) defines preference reversals as "an empirical regularity such that 
there exists a robust experimental design of lotteries for which substantial 
fractions of subjects state prices [ ... ] which are opposite to the preferences 
expressed for or the choices made out of the respective lotteries". In other 
words, preference reversals represent a violation of the principle of procedure 
invariance according to which valid methods for preference elicitation should 
yield the same preference ordering. Preference reversals matter in CVM studies 
of risk and uncertainty because respondents in a CVM interview might state a 
monetary value for some risk reduction policy when asked their WTP, however, 
one cannot be sure that the same result would have been obtained if the 
respondent had been asked to choose between two uncertain alternatives based 
on his preferences. As Hanley and Shogren (2005: 24) note such cost-benefit 
analyses reveal little useful information since the valuation depends strongly 
upon the context in which the policy is framed. The authors propose a 
mechanism based on Cherry et al. (2003) for CVM studies inducing respondents 
to avoid preference reversing behavior in CVM settings, however this 
mechanism appears rather impractical and time consuming in practice. 
The problems associated with valuation of risky and uncertain outcomes 
using the CVM and the solutions proposed in the literature so far reveal that 
unresolved methodological issues remain. Respondents have trouble behaving 
according to the normative rational decision criterion of expected utility so that 
simple CVM studies not taking these problems into account will necessarily lead 
to non-optimal outcomes, in most cases to an overvaluation of risk reduction. 
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2.2.2 Rationality problems due to preference uncertainty 
In addition to uncertainty over future outcomes or environmental states it was 
shown in the literature that respondents often face some uncertainty w. r. t. their 
own preferences between environmental and market goods, especially so when 
they are asked to think about their personal trade-offs between these goods. 
Such preference uncertainty might be the source of a number of the procedural 
biases discussed above since uncertainty over their preferences would make 
respondents susceptible to answer WTP questions in a systematically distorted 
way. It is reasonable to expect that in a situation where respondents are 
uncertain of whether they prefer one situation over another or not their answers 
could easily be influenced by specific elements of the CVM questionnaire and 
survey design giving rise to irrational WTP statements thus leading to socially 
desirable responses and starting point bias etc. The question formats and the 
methods for analyzing CVM responses described above do not take the 
existence of preference uncertainty into account. Therefore, this section will 
briefly analyze existing approaches for dealing with preference uncertainty in 
CVM studies. 
It is hypothesized that one main source of such preference uncertainty is the 
respondent's unfamiliarity with the environmental good to be valued, i. e. his 
lack of experience in using it or, in case of an environmental degradation, his 
lack of experience in being deprived of it and its environmental services. 
Another important source of preference uncertainty is certainly missing 
familiarity with the valuation task, i. e. to think in monetary terms about 
environmental goods (cf. Samnaliev et al. 2006: 508). Although people might 
acknowledge that in reality there are numerous situations where environmental 
goods are actually traded off against market goods, these decisions usually occur 
in the domain of public decision making where the general population is not 
involved since such decisions are delegated to a higher administrative level. 
Being all of a sudden put into the situation to personally attribute a monetary 
value to some environmental improvement is certainly not an everyday and 
common task. 
However, preference uncertainty seems not to be restricted to non-market 
goods. As Ariely et al. (2003) demonstrate even the valuations of commonly 
used market goods exhibit a considerable degree of arbitrariness. In their 
experiments test persons were asked whether they would accept to purchase 
some common market good, e. g. a cordless trackball, a cordless computer 
keyboard, bottles of average and rare wines etc, at a price in dollar terms 
equaling the last two digits of their social security numbers. Subsequently they 
had to state their maximum WTP for the product. The answers were 
consequential since the test persons were required to purchase the good if a 
random device chose that the item would be sold at the stated price. It was 
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demonstrated that although the test persons were made aware of the randomness 
of this bid amount their valuations were anchored on it so that a significantly 
positive relation between the amount derived from the social security numbers 
and the personal valuations of the goods was found. However, within the 
product categories the test persons exhibited consistent valuations in that 
cordless trackballs were consistently valued lower than cordless keyboards and 
average wines lower than rare wines. The authors of this study describe the 
observed behavior as "coherent arbitrariness" since on the one hand valuations 
seem coherent due to the expected relations of value within the product 
categories but on the other hand are significantly influenced by the arbitrary 
anchor. It is hypothesized, therefore, that consumers in general do not have 
specific WTP values for products, they rather have some range of values what 
the item would be worth to them (cf. Ariely et al. 2003: 77). If the price falls 
below this range they will certainly purchase the item, if it exceeds the range 
they will decline the purchase. However, it is uncertain how they will decide if 
the price falls within the range which opens the opportunity for the observed 
arbitrariness of valuations. 
If such uncertainty ranges exist for common market goods that are familiar to 
people it is only plausible to assume the same in the case of the valuation of 
environmental goods. Respondents in CVM surveys certainly have a clear idea 
which bid they would definitely accept in a dichotomous choice format and 
which bid is clearly beyond being acceptable. Whenever the proposed bid falls 
between these two values that respondents would clearly accept or, respectively, 
reject, uncertainty of their true valuation exists. A number of methodological 
CVM studies have approached the issue of dealing with respondents' 
uncertainties of their preferences in order to obtain more valid welfare estimates. 
The approaches of dealing with respondent uncertainty can be classified into 
two categories: ( 1) uncertainty questions in combination with open-ended and 
dichotomous choice question formats and (2) multiple category (polychotomous 
choice) valuation questions allowing respondents to express uncertainty. In the 
first approach respondents are usually in a first step asked their WTP for some 
environmental project in the standard way. Subsequently, they are asked to rate 
on a given scale, e. g. between 0% and 100%, how certain they are that they 
would actually pay the stated amount (cf. Li and Mattsson 1995, Champ et al. 
1997, Loomis and Ekstrand 1998, Berrens et al. 2002). Other studies use 
discrete categories like "definitely sure" and "probably sure" in order to avoid 
specific probabilistic statements ( cf. Blumenschein et al. 19,98, Johannesson et 
al. 1998). The validity of the first approach resulting in a post-decisional 
certainty measure must be seen very critical. It is highly doubtful that 
respondents will be able and motivated to reassess their just previously made 
WTP statement correctly in the light of their preference uncertainty. Such an 
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approach bears the risk that respondents feel like fools when they have to admit 
that their statement is actually quite doubtful. 
Therefore, the second approach of assessing the level of preference 
uncertainty using a polychotomous choice question format is more promising. In 
this format respondents are given the possibility to express uncertainty directly 
when stating their WTP, either in a DC or in a PC format. The simplest form of 
polychotomous choice which was already recommended by the NOAA-panel in 
1993 is to include a "not sure"-option in a DC question format. Carson et al. 
( 1996b) recommend to treat "not sure"-responses conservatively as "no" 
responses since it must be expected that if those respondents were forced to 
choose strictly between "yes" and "no" they would reject the bid. 
In an alternative, however more complex, polychotomous choice approach 
respondents can choose from a wide range of feeling uncertain about their "true" 
WTP while not being forced to contradict themselves. Multiple-bounded 
discrete choice (MBDC) represents a mixture between the payment card 
question format and the dichotomous choice format (cf. Ready et al. 1995, 
Welsh and Poe 1998, Alberini et al. 2003). Like in the PC format respondents 
are presented a list of bids, however, instead of indicating the highest acceptable 
amount for the proposed program respondents in the MBDC format are given a 
polychotomous choice option of rating for each interval on the list how likely 
they are to vote for the program if they had to pay the specified amount. Thus, 
for each bid respondents should indicate one of the given categories of 
likelihood "definitely yes", "probably yes", "not sure", "probably no" and 
"definitely no". For bid levels below their uncertainty range it is expected that 
respondents will indicate "definitely yes" whereas for bid levels above that range 
"definitely no" will be chosen. The uncertainty categories in this format give the 
respondent the possibility to express uncertainty about the respective bid levels 
in the three broad verbal categories "probably yes", "not sure" and "probably 
no", thus in this format respondents consider their certainty about bid levels not 
in retrospect but simultaneously. In contrast to the post-decisional certainty 
measures, therefore, expressed uncertainty in the MBDC format directly refers 
to preference uncertainty and not to the likelihood of having told the truth in the 
preceding WTP question. 
The response data collected in a MBDC format allow to formulate different 
models for the estimation of WTP based on the desired level of certainty. For 
example, if absolute certainty of the "yes"-response is desired a "definitely yes"-
model can be estimated where the highest amount on the list of bids for which 
"definitely yes" was indicated is taken as the lower bound of the respondent's 
WTP interval and the next higher bid level is taken as upper bound. 
Alternatively, one could generate a "probably yes"-model or a "not sure"-model. 
A comparison of the "definitely yes"-, the "probably yes"- and the "not sure"-
model with WTP responses obtained from regular open-ended (OE), PC and 
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single-bounded DC formats reveals three interesting results: the "definitely yes"-
model yields WTP estimates well below those obtained from the regular OE, PC 
and DC formats, the "probably yes"-model yields estimates close to the OE and 
PC formats, whereas the DC estimates are nearly identical with the "not sure"-
model (cf. Welsh and Poe 1998: 179). These results shed light on the reasons for 
the differences between the elicitation question formats: in the OE and PC 
formats respondents behave more cautiously and state as their maximum WTP 
only those values they feel quite confident with. In contrast, the DC format 
induces respondents to answer "yes" to the proposed bid although they feel 
considerably uncertain about whether they are actually willing to pay this 
amount. Thus, these findings are in line with the observed starting point bias in 
the DC format. 
The rationality of WTP statements made under preference uncertainty is 
certainly an issue that deserves scrutiny, especially if respondents have no 
possibility to express this feeling while giving their WTP responses. This issue 
will, therefore, be taken up again in chapter 4 where a theoretical approach 
employing fuzzy preferences will be discussed that may prove useful to 
incorporate the phenomenon of preference uncertainty into environmental 
valuation methods. 
2.3 Summary 
This chapter gave an overview of the main aspects of the state of the art of 
environmental valuation with a focus on the Contingent Valuation Method. As a 
direct method of preference elicitation the CVM has the advantage to allow the 
assessment of both use and non-use values which play an important role in the 
context of environmental goods. In 2.2 the Hicksian Compensating Variation 
was derived as an appropriate individual welfare measure for environmental 
improvement projects. The Compensating Variation in this case can, as an 
approximation, be interpreted as the willingness to pay for a proposed 
improvement of an environmental good and is as such accessible to valuation 
using the CVM. In order to lay the foundations for further research of the CVM 
in this study the main approaches of questionnaire design and econometric 
estimation as well as the main theoretical and procedural concerns addressed in 
the past and current literature were presented. It was shown, however, that the 
simulated market settings employed by the direct valuation methods in order to 
measure also non-use values of environmental changes come at the cost of 
concerns that respondents often do not behave fully rationally. Such irrational 
behavior in CVM interviews may, therefore, result in biased benefit estimates. 
Therefore, the second section of this chapter discussed in detail what can go 
wrong in CVM interviews when respondents do not behave fully rationally and 
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approaches found in the literature to mitigate biases resulting from irrational 
response behavior were presented. Finally, the issue of preference uncertainty 
was addressed and its effects in CVM surveys were highlighted. Preference 
uncertainty was identified to be one of the prerequisites for the occurrences of 
procedural biases since the lack of firm preferences between market and 
environmental goods may make respondents susceptible to being unduly 
influenced by specific characteristics of the survey instrument employed. 
It is the purpose of this study to build on this previous work in the literature 
and find new ways of describing unexplained response behavior and make 
recommendations for an improvement of the CVM design in order to better 
account for the behavior of real world decision makers. 
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3 Rationality in economics 
3.1 Outline of the chapter 
The assumption of rational economic agents has always played a prominent and 
very important role in economic theory. Rational action and decision making is 
seen as the underlying postulate of economic behavior. In fact, it is argued that 
the rationality postulate is essential for economic models to have a meaning, i. e. 
to have explanatory value with respect to economic behavior. As Silberberg 
(1990: 300) puts it, "Anything in the world can be explained on the basis that the 
participants are stupid [... ].", but no systematic conclusions or refutable 
hypotheses could be drawn from such an assumption. The challenge and at the 
same time the value of building economic models is to explain people's 
observed economic behavior based on the assumption that they make rational 
decisions, i.e. that they are not stupid. At the same time, over the course of time 
the rationality assumption has proven to be one of the most controversial and 
criticized of all the assumptions stated in economic models. This stems from the 
fact that on the one hand side the definitions or axioms of rationality used in 
many economic models are often unrealistic in that real economic agents could 
not be expected to fully act on the basis of these axioms and on the other hand it 
has been shown that in certain and reproducible circumstances people 
consistently violate these rationality axioms in their observed economic 
behavior. 
This chapter presents the emergence and further development of rationality 
concepts in economics. To this end, in section 3.2.1 the history of the rationality 
postulate starting from Adam Smith via Alfred Marshall is briefly reviewed. The 
three axioms of rationality which form the basis of the concept of instrumental 
rationality in neoclassical economics are introduced. Subsequently, the main 
points of criticism of the central rationality axiom, transitivity, will be 
highlighted. Specifically, arguments are presented as to why it is not reasonable 
to expect that economic agents always optimize. Section 3.2.2 will explore 
extensions of the concept of instrumental rationality leading to the overarching 
concept of bounded rationality. In section 3.3 the emergence of the bounded 
rationality concept as well as prominent instances of boundedly rational 
behavior will be presented. Since bounded rationality draws heavily on 
psychological insights on human information processing and decision making 
the main concepts of cognitive psychology shall be addressed in the light of 
decision making in environmental valuation. Finally, specific models of dual-
processes of reasoning reflecting boundedly rational decision making in 
environmental valuation will be outlined. These models form the conceptual 
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basis for the development of an empirical survey instrument for the analysis of 
bounded rationality in chapter 4. 
3.2 Rationality concepts in economics - an overview 
3.2.1 What is rationality? 
Although Adam Smith does not use the term "rationality" explicitly in his work 
"The Wealth of Nations" first published in 1776, his reflections on human 
behavior in economic contexts serve as a good starting point for a discussion of 
what "rationality" means in economics and how the interpretation and 
operationalization of this term has changed over time. In his famous sentence "It 
is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest" ( cf. Smith 1993: 
I.ii, p. 22) he postulates that people enter into mutually beneficial bargains out of 
their selfishness. Thus, Smith establishes the individual's focus on his self-
interest as the fundamental driver of any economic behavior, and any action that 
an individual undertakes should be in pursuit of this self-interest. In this respect, 
the major task of human beings as economic agents is "to judge where self-
interest lies" ( cf. Simon 1997: 6). Without referring to the term "rational" 
directly Smith clearly provides a description of the appropriate criterion of 
economic behavior. His view of rationality stems from everyday common sense, 
with respect to their behavior he simply assumes that people have reasons for 
what they do, i.e. in Silberberg's words: that they are not stupid. 
Smith's common sense view of rationality was soon going to be further 
specified and adapted to the requirements of the developing economic theory 
(cf. Simon 1987). Alfred Marshall who developed the marginalist approach to 
economics uses in his book "Principles of Economics" (cf. Marshall 1890: 6) the 
formulation "[ ... ] free choice by each individual of that line of conduct which 
after careful deliberation seems to him the best suited for attaining his ends, 
[ ... ]" in order to specify how an economic choice should be made. Thus, 
Marshall proposes that an economic agent who is to make the choice out of a 
number of alternative economic actions uses active reasoning given the available 
information about these alternative actions in order to find out which of the 
given actions represents the best way to satisfy the individual agent's goals and 
needs. This formulation, therefore, sets the scene for two fundamental assertions 
of neoclassical economics: ( 1) reasoning about the utility that is generated by 
each available alternative and, (2) choosing among the given alternatives so as 
to maximize the utility that can be achieved from the given alternative economic 
actions. It must be noted, that Marshall extends Smith's notion of self-interest as 
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the main driver of economic action. He explicitly states that the ends that an 
economic agent wishes to attain by some economic action might be either selfish 
or unselfish. With this remark, Marshall already acknowledges that other-
regarding behavior, i. e. altruism, can be as much an element from which people 
derive individual utility as behavior that one might call selfish or egoistic. It can 
be speculated that Adam Smith used the term "self-interest" in quite the same 
sense as Marshall without explicitly making the difference between strict 
selfishness on the one hand and unselfishness on the other. 
The view of rationality that was established by Marshall and that is currently 
the view of rationality in the standard neoclassical economic models is usually 
termed fall, perfect, global or instrumental rationality. The terms perfect and 
global should indicate that under this rationality concept economic agents are 
assumed to have full knowledge or information about all possible economic 
actions and their resulting outcomes and are able to fully compute the ( expected) 
consequences of these actions and outcomes on their utilities in order to be able 
to make the decisions that maximize their utilities. The term instrumental refers 
to the view that "rational action is defined with respect to a given set of 
objectives: it is the action which best satisfies those objectives" (cf. Hargreaves 
Heap 1989: 40), i. e. the action leading to the outcome that best satisfies those 
objectives is considered the instrument suitable for achieving these. For every 
achievable outcome there is at least one instrument, one line of action, which 
yields this outcome. 
In neoclassical microeconomic theory full rationality is described by a set of 
desirable properties of individuals' preference orderings, the three rationality 
axioms. A preference ordering that is reflexive, complete and transitive is 
generally perceived as a rational preference ordering since these properties 
guarantee that an individual will always make consistent choices out of a set of 
available consumption bundles ( cf. Mas-Colell 1995: 6). Among these axioms, 
transitivity is by the far the most important one. Given completeness, transitivity 
imposes logical consistency restrictions on the preferences of an individual. If 
transitivity holds, the existence of preference cycles is ruled out, i. e. it is 
assured that for instance if coffee is stated to be at least as good as tea and tea at 
least as good as coke, then coke cannot be preferred to coffee. It is obvious that 
one would require an individual to exhibit transitivity in his preferences in order 
to classify him as rational in this example, the preference of coke over coffee in 
the above example would simply be logically inconsistent with the previous two 
preference assertions with respect to coffee, tea and coke. 
It has been criticized that the concept of instrumental rationality with its three 
main axioms of rational preference orderings does not adequately capture the 
rationality inherent in economic decisions of real-world economic agents. It is 
concerned only with the optimal instrument but not with the possibilities that 
economic agents actually have to find this instrument in real-world decision 
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environments. There is an abundant literature on the criticism of the neoclassical 
rationality concept and its operationalization, utility maximization. The most 
frequently criticized axiom of rational preference orderings in neoclassical 
economics is transitivity. In general, two lines of criticism are discussed: (I) 
transitivity and the assumption of stability of preferences over time and (2) 
unidimensional versus multidimensional consumption bundles. As to issue (I), 
there is no reason why preferences should not be allowed to change over time, 
either systematically or unsystematically, and, therefore, exhibit intransitivities 
among the alternatives available. An example of some systematic, or context 
dependent, preference change leading to intransitivities is given by Rosenberg 
(1992, cited in Lagueux, 2004 ): is it irrational for an individual to prefer regular 
coffee over milk at breakfast, milk over decaffeinated coffee at lunch, and the 
latter over regular coffee at dinner? In order to save the stability of preferences 
of this individual one would have to redefine the commodities like e. g. "milk 
for breakfast" and "regular coffee for lunch" where "breakfast" and "lunch" 
represent the different contexts in which the individual beverages need to be 
evaluated. But even with such a definition stability of preferences and 
transitivity are not assured. If, on one day, the individual plans a late night out 
he might well prefer regular coffee to decaf coffee for dinner and thus violate 
transitivity over time. One could, thus, specify the beverage even further as e. g. 
"regular coffee for dinner if a late night out is planned". This example could be 
extended into infinity which would only reveal that preferences can certainly not 
be assumed to be stable so that the fulfillment of transitivity as a condition for 
rational choice can reasonably only be expected at any one particular point in 
time. While under these circumstances it is still possible to represent a 
commodity choice at that point in time as conforming to the common rationality 
concept and thus as utility maximizing, the failure of preferences to exhibit 
transitivity over time makes a generalization of this utility maximizing choice to 
other similar decision situations impossible. 
As to issue (2) it is expected and has generally been found that transitivity is 
fulfilled in situations of choices among unidimensional or two-dimensional 
commodities or commodity bundles consisting of only two single commodity 
quantities. In a set of unidimensional commodities the single commodities differ 
only in the level of that single attribute that characterizes them, e. g. the face 
value of a coin. In the situation of choosing from two-dimensional commodity 
bundles the individual only needs to make trade-offs among the quantities of the 
underlying commodities, i. e. more of one commodity against less of the other. 
These situations are usually sufficiently simple for transitivity to prevail. As has 
been argued and shown already by May ( 1954) choices from multidimensional 
commodities or commodity bundles exhibit a substantial potential for 
intransitivities. May's design of a multidimensional decision problem was the 
following: three marriage partners were distinguished; each of them was ranked 
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according to three dimensions, namely intelligence, appearance, and wealth. The 
first partner, call her x, was very intelligent, plain looking, and well-off, the 
second, y, was intelligent, very good looking, and poor; and the third, z, was 
fairly intelligent, good looking, and rich. The subjects in this experiment were 
presented these marriage partners successively in pairs and asked to choose the 
most preferred, respectively. It turned out that from 62 subjects, 17 exhibited 
circular preferences of the kind x >- y >- z >- x. From these choices it became 
clear that these individuals seemed to follow a particular decision rule in which 
they chose that partner that was superior to them in two out of the three criteria. 
This experiment was later repeated by Tversky (1969) who obtained similar 
results. Thus, a number of individuals was unable to perform the trade-off 
among the three relevant characteristics in a consistent way but seemed to rely 
on a simplifying decision rule that produced intransitive choices. This result 
indicates that transitivity seems to be a quite strong criterion for rationality that 
is most likely not always fulfilled in many real-world decision situations (see 
Rieskamp et al. 2006 for a discussion of theoretical frameworks allowing for 
intransitive choices, especially in the situation of risk and uncertainty). 
Given this short compilation of criticisms of the neoclassical rationality, it is 
highly questionable that economic agents really should be expected to behave 
according to the mentioned properties and to apply the maximization of utility 
fully as their behavioral decision rule. It was shown by numerous empirical and 
experimental studies that people do not conform to this claim, at least in 
complex decision situations as are usually encountered in the real world. Thus, 
while Friedman (1953) correctly argues that optimization theory does not 
describe the underlying procedures of decision making, it is doubtful that the 
substance of these decisions, i. e. their outcomes, can be accurately predicted by 
optimization theory since it relies on the highly formalized and unrealistic 
axioms of rational choice. 
Without doubt the theoretical models relying on the neoclassical rationality 
axioms have proven extremely useful and have led to a wide variety of insights 
into economic decision making. However, by focusing on such optimal 
outcomes the gap between real-world decisions and those explained by the 
formal economic models has widened and the common sense perspective of 
Adam Smith's rationality was increasingly forced to take the back seat in 
economic modeling. 
3.2.2 Extensions of the neoclassical rationality concept 
One way of resolving the conflict between theoretically consistent preferences 
as described by the transitivity axiom and people's observed violations of such 
rationality is to distinguish between normative and descriptive concepts of 
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rationality. The perfect, global and instrumental concept of rationality is in this 
sense clearly a normative concept since it prescribes how economic agents 
should behave in a perfect model world in order to achieve the outcomes that 
maximize their utilities. As such, this rationality concept serves as a normative 
reference against which the descriptive concepts of rationality can be contrasted. 
Descriptive rationality concepts aim at taking account of real-world rational 
decisions, i. e. acknowledging cognitive and computational limitations of real 
economic agents and considering the specific decision environments in which 
agents are incorporated. As a result of the criticism of instrumental rationality as 
the appropriate real-world rationality concept a number of descriptive concepts 
have been developed, some of which have received great attention in the 
literature. 
Herbert Simon was the first to contrast the well-established perspective of 
instrumental rationality against an alternative perception of rational decision 
making. His point of view has its roots in the psychological research on human 
decision making which, quite in contrast to the general view of economics, lays 
its focus more on how humans make decisions as opposed to how the outcomes 
of these decisions relate to people's preferences in the end. With this 
perspective, Simon decidedly takes a step back from the idealized notion of 
instrumental rationality and orients himself on Adam Smith's common sense 
view of rationality. He argues that "everything that psychology has learned 
about the processes of human choice is consistent with the view expressed by 
Adam Smith" ( cf. Simon I 997: 8). And further: "People do have reasons for 
what they do, but these reasons depend very much on how people frame or 
represent the situations in which they find themselves, and upon the information 
they have or obtain about the variables that they take into account." Thus, on the 
one hand Simon accepts Smith's view of individual self-interest, that people 
have reasons and, in their actions, follow some intentions in order to achieve 
explicit or implicit goals. This view is often referred to as the "teleological" 
assumption of rationality. 
On the other hand, and this contrasts the instrumentalists' idealized view, 
Simon explicitly acknowledges the specific characteristics of the real-world 
decision environments and the limitations with respect to the information 
available to the decision makers and to their cognitive abilities to take all 
relevant variables into account. As a result, Simon's way of looking at economic 
decisions does not concern as much the substance of the decision as rather the 
process of decision making, i. e. the way the decision outcome is achieved. 
Thus, in contrast to an instrumentalist interpretation of rational choice, the focus 
is shifted onto the process, i. e. the procedure of decision making in which the 
human decision maker is seen to operate in a social context and is constrained 
by his cognitive abilities and psychological characteristics. In Simon's words, 
instrumental rationality "is a theory of decision environments (and utility 
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functions), but not of decision makers." Procedural rationality, in contrast, is 
interested in "[ ... ] how the decision maker generates alternatives of action and 
compares them" ( cf. Simon 1997: 18). A choice is, thus, procedurally rational if 
it is the outcome of an explicit rule "regardless of whether or not the choice is 
optimal" (cf. Pingle and Day 1996: 192). 
Consequently, with this focus on cognitive limitations and on the process of 
decision making, Simon needed to be more explicit about the specific 
procedures of how economic subjects actually make decisions in complex 
situations of the real world. In his view, since optimization is not possible under 
real-world conditions, rules of behavior need to take its place. His procedural 
action is any action which is guided by a rule, often a rule of thumb, rather than 
an optimizing calculation. Rules of thumb, or decision heuristics as they are 
termed in the modem literature, serve as shortcuts, as good (and necessary) 
alternatives to an unfeasible and, in the case of uncertainty, never ending 
calculation of optimality. The latter point is known in the literature as the 
"infinite regress" problem ( cf. Conlisk 1996, Lipman 1991, Mongin and 
Walliser 1988, Winter 1971). An instrumental decision maker, in a complex real 
world, needs to make a decision whether to choose an alternative or not. In the 
real world not all of the information needed to take an optimal decision in this 
respect is available or known a priori, it is necessary that the decision maker 
first acquires this information, i. e. that he searches for it actively. In order to 
choose one alternative over the others, one must first know all the other 
alternatives and the benefits associated with these alternatives. 
However, in the real world information acquisition is costly, either in terms of 
time and thus opportunity costs or in actual monetary costs. The decision maker, 
therefore, is faced with another decision: how much to invest in information 
search. Instrumentally rational as he is he would continue to invest in additional 
information until the expected benefit of the last piece of information is just 
equal to the cost of acquiring this particular piece of information, i. e. until the 
marginal benefit of information search equals its marginal cost. However, the 
marginal benefit of this information is unknown until it is acquired so that one 
would first need to know all the unknown information before making this kind 
of cost-benefit analysis of optimal information acquisition. But if all the 
information is known one would not need to determine at which point to 
optimally stop searching. Thus, what is needed is some rule that tells the 
decision maker when to stop searching and use the available information about 
the alternatives to finally make a decision. 
With its focus on the process of decision making rather than on the logical 
consistency of the decision outcomes procedural rationality stands in clear 
contrast to instrumental rationality. Thus, procedural rationality is clearly a 
descriptive concept where the outcome of the decision making process is 
perceived as rational as long as it is in congruence with the limited cognitive and 
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computational capacities of the decision makers. As such, these two concepts 
seem incompatible so that one is forced to take one position or the other, i. e. 
insisting that rational decisions must be also logically consistent and everyone 
who chooses otherwise is simply irrational or surrendering to the sad facts of life 
and accept that people are simply incapable of knowing what's really good for 
them. 
However, apart from these two extreme world views there are hybrid 
rationality concepts that draw both on instrumental and procedural rationality at 
the same time in order to come up with a more adequate and realistic perception 
of rational decision making: institutional rationality and evolutionary rationality, 
where both concepts are to some extent related. Both incorporate instrumental 
rationality as one mode of operation whereas another mode of operation bears 
close resemblance to rule following as postulated by the concept of procedural 
rationality. Thus, institutional and evolutionary rationality can be classified as 
dual-mode rationality concepts. As Redmond (2004: 177) argues, "institutional 
rationality [ ... ] requires two types of thinking, one which produces rule-
following behaviors and one which produces purpose-seeking behaviors". This 
distinction of modes has its origin in the research on human "cognitive processes 
which involve a complex and multi-tiered system, one that distinguishes 
between actions resulting from deliberation on [the] one hand and actions 
resulting from habit and reflex on the other" ( cf Hodgson 1994, see also section 
3.3.3 for details on cognitive psychology). This distinction conforms well to von 
Hayek' s (I 973) assertion that "man is as much a rule-following animal as a 
purpose-seeking one". 
In which kinds of situations are these two modes employed for decision 
making? Purpose-seeking activities can be characterized as situations in which 
active cognitive reasoning is required, most notably when a novel situation 
exhibits few parallels to already existing experience or when there is a conflict 
between various goals of a decision maker. In such situations, the decision 
maker needs to devise a plan in order to achieve his goals. Rule-following 
activities, on the other hand, are characterized by little need for cognitive effort 
since they are backed by personal experiences with the same or similar 
situations in the past so that a decision maker can simply retrieve from his long-
term memory already pre-scripted courses of action. Here, the main task for the 
decision maker is to classify the respective situation in order to be able to 
retrieve the appropriate stored rule for behavior. 
The underlying logic of this dual mode of operation is to be seen in an 
economizing on scarce cognitive resources: those situations that can be dealt 
with by pre-scripted rules that have proven to be useful in the past should not 
take away scarce cognitive resources from situations in which it is necessary, 
due to the novelty of the situation, to use active cognitive reasoning in order to 
devise a plan and find an appropriate course of action that will lead to the 
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individual's goals. Thus, from Redmond's point of view, such a dual system of 
decision making is rational in the sense that the cognitive limitations, not only in 
terms of basic computational capabilities but also in terms of competing 
resources, are best allocated to the multitude of decision tasks that an individual 
faces every day. This view is highlighted in the following quote by Redmond 
(2004: 180): "Probability of success is higher when the mind is engaged in 
fewer tasks. Thus it would confer adaptational value if capacity and attention 
were conserved in order to be available for those situations of an important, 
rather than a routine, nature". 
However, the borderline between rules, habits or customs and active 
cognition is hazy but this is precisely the origin of institutions. Institutions, in 
this case, can be seen as a set of behavioral guidelines for an individual or a 
group of people. They consist of norms, habits, customs, traditions and laws and 
as such form the basic behavioral elements of a society. According to Bush 
( 1987) all institutions are the outcome of conscious choices made at some point 
in time by group members. Persistent institutions have proven to be successful 
rules for dealing with recurrent problems within a society. Thus, one can 
observe the development from cognitively effortful problem solving until 
successful plans are discovered to the establishment of these plans within a 
group of people so that these plans and courses of action become rules, habits 
and routines adding to the institutional pool of that group. In this sense, 
institutional rationality comprises both some form of instrumental rationality in 
which a problem is solved using cognitive effort, either by groups over an 
extended period of time or just by one individual, and rule-following based on 
these culturally or individually learned successful problem solving plans. 
The concept of evolutionary rationality2 is closely related to institutional 
rationality, however, it makes the evolution of institutions as mentioned above 
more explicit. It originates from work of Vernon Smith who found systematic 
deviations from the predictions of instrumental rationality in his experiments. As 
Smith (2003: 467) noted, hypotheses derived from instrumental, or 
constructivist rationality as he calls it, were not always confirmed: while in 
impersonal market exchange situations people seemed to behave rationally in 
the constructivist sense, people were often found to deviate in situations of 
personal exchange, e. g. in two-person game situations in which people chose to 
cooperate where defection would have been the rational move but, nevertheless, 
2 Evolutionary rationality is also called "ecological rationality" by some authors (cf. Smith 
2003), however, the term "ecological rationality" often describes the rationality of an 
adaptive decision maker (cf. Todd and Gigerenzer 2003) whose behavior is the best 
response to the constraints of the decision environment in the real world and, thus, 
"ecologically" rational. This latter concept is already included in the concepts of 
institutional and evolutionary rationality, so that no further distinction shall be made here. 
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achieved cooperation by their counterpart, thus reaching a collectively superior 
outcome. 
Such experimental and empirical findings which could not convincingly be 
explained by the constructivist view gave rise to perceiving the development of 
institutions "as an undesigned ecological system that emerges out of cultural and 
biological evolutionary processes" (cf. Smith 2003: 469). Thus, in sharp contrast 
to the concept of institutional rationality mentioned above, evolutionarily 
rational institutions need not be devised by conscious and cognitively effortful 
reasoning processes but have emerged from social processes in which agents, 
based on their experiences try new patterns of behavior that are subsequently 
selected or rejected on the basis of the desirability of the achieved outcome. In 
this evolutionary process the agents who introduce new patterns need not be 
rational in the instrumental or constructivist sense, they need not be able to 
apply conscious and consequent reasoning for determining their courses of 
action, they can be "naYve" and experience-based in their reasoning and still give 
rise to a new trial-and-error process that results in superior outcomes that 
subsequently get selected as institutions to persist. In an evolutionary process it 
is possible that institutions emerge that prove to be superior to institutions that 
would have been devised by constructivist rationality alone.3 










Figure 3-1 visualizes the connection of the rationality concepts described above. 
While instrumental rationality and procedural rationality represent antipodes in 
the sense of being mainly normative versus descriptive, respectively, both are 
3 See also Vanberg (2004) and Holland (1996) on evolutionary rationality where the 
evolutionary processes of rule creation and selection are made more explicit. 
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generally conceived as operating in one single mode. Since the hybrid concepts 
of institutional and evolutionary rationality draw on both single-mode concepts 
they can be classified as dual-mode concepts of rationality. 
The field of descriptive rationality concepts derived from a more procedural 
perception of rationality shall be subsumed here under the term "bounded 
rationality". In the literature, no clear cut definition of what bounded rationality 
comprises and what it does not, has emerged. In any case, the central 
characteristic of bounded rationality is its requirement to be in line with the 
central findings of cognitive psychology regarding information processing in 
human brains, problem solving and decision making. As already mentioned in 
the section on procedural rationality as conceptualized by Herbert Simon, the 
use of decision heuristics in order to find a way out of the notorious infinite 
regress problem of rational choice is the main feature of the descriptive 
rationality concepts. Evolutionary rationality explains the emergence of such 
decision rules while institutional rationality provides an intuition as to when it is 
rational to employ conscious, cognitively effortful reasoning and when 
procedural, rule-following behavior seems to be more appropriate. Due to the 
importance of the overarching concept of bounded rationality for this study, the 
following section shall briefly review its development and evidence in the 
literature before addressing more specifically the kinds of decision heuristics 
employed by boundedly rational decision makers. 
3.3 Bounded rationality 
3.3.1 The emergence of bounded rationality in the literature 
Even before the term "bounded rationality" appeared for the first time in the 
social science literature with Herbert Simon's book "Models of Man" (cf. Simon 
1957), the concept developed in social science works under different terms. In a 
recent historiographic survey Klaes and Sent (2005) analyze the occurrence of 
related terms over the course of time. They identify a base field of expressions 
and technical terms setting the stage and preceding the occurrence of bounded 
rationality. The term limited intelligence appeared for the first time in the 
literature in 1840 in a Report to the Council of the Statistical Society and can be 
considered the starting point of the conceptual development of bounded 
rationality. Limited intelligence is later joined by a number of terms within the 
base field of bounded rationality, namely finite intelligence, incomplete 
rationality, limited rationality and approximate rationality. The numbers of 
occurrences of these terms of the base field in the literature up to now, along 
with those of subsequent concepts, are illustrated in table 3-1. 
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While limited intelligence was at that time far from being used as a technical 
term and rather carried along prejudicial and offending connotations with 
respect to other peoples or social classes, the term finite intelligence became a 
technical term largely confined to the philosophical literature as of the year 
1880. It was mainly used to distinguish man's intelligence, thoughts and ideas 
from divine, perfect intelligence, thus closely associated with religious ideas. In 
the 1920s this term becomes mainly used to describe the limitations of human 
cognition with respect to the perception of the natural world. 
Table 3-1: The development of the Bounded Rationality field from 1840 -































In 1922 the word "rationality" starts to be associated with discussions of finite 
intelligence in Oakeley's article "On the Meaning of Value" (cf. Oakley 1922, 
cited in Klaes and Sent 2005: 34) which is contrary to its title not an economic 
work but a philosophical treatise of how humans with their finite intelligence 
and limited knowledge of the world could possibly "comprehend ideals of 
value". In this sense, incomplete rationality is seen as a central property of, in 
this respect, limitedly endowed human beings. Whereas incomplete rationality 
was just very shortly and rarely used in the literature (see table 3-1 ), the 
expression limited rationality first used by Almond (1945, cited in Klaes and 
Sent 2005: 36) turned out to be a much more potent technical term for a further 
diffusion of the controversies on rationality. When Herbert Simon entered the 
discussion of rationality concepts in economics, he picked up limited rationality 
as the common term in the social science literature at that time in his 
groundbreaking article "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice" in 1955 (cf. 
Simon 1955). 
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According to Klaes and Sent (2005) Simon seemed to experiment for some 
time with variations of rationality terms, in the process coining the term 
approximate rationality, until he finally created the technical expression 
bounded rationality which came to dominate the entire conceptual field in the 
subsequent decades. Simon intended "to use this expression as a label for the 
things that economists needed to pay attention to - and were not" (Simon 
1999: 23, cited in Klaes and Sent 2005: 37). From hindsight, bounded rationality 
emerged as the dominating technical term for mainly two reasons: first, Simon 
elevated it to the rank of a principle, the "principle of bounded rationality" 
which seemed to motivate discussions and further research as to a deeper 
understanding of such a principle, and, second, the term "bounded" seemed to 
appeal to mathematically oriented economists who were used to thinking of 
optimization problems in terms of boundary conditions to some objective 
function. Thus, the limitations of the human mind were coined as a mere 
extension to the already existing boundary conditions of a mathematical 
optimization problem which made this concept easier to assimilate in 
economics. In the introduction to part IV of "Models of Man" ( cf. Simon 1957: 
196ft), where the term bounded rationality was supposedly used for the first 
time in the literature, Simon sets out the principle as follows: "The alternative 
approach employed in these papers is based on what I shall call the principle of 
bounded rationality: The capacity of the human mind for formulating and 
solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problems 
whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world - or 
even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality". Later, Simon 
(1987: 266) states that the concept is used to "designate rational choice that 
takes into account the cognitive limitations of the decision maker - limitations 
of both knowledge and computational capacity." Thus, the concept was intended 
as a criticism of neoclassical economics which used to model decision making 
generally in an environment of either perfect information or optimal risk taking 
under the assumption of unlimited computational abilities. 
With his models based on the "principle of bounded rationality" Simon starts 
to provide a formal framework for modeling decision making under 
circumstances that are seen to be more appropriate in real-world situations and 
thus challenges the standard neoclassical models. He explicitly takes into 
account and includes into his models those conditions of the human mind and of 
his social, external environment that prevent human actors from making 
decisions in such a way that would even approximate the predictions of 
neoclassical economics. Instead of aiming only on the outcome of a decision 
problem, as this would be the focus under the concept of substantive or global 
rationality, bounded rationality stresses the importance of the process of 
decision making, of how people actually arrive at their decisions given their 
knowledge, computational capabilities and external constraints. In order to be 
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able to arrive at suitable decisions at all, human actors seem to have developed 
simplifying strategies, based on tradition and experience, that have proved to be 
successful in the past. These rules of thumb, or heuristics, enable a decision 
maker to arrive at least at a satisfactory decision within the given constraints. 
For this search for merely satisfactory outcomes for which, after attained in the 
decision making process, any search for better outcomes is terminated, Simon 
has coined the term "satisficing". Under the satisficing heuristic a decision 
maker defines an aspiration level, i. e. a minimal level of well-being to be 
attained by some decision, and searches and evaluates the available alternatives, 
the budget set, until an alternative satisfying that minimal aspiration level is 
found. At that point, the search and evaluation of further alternatives is 
terminated and the decision maker settles with the (first) satisfactory outcome 
found along the search. In this simple procedure, the main concern of the 
principle of bounded rationality and its main point of criticism of neoclassical 
economics becomes apparent: the necessity to define at which point a search or 
a decision making process is finally terminated. The satisficing heuristic, 
therefore, represents a real-world operationalization of the common condition 
for search-stopping that the marginal benefit of further search should equal its 
marginal cost. 
3.3.2 Evidence of bounded rationality in economics and the social sciences 
Accepting the existence of bounded rationality in real-world decision making 
does not mean to assume that all decisions exhibit strong distorting effects that 
would entirely reject the results predicted by the standard theory of instrumental 
or substantive rationality. There are many situations in which the outcomes of 
economic decision problems are in conformity with the standard theory, i.e. 
where economic agents achieve optimal or nearly optimal outcomes. However, 
the literature provides a wide variety of examples in which the assumptions of 
the standard theory seem to fail systematically and where alternative approaches 
for explaining the observed behavior, like for example bounded rationality, need 
to be taken into consideration. This section will review some of the evidence of 
boundedly rational behavior found in the literature and will try to uncover some 
unifying pattern from these examples. 
One line of evidence of boundedly rational behavior is based on direct 
experiments with single individuals in order to test whether they adhere to the 
assumption of substantive rationality in that experimental setting. The basic idea 
in many of such experiments is to confront individuals with a specific decision 
problem to which an objectively correct solution exists, such as dealing with 
probabilities and statistical evidence. These experiments demonstrate that 
individuals are susceptible to a number of systematic biases: e. g. they often 
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seem to misunderstand statistical independence of given data, they mistake 
random data for patterned data and vice versa, they make errors in updating 
probabilities on the basis of new information ( a violation of Bayes' rule), make 
false inferences about causalities and exaggerate the ex ante probability of a 
random event which has already occurred,just to name a few (see Conlisk 1996 
for a detailed review of these effects). Other experiments do not make use of 
such a reference point of objectively correct answers but they test whether the 
observed behavior exhibited by test individuals in an experimental setting 
conforms to the expectation predicted by the standard rationality assumption. In 
these experiments it is often found, for example, that people place higher values 
on "status quo" options than would be expected, that they fail to discount the 
future consistently and that they fail to adjust repeated choices in the light of 
changing constraints ( cf. Conlisk 1996 ). It is, thus, hypothesized that people 
systematically commit cognitive errors and use simplifying rules, or heuristics, 
when solving a given task. 
The above mentioned results emerged from a body of literature mainly 
initiated by decision theory psychologists around Daniel Kahneman, Amos 
Tversky and Paul Slovic who started an extensive research program known as 
"Heuristics and Biases" (cf. Kahneman et al. 1982, Gilovich et al. 2002). Under 
the overarching theme of simplifying mechanisms of information processing 
leading to systematic biases of judgment and decision behavior, three basic 
heuristics were identified to be accountable for these effects: (1) availability, (2) 
representativeness, and (3) anchoring and adjustment. The availability heuristic 
refers to judgment errors caused by the ease of memory retrieval, e. g. the 
estimation of how frequently a specific event occurs would be biased by how 
recently such an event has occurred because recent events are more easily 
available in the mind than less recent ones. 
The representativeness heuristic refers to judgment which is influenced by 
what one considers typical. A rather famous and widely controversially 
discussed example is the "Linda problem" which shall be cited here because of 
its prominence in the literature. In this example, test persons are given a brief 
description of a 31 year-old woman who is single, outspoken and very bright. As 
a student she majored in philosophy and was deeply concerned with issues of 
discrimination and social justice. Also, she participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations. After this description the test persons are asked to rank a 
number of statements about her according to their probability to be true. 
Surprisingly, a majority oftest persons rank the statement "Linda is a bank teller 
and is active in the feminist movement" (T&F) more likely than the more 
general statement "Linda is a bank teller" (T). This judgment is a clear violation 
of the conjunction rule according to which the more specific category T &F 
cannot be more likely than the more general category T since the former is just a 
subset of the latter. Therefore, such biased judgment was termed "conjunction 
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fallacy". It is argued that this behavior is brought about by the higher 
representativeness of the specific statement T &F in terms of the description of 
the personality, i. e. the description resembles that of a typical feminist (without 
even mentioning this trait explicitly) so that the more specific statement of Linda 
being a feminist bank teller is invoked more strongly than the one of being "just" 
a bank teller, for which the personality description is not at all typical. The 
conjunction fallacy could be replicated in a wide variety of experiments under 
different environments. 
An often cited consequence of the representative heuristic is the phenomenon 
of preference reversals which have already been discussed in relation to 
reasoning errors in the CVM under risk and uncertainty in section 2.2.1. 
Preference reversals represent a violation of the fundamental principle of 
procedure invariance and are, thus, of great concern for any empirical 
application of economic decision making. For illustration, a simple example of 
preference reversals shall be given here using the following two gambles A and 
B: 
Gamble A: 90% probability to win $8 
Gamble B: 20% probability to win $30 
In preference reversal experiments test persons are asked to state a minimum 
price at which they would sell each of these gambles (assuming they had 
acquired the right to play the gambles themselves) and to subsequently choose 
which gamble they would like to play. In this experiment, most people choose to 
play gamble A over gamble B, but at the same time a high proportion of people 
( 40% - 50%) states a higher selling price for gamble B. This result is a clear 
violation of procedural invariance according to which it should not matter which 
method, pricing versus choice, is used for eliciting the preferences over these 
gambles. Preference reversals are usually explained by the compatibility effect 
and the prominence effect which can both be interpreted as being based on 
representativeness. The compatibility effect states that when monetary values 
are an available attribute of a gamble they have more influence on an evaluative 
response which is also in monetary units like a price. Thus, since $30 is much 
higher than $8 gamble B receives a higher price. On the other hand, when asked 
to choose a gamble to play a probability of winning of 90% features much more 
prominent than one of 20% so that people tend to make their choice, in this case 
correctly, based on the higher probability. The literature dealing with preference 
reversals is much too extensive to be reviewed here ( cf. Irwin et al. 1993, List 
2002, Safra et al. 1990, Seidl 2001 ). 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic refers to judgment which is 
influenced by what comes first, i. e. where "people make estimates by starting 
from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer [and where] 
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adjustments are typically insufficient" (cf. Tversky and Kahneman 1974: 1128). 
Such anchors, although randomly chosen and presented to test persons, were 
shown to influence judgments consistently in a wide variety of task 
environments. Thus, whenever anchors are chosen or provided in a biased way 
the outcome of a judgment based on anchoring and adjustment will be biased as 
well. The starting point bias in the dichotomous choice elicitation format is a 
good example for the use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic in the 
context of the CVM. A number of results inconsistent with the traditional 
rationality assumptions, especially in judgments based on the correct application 
of the expected utility criterion, could be explained by these three underlying 
heuristics and as such form the conceptual basis for frequently observed 
judgment errors in CVM surveys. 
It was found that certain cognitive errors could be avoided with increasing 
experience on the side of the individual decision maker and by making certain 
changes in the experimental design. From these findings, it was investigated 
under which circumstances the found systematic biases could be made to 
disappear ( de biasing). It turned out that while setting clear economic incentives 
and punishing cognitive errors successfully eliminated some of the biases, others 
consistently kept occurring so that the possibilities for debiasing remained 
limited ( cf. Grether 1992, Slonim 1994 ). 
A second line of evidence of boundedly rational behavior is rooted in testing 
rationality assumptions using real economic data, either from actual transactions 
or from economic surveys. Thaler (1992) provides a comprehensive overview of 
anomalies in everyday economic life collected from a series of articles in The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives. In the field of consumer behavior it 
commonly occurs that households deviate substantially from the assumptions of 
standard life cycle theory of intertemporal choice. Smoothing of consumption on 
the basis of perceived life-time income is usually far from efficient in this sense 
so "that the young and the old consume too little, that consumption is unduly 
sensitive to short run income fluctuations, that consumption is not sensitive 
enough to expected future changes in income, and that consumption is 
improperly sensitive to the composition of wealth and income" ( cf. Conlisk 
1996: 672). A rich source of anomalies are the financial markets, e. g. the stock 
market and foreign exchange markets where investors exhibit anomalous 
behavior with respect to asset pricing. The development of asset prices generally 
deviates from the predictions of the efficient markets hypothesis according to 
which arbitrage should make price predictability impossible. However, a 
number of studies demonstrate anomalies like end-of-week, end-of-year, 
seasonal and holiday effects ( cf. Thaler 1992: 139ft), excess fluctuation in prices 
relative to fluctuation in fundamental data and dramatic bubbles that cannot be 
explained by changes in fundamentals, just to name a few. Cutler et al. (1991) 
provide an extensive overview of such anomalies. 
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An anomaly already discussed in the context of environmental valuation (see 
chapter 2) seems to be present in other economic situations as well: that people 
attribute a higher value to a good if they are asked to sell it than if they were to 
acquire it, i. e. the disparity between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-
accept. This anomaly is at odds with standard utility theory and implies that an 
individual's indifference curve exhibits a kink at the status quo location. Such 
indifference curves whose location changes every time a different status quo is 
observed cannot conform to the basic assumptions of utility theory like e. g. 
transitivity. In their prospect theory Kahneman and Tversky ( 1979) have termed 
this kind of behavior "loss aversion" and "endowment effect". Since the 
development of the theory, prospect theory has been extended in a number of 
ways, e.g. allowing for uncertainty of status quo and reference points (see 
Schmidt et al. forthcoming for a discussion of refinements of prospect theory). A 
further example of frequently occurring anomalies is the phenomenon of 
overbidding, termed "winner's curse" by Thaler ( 1992). During auctions, 
experimental or real, it is a common phenomenon that the winning bid either 
exceeds the value of the offered stake or turns out to generate a disappointingly 
low surplus falling short of the opportunity costs of the investment. Numerous 
studies ( e. g. Capen et al. 1971, Hendricks et al. 1987, cited in Thaler 1992) 
have been conducted on returns of oil drilling lease auctions documenting the 
losses and low returns for the winners. According to Thaler (1992: 62) "the key 
ingredient is the existence of a cognitive illusion, a mental task that induces a 
substantial majority of subjects to make a systematic error. [ ... ] Whenever such 
an illusion can be demonstrated, the possibility that market outcomes will 
diverge from the predictions of economic theory is present." 
In summary, the above mentioned behavioral anomalies demonstrate the fact 
that the standard assumption of substantive rationality is too idealistic to 
accommodate and explain many facets of behavior observed in the real world. 
As was shown in chapter 2 deviations from instrumentally rational behavior was 
also widely observed in the field of environmental valuation methods. This 
section demonstrated that the reasons for such anomalous behavior, whether in 
every day economic decisions, laboratory experiments or CVM surveys, are 
based largely on the same behavioral principles. Thus far, however, bounded 
rationality and its behavioral consequences were treated in a rather descriptive 
way. In order to understand and analyze boundedly rational behavior its 
underlying mechanisms need to be explored further. Since the main 
characteristics of bounded rationality as described above were found in people's 
limited cognitive and information processing capabilities explanations for 
boundedly rational reasoning should be found in the field of psychology, 
especially modem cognitive psychology. The following section of this chapter 
will, therefore, explore these foundations of boundedly rational information 
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processing, specifically in relation to environmental valuation methods, by 
looking over the disciplinary fence into the neighboring field of psychology. 
3.3.3 The psychological foundations of bounded rationality in 
environmental valuation 
3.3.3.1 Why deal with psychology? 
Looking at human decision making behavior in general, evidence of decision not 
conforming to the assumption of full rationality is rather strong in real-world 
situations. As shown above, in many judgment and decision making 
environments people deviate systematically from the predictions made by 
standard theories based on the fully rational homo oeconomicus. One 
explanation for this behavior is certainly that deliberation comes at a cost to the 
economic agent so that these costs need to be included into models of optimal 
decision making. This approach, however, is limited by the infinite regress 
problem of optimal search mentioned in section 3.2.2 where Simon proposed the 
use of the satisficing heuristic to determine the point of equality of marginal 
benefits of further search and marginal cost in an intuitive way. Given these 
observations and given the fact that decisions are actually taken in the real world 
despite the impossibility of determining optimal stopping as defined above there 
must be other explanations of how people actually arrive at decisions, some 
even in very short time without possibly being able to check for the fulfillment 
of the mentioned marginal condition. 
Relating the insights of the preceding sections of this chapter to the theme of 
this study, environmental valuation using direct valuation methods like the 
CVM, some important connections can be drawn between the rationality 
problems mentioned in chapter 2 and the concept of bounded rationality 
described above. It was revealed that CVM respondents are susceptible to 
produce systematically biased responses to the WTP elicitation question when 
particular characteristics of a questionnaire or an interview situation prevail. In 
case respondents were fully rational in the instrumental sense their responses to 
the WTP elicitation question would simply be guided by their evaluation of their 
preference ordering w. r. t. to market and environmental goods. Their response 
would, thus, be invariant to procedural characteristics of the survey as long as 
the environmental good to be valued remains the same. Obviously, this is not the 
case as demonstrated by a multitude of valuation studies systematically 
exploring biased response behavior. 
Instead, respondents' WTP statements seem to be guided to some extent by 
characteristics of the survey that should have nothing to do with their "real" 
valuation of the environmental good. The initial bid in a dichotomous choice 
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elicitation question or the presence of an interviewer during the interview appear 
to trigger certain behavioral programs within the respondent with which he 
reacts to these elements of the decision environment. It might be suspected that 
such behavior stems from certain rules the respondent has learned to apply in 
particular decision situations. For example, as is often suspected, an initial bid 
signals the respondent a reasonable amount that everyone would have to pay for 
the provision of an environmental good, like e. g. a fair share of the cost of 
provision. The behavioral rule activated in this situation might be to accept such 
a fair share although the respondent is not entirely certain of the actual benefits 
accruing to him in case the environmental good is provided. 
For the respondent such a behavior must not be considered irrational, 
although it might be from a strictly instrumental point of view. Employing such 
a behavioral rule functions as a simplifying heuristic that allows him to evaluate 
an unknown situation that would otherwise require much cognitive effort with 
much less time and effort, instead. The respondent considers the use of such a 
heuristic as rational since it might have helped him in previous situations to 
make adequate decisions. Therefore, such observed behavior must be evaluated 
in the light of bounded rationality as discussed above. 
In order to search for the underlying reasons for boundedly rational reasoning 
and human decision making behavior it seems promising to look into the 
neighboring field of psychology as a discipline that lies at the core of mental 
processes in human brains, the foundations of all behavior. The necessity to 
transgress the disciplinary boundaries of economics and search for explanations 
of boundedly rational behavior in psychology was prominently stated by Simon 
in two citations: "If the principle [ of bounded rationality] is correct, then the 
goal of classical economic theory - to predict the behavior of rational man 
without making an empirical investigation of his psychological properties - is 
unattainable" ( cf. Simon 1957: 199) and: "Theories of bounded rationality are 
more ambitious [than simply expected utility], in trying to capture the actual 
process of decision as well as the substance of the final decision itself. A 
veridical theory of this kind can only be erected on the basis of empirical 
knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the human mind; that is to say, 
on the basis of psychological research" (cf. Simon 1987: 267). In the light of this 
necessity, after a long period of seemingly insurmountable gaps in their 
respective world views the scientific fields of economics and psychology have 
in recent times come increasingly closer in the way they perceive human 
decision making (cf. Handgraaf and van Raaij 2005). Behavioral economics 
(from the side of economists) and economic psychology (from the side of 
psychologists) are now well-established fields of interdisciplinary cooperation. 
Broadly speaking, psychology aims at understanding mental processes of 
human beings and at explaining human behavior using this understanding. 
Exploring the link between the outside world with its many stimuli and the inner 
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perception, experiencing and feeling of an organism with its subsequent 
consequences on that organism's behavior observable from the outside world 
constitutes the general interest of the discipline (cf. Ulich and Bosel 2005: 11ft). 
More particularly, psychology distinguishes "forces" like emotions and motives 
on the one hand from "functions" like cognition and action on the other (cf. 
Rohracher 1984 ). Forces are considered the more fundamental psychic 
phenomena, they form the basis of experiencing and give rise and reason to 
psychic functions. At the same time these psychic forces are difficult to observe 
and, therefore, remain largely inaccessible. Cognition is an expression for all 
processes of acquiring, organizing, storing, retrieving and utilizing knowledge 
(cf. Medin et al. 2005: 4), whereas action comprises purposeful, subjectively 
meaningful and conscious forms of behavior (cf. Ulich and Bosel 2005: 15). 
Thus, psychology analyzes the link between states of mind (motives), perception 
and processing of information and observable behavior, all of which also form 
the basis of economic action and decision making. 
With respect to the objective of understanding the role of information search 
and deliberation as being the main feature of boundedly rational behavior in 
economics in general and of response behavior in environmental valuation 
surveys in particular, the field of cognition within the discipline of psychology 
seems most promising for discovering suitable concepts relating to decision 
making. Using economic terminology, the above mentioned forces "emotions" 
and "motives" can be interpreted as being part of or forming the preference 
ordering, e. g. between market commodities and environmental goods, of an 
economic agent. The function "action" or behavior, on the other hand, can be 
interpreted as an economic agent's expression of this preference, i. e. the result 
of an economic decision making process, for example a WTP statement in 
CVM. The function "cognition", then, serves as a link between an individual's 
preferences and his economic behavior since perception and information 
processing of outside stimuli influence an agent's emotions and motives for 
action. At the same time the cognitive system is responsible for finding those 
actions that are suitable to be in line with these motives, i. e. that best conform 
to the agent's preferences. Thus, cognitive aspects of psychology really lie at the 
heart of economic decision making in general and, consequently, need to be 
considered thoroughly in any kind of survey like the CVM. 
It goes without saying that the discipline of psychology has seen over time a 
variety of different schools of thought that represented the most influential 
scientific paradigms within psychology at that time. Two of these schools, 
behaviorism and cognitivism, are of particular interest for research of 
environmental valuation survey methods like the CVM because their main 
paradigms are reflected in the approaches of dealing with rationality problems 
encountered in CVM surveys. In order to make this link between psychological 
schools of thought and survey research more explicit, the following section will 
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give a brief overview of their main paradigms and illustrate their influence on 
the perception of rationality in CVM surveys. 
3.3.3.2 Cognitive psychology and its relation to the discipline of psychology 
Behaviorism has dominated psychology for at least fifty years in the first half of 
the twentieth century. The behaviorist school has developed in the United States 
as sharp contrast both to the psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud which focused on 
unconscious conflicts within the life-history of individuals and to the method of 
introspection as practiced by the pioneer of psychology, Wilhelm Wundt, who 
established the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig, Germany in 1879. 
Wundt's "psychology of consciousness" was already mainly concerned with 
cognitive processes, however, his method of introspection which is based on 
detailed subjective reports of test individuals performing some predefined 
cognitive task led to increasingly contradictory and even irrelevant results. In 
contrast, the guiding principle of behaviorism had its focus on observed 
behavior. Any unobservable mental processes, especially aspects of cognition, 
were thought inappropriate in principle for scientific analysis. One of the 
founders and protagonists of behaviorism, John B. Watson (1878 - 1958), aimed 
at transforming psychology into a discipline of natural sciences. To this end he 
established an exact method of experimental psychological research which 
would generate quantitative data in accordance with the standards of those 
obtained in other fields of natural science, taking physics as an example. 
Behaviorists aimed at discovering the underlying principles of human behavior, 
the natural laws of the mind (cf. Watson 1968). The combination of stimulus 
and reaction, L e. the relationships between observable behavior and the 
underlying conditions producing this particular behavior, was the main paradigm 
of behaviorist research. As such, behavior was regarded as an organism's 
adaptation to the various stimuli of the surrounding environment and all 
observed behavior was scrutinized as to its relationship to such adaptation. The 
mind was given the role to produce such adaptive behavior in reaction to the 
external stimuli (cf. Wertheimer 1971). In the course of behaviorist research, the 
human being as a subject was substituted by the rat as a suitable object of study. 
From hindsight, however, it is astonishing that this strict behaviorism as 
described above has remained a closed field of psychology, especially in the 
United States of America, for such a long time. Even exact natural sciences like 
physics, the leading example for behavioral psychologists, were open enough to 
develop theoretical models of quantum mechanics without being able to access 
the realm of atoms with accurate measurements. However, the paradigm shift 
towards cognitive psychology and its focus on information processing did not 
occur before the beginning 1960s. 
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Cognitivism's view of human beings as active regulators of their behaviors is 
not self-evident and just a relatively recent change of paradigm in psychology. 
The motivation to perform some action is now perceived as a mostly active 
decision making process, in which acquisition and evaluation of information, 
formation of expectations and considering alternative consequences play the 
crucial roles. The main cognitive tasks that illustrate the paradigm shift from 
behavioral psychology to cognitive psychology can be seen as (I) anticipation of 
consequences, (2) estimation of prospects for success, (3) evaluation of own 
capabilities, (4) comparison of expected outcomes with prior objectives and (5) 
estimation of probabilities (cf. Ulich and Bose! 2005: 129). Thus, in contrast to 
behaviorism individuals are seen as largely independent from external stimuli 
and as being able to regulate their behaviors mainly by themselves. 
In the 1970s cognitive psychology started to increasingly draw analogies to 
the fields of information theory and computer science, a considerable number of 
technical terms and concepts were derived from these fields and appropriated 
within cognitive psychology. An early but highly influential model of 
information processing was the so-called Sternberg paradigm by Sternberg 
{I 966). He characterized an overall cognitive task as a sequence of abstract units 
of information processing with each unit of processing requiring a certain time 
so that the complexity of some task with an observable outcome could be 
represented by the overall time needed for this task. Subsequently, research of 
such processes of information processing became broader and increasingly 
complex. Anderson and Lebiere (1998) developed a framework of cognitive 
architecture with which entire cognitive systems can be represented by units of 
information processing. 
In recent times one part of cognitive psychology has developed towards 
understanding the fundamental neurological processes of cognition and other 
psychological phenomena. This field of neuropsychology has emerged in 
parallel to the understanding of physiological processes in the human brain 
( cognitive neurosciences) and to technical improvements necessary for the 
measurement of brain processes starting with the electro encephalography 
(EEG) as soon as 1924 until the use of modem visualization technologies like 
positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnet resonance imaging 
(fMRI) (see Medin et al. 2005: 24ff for details of these methods). These new 
fields of cognitive psychological research, however, shall not be pursued here 
any further. 
This brief description of the main aspects of behaviorism versus cognitivism 
already sheds light on the fundamentally different perceptions of rational 
response behavior in CVM and the recommendations for improving the method 
of valuation. As described above, behaviorism is dominated by the stimulus -
response framework. In the context of the CVM a particular scenario including 
the payment scheme would represent the stimulus given to the respondent in the 
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course of the interview to which the interviewee should react with an 
appropriate response, i. e. the WTP statement that is in congruence with his 
expected utility change. This relationship between stimulus and response is 
simple, however, in practice it is often unduly disturbed by external influences, 
other stimuli, like the framing of the scenario, the presence of interviewers or 
payment vehicles, i. e. necessary elements of a CVM survey that should have no 
influence on the utility change accruing from the proposed project. In CVM 
research, the view that such disturbing external influences simply need to be 
investigated and eliminated in the survey design in order to obtain valid, i. e. 
rational, WTP responses reflects that behaviorist paradigm. However, this 
approach neglects crucial aspects of human information processing and 
reasoning inherent in the cognitivist paradigm so that its success for improving 
CVM surveys is only limited. 
From the cognitivist perspective the mental processes during a CVM 
interview are more complex and cannot be reduced to a simple stimulus -
response pattern as desired from the behaviorist perspective. The external 
stimuli mentioned in the preceding paragraph must be seen as integral parts of 
the decision environment unless they cannot be entirely omitted from the 
interview. CVM respondents process all the available information, maybe to 
different degrees depending on their motives and their computational capacities. 
Some information that the CVM researcher considers highly relevant for the 
evaluation of the scenario might be only of minor importance for the respondent 
due to the prominence of some other aspect, like the fairness of the payment 
vehicle employed. Consequently, the respondent might choose to employ 
simplifying decision heuristics and disregard essential scenario information. 
Respondents' attention may be limited, e. g. due to an inappropriate presentation 
of information concerning the CVM scenario. Further, the motivation of the 
respondent to consider the trade-off situation thoroughly might be rather low 
leading him to process the given information only superficially. Under the 
cognitivist perspective, all these aspects cannot simply be eliminated in the 
survey design but must be treated as being part of the respondent's particular 
decision environment, including his information processing capabilities and 
constraints. Therefore, the perception of rationality under the cognitivist view is 
clearly a bounded one since the respondent is regarded in a way that takes his 
decision environment into account realistically. 
In order to better understand the cognitive capabilities and restrictions that 
respondents generally face in environmental valuation interviews the next 
section will explore some fundamental principles of modem cognitive 
psychology as they are relevant for the conceptual and empirical research in this 
study. 
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3.3.3.3 Fundamentals of cognitive psychology 
Due to the relatively short history of cognitive psychological research the 
insights gained for an understanding of the human mind are still relatively 
limited and thus many fundamental questions remain unexplained to some 
extent ( cf. Anderson 2001 ). However, a number of important concepts of the 
working of the human mind are already quite well understood and insofar as 
those concepts contribute to an understanding of CVM response behavior as 
investigated in this study they will be briefly described and discussed in the 
following. 
Attention 
The first cognitive process of importance for the present study is attention since 
it can be perceived as the gatekeeper of stimuli like e. g. visual or audio 
information entering the cognitive system. In general, there exists a system of 
various processing units like the perceptive, the motor and the central cognitive 
units that work largely in parallel, i. e. independently from each other. Also, 
each of these units has some capacity for parallel processing as well, e. g. 
performing some task with the hands while walking, or listening to music and a 
conversation at the same time. However, in each of these units there seem to be 
bottlenecks that limit such parallel processing which appears to be associated 
with limited attention capacity (cf. Medin et al. 2005: l 15f). 
These limits are especially pronounced in the auditive system where attention 
needs to be focused on those auditive stimuli that are required for subsequent 
processing in the cognitive system, i. e. where unnecessary information is 
filtered out (cf. Broadbent 1958). Neisser (1967) demonstrated experimentally 
that auditive information which the test person should not be attentive to, i. e. 
that was meant to be filtered out, is available only up to 5 seconds in a sensory 
store called echoic memory, subsequently this information is lost. This feature 
called selection, i. e .. filtering of information after entering some kind of sensory 
memory, ensures that attention can be switched to that information input in case 
it becomes important somehow, e. g. when a key word with a special importance 
like a name comes up in a conversation of a neighboring table in a restaurant etc. 
( cf. Medin et al. 2005: 110, 117). However, it is still controversial whether this 
selection occurs early, i.e. after only rudimentary processing, or late, i. e. after 
considerable processing including semantic recognition. A similar mechanism 
exists for visual inputs (iconic memory), however, the storage time of visual data 
in the sensory memory is very short, usually much shorter than one second. 
Apart from the findings that within a mode of perception, i. e. audio and 
visual, attention is mainly directed to one particular information at a time and 
other information is largely filtered out or ignored, bottleneck effects appear also 
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to be present between those modes of perception. Karlin and Kestenbaum (1968) 
demonstrated that the time needed to process an auditive stimulus almost 
doubled if test persons were to process visual stimuli slightly prior to the 
auditive stimulus. Thus, there seems to be a central bottleneck of attention which 
sets limits to the parallel processing capabilities of the cognitive system. 
Consequently, attention needs to be shifted between competing requirements of 
information processing. For selective information processing it is now 
considered that both bottleneck effects filtering out superfluous sensory 
information, either early or late, and capacity effects allowing only for a certain 
amount of incoming information to be processed play a role ( cf. Pashler 1998). 
The role of attention in CVM interviews is rather obvious since the level of 
attention a respondent attributes to information presented to him decides about 
the amount of such information available for further processing and evaluation 
in the light of his economic preferences. Due to the mentioned bottleneck and 
capacity effects scenario-relevant information needs to be presented in such a 
way that the interviewee's ideally uninterrupted attention to it is assured. Here, 
two aspects are of particular importance. First, the interviewee might be 
distracted by other stimuli like e. g. noise or television in the background, 
children etc. Second, he might still be processing recently provided information 
while the next aspects of the scenario etc. are already presented, thus preventing 
him to be attentive for new pieces of information. In the CVM literature the 
concern of preventing "information overload" and "tiring" has also often been 
voiced in this respect. 
Representation of information 
The next cognitive concept of importance is the fundamental process of 
representation of information that has entered the human cognitive system 
through the gatekeeper of attention. According to the theory of dual coding ( cf. 
Paivio 1986) visuospatial and verbal information are coded in fundamentally 
different ways. Visuospatial information of referents in the real world, like e. g. 
images, is generally represented in an analog way, i. e. the representation 
mimics the (spatial) structure of the referent. The spatial arrangement of the 
single elements of a visual input in relation to each other is retained in the 
memory. In contrast, verbal information is represented by propositions, i.e. 
"abstract assertions that are not tied to any particular sensory modality" (cf. 
Medin et al. 2005: 255). In these propositions only the relevant meanings are 
retained, superfluous information like details of a particular sequence of words 
is discarded (unless it carries a special meaning). Propositional structures, 
finally, can be seen as a logical network of such relevant meaning that are 
connected to each other. Altogether, such a network of propositions that carry 
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the meaning of input information can be seen as the representation of the content 
of that verbal input within the cognitive system, i.e. in the memory. 
The fact that verbal information is represented as abstract propositions 
highlights the importance of the translation process ofthe verbal description ofa 
CVM scenario into the propositions stored for further processing. The recipient 
of verbal information, either text to be read by the interviewee himself or being 
read out loudly by the interviewer, needs to be able to filter out the important 
parts of the information in order to establish a propositional network that carries 
the essential facts about the presented scenario and payment scheme. This 
emphasizes the well-known recommendation that CVM researchers devote 
much time and effort especially on the design of verbal scenario information. 
Further, the fact that visuospatial and verbal information is represented in 
different ways is underscored by the finding that different regions of the brain 
have been shown to be active depending on the processing of visuospatial or 
verbal information. Furthermore, Shephard (1967) and Standing (1973) have 
both shown that visual memory is superior to the memory of verbal information 
stemming from the assumption that analog representations are more easily 
retrievable than abstract propositional representations. This explains the well-
known fact that it is easier to memorize verbal information if it is associated 
with a visual imagination of that information. Quite naturally, the combination 
of verbal and visual information in the presentation of a CVM scenario helps the 
interviewee to absorb and memorizes higher amounts and more complex 
information. 
Theories of memory: the role of elaboration 
Due to its importance for the storage of scenario information for further 
processing in the course of evaluating such a CVM scenario some remarks about 
the human memory system should be dropped at this point. Formerly, the human 
memory system was perceived as a sequence of storage units, namely the 
sensory memory as mentioned above from which the relevant information is 
transferred to the short-term memory through the filter of attention. 
Subsequently, contents of the short-term memory could be transferred by the 
active process of memorization into the long-term or permanent memory (cf. 
Broadbent 1958, Waugh and Norman 1965). It was hypothesized that the short-
term memory had a limited capacity of about 6 - 8 elements, the so-called 
memory span, which can easily be determined by the number of elements, e. g. 
numbers, letters, words etc., that one can reproduce immediately after being 
presented. If one does not achieve the transfer of an element of the short-term 
memory into long-term memory by active memorization (e.g. constant 
repetition or rehearsal) that element would be overwritten by new, i.e. more 
recent information entering the short-term memory via attention. This theory 
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which was in line with a lot of experimental data at the time was challenged by 
Craik and Lockhart (1972) who argued that the amount of information stored in 
long-term memory did not as much depend on the time spent on (mechanical) 
memorization, e. g. the number of repetitions, but on the depth with which this 
particular information is processed in the cognitive system. Their theory of 
processing levels states that memorization only increases the likelihood of 
storage in the memory if that information is memorized in a deep and 
meaningful way, i.e. passive memorization like pure repetitions will not lead to 
permanent storage. 
Craik and Lockhart's theory and a number of experiments verifying this 
distinction ( cf. Glen berg et al. 1977) led to the abandonment of the assumption 
of a separate short-term memory, it simply turned out to be superfluous for the 
explanation of memory processes. In place of short-term memory Baddeley 
(1986) proposed the concept of a phonological and articulatory loop for verbal 
stimuli in order to account for the existence of the memory span of 6 to 8 
elements mentioned above. The articulatory loop represents the so-called 
working memory as the amount of information that can be kept in memory by 
constant repetition (loop) and it corresponds roughly to the amount of syllables 
that can be read (and repeated) within 1.5 to 2 seconds (cf. Baddeley et al. 
1975). Whereas the articulatory loop represents the working memory for verbal 
stimuli, visual stimuli are kept available in the so-called visuospatial sketchpad. 
The task of the sketchpad is to keep constant track of changes of the spatial 
arrangements of objects surrounding us, i. e. determining one's own location in 
relation to the outside world. These two systems of working memory represent 
support systems for the central executive which coordinates attention and the 
systems of working memory and which utilizes their information for higher 
cognitive processes, for example the evaluation of a CVM scenario in the light 
of one's preferences. The distinction of these support systems to the concept of a 
short-term memory is that they work independently from each other and exhibit 
no interference. Thus, the phonological and articulatory loops and the 
visuospatial sketchpad are simply support systems to keep information available 
and accessible for further processing by the central executive. 
As mentioned above primary sensory information is quickly translated into 
semantic information where especially the meaning of verbal information is 
represented in some kind of propositional structure while the superfluous details, 
like the exact wording in sentences, are erased, i. e. lost. It appears that this 
translation is crucial for a transfer of information to the long-term memory. Such 
translations occur the better the more meaning is given to the primary 
information, i.e. the more a person elaborates on it (cf. Medin et al. 2005: 155). 
Elaborative processing consists of an enrichment of the content to be stored by 
additional information that creates associations and thus embeds this content 
into a broader context. In line with the theory of processing level a higher degree 
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of elaboration on sensory information increases the likelihood that this 
information is translated into meaningful propositional structures that are then 
more easily transferred to the long-term memory. The fact that information can 
usually be remembered better if it is considered to be personally of importance 
can also be explained by a higher degree of processing, by higher elaboration 
that creates a meaningful propositional structure and forms associations with 
other aspects of personal importance. In section 3.3.4 theories of information 
processing, especially the theories of dual-processes will be described in more 
detail since they form the underlying psychological theory of the research 
approach pursued in this study. 
While the long term memory does not play an important role in the context of 
environmental valuation due to the short duration of CVM interviews storage of 
scenario information in the working memory is certainly a crucial aspect. In this 
respect the distinction between short term memory and working memory is 
mostly academic, however, the importance of elaboration is highlighted by the 
theory of processing levels. The more an interviewee elaborates on the provided 
scenario information and gives a personal meaning to it the better this 
information will be available in the working memory for further evaluation. An 
interviewee will elaborate more on the given information if it relates to his 
personal context so that the information carries meaning for his personal 
circumstances. In order to help interviewees to elaborate it is common practice 
in CVM interviews that the essential aspects of the scenario information are 
repeated before proceeding to the WTP question. For example, the respondent is 
asked to what extent he considers certain aspects of the presented scenario as 
important. Such an intermezzo forces the interviewee to reconsider the presented 
information and put it into a personal context, thus increasing its availability for 
further information processing, for example a monetary evaluation of the 
benefits generated by the CVM scenario. 
This short introduction should serve to highlight some basic and relevant 
aspects of current knowledge of cognitive psychological processes of human 
beings in order to provide some necessary background for the more specific 
models of information processing and reasoning. It was shown how central 
aspects of cognitive psychology relate to crucial issues of the design of 
environmental valuation surveys. The field of cognitive psychology is 
developing rapidly and important and stunning insights into the functioning of 
the human mind are published at a high rate. These new insights are mainly due 
to the modem technologies of fMRI (see above) that allow almost a direct 
observation of the working of the brain. For a most recent textbook covering the 
entire state-of-the-art in cognitive psychology consult Medin et al. (2005). In the 
following section the basic concepts of cognitive psychology just presented will 
be employed in a set of theories and models of human information processing 
and reasoning forming the basis of the empirical research approach of this study. 
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3.3.4 Psychological models of reasoning: dual-process approaches 
3.3.4.1 The concept of dual-process approaches 
After this discussion regarding the important connections between cognitive 
psychological aspects and response behavior in CVM surveys a specific class of 
theories concerning the process of reasoning and problem solving need to be 
addressed in detail. These theories form the conceptual basis of the empirical 
research of this study since they allow the formulation of survey instruments for 
an analysis of CVM response behavior in the light of bounded rationality of 
respondents. However, unlike the fundamentals of cognitive psychology 
described above the question of which basic processes actually guide our 
thinking, reasoning, inferring and problem solving is far from being settled. 
Experimental findings of reasoning have produced a number of theories each of 
which can claim some plausibility for explaining the observed data. 
Traditionally, the competition stretches from "models of mental phenomena to 
be built out of networks of associative devices that pass activation around in 
parallel and distributed form" (see e.g. McClelland et al. 1986 for models of 
parallel distributed processing) to the other extreme of "models built out of 
formal languages in which symbols are composed into sentences that are 
processed sequentially", in close analogy to the functioning of computers (cf. 
Sloman 2002: 379). However, there is a vast amount of evidence to strongly 
suggest that neither of these two extreme views holds the sole truth. Human 
thinking rather seems to be composed of building blocks from both of the above 
mentioned extremes each of which is sometimes more and sometimes less 
involved in a specific reasoning task. 
This perspective is summarized in the field of cognitive research on the two 
systems of reasoning, i.e. on the so-called "dual-process" approaches. Until 
now, dual-process theories of reasoning do not form a coherent view w. r. t. the 
exact nature of reasoning, rather a multitude of specific approaches and 
conceptual models has arisen since the beginning of the 1980s each focusing on 
a more or less specific problem constellation. However, these models all have in 
common that they aim at explaining the puzzling facts, i. e. that people are 
"capable of being foolish one moment and wise the next, capable of behaving 
intransigently and then credulously in tum, capable of believing the right thing 
with their whole hearts while saying precisely the wrong thing with their whole 
mouths" (cf. Gilbert 1999: 4). The common perception of these models is the 
view that "two qualitatively different modes of information processing operate 
in making judgments and decisions in solving problems. In essence, the 
common distinction in dual-process models is between a fast, associative 
information-processing mode based on low-effort heuristics, and a slow, rule-
based information-processing mode based on high-effort systematic reasoning" 
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( cf. Chaiken and Trope 1999: ix). Not surprisingly, this distinction mirrors the 
dual-mode rationality concepts of institutional and evolutionary rationality 
mentioned in section 3.2.2 The multitude of models for these two different 
modes of information processing has also generated a multitude of names. 
Overall, one of these processes has been referred to as intuitive, natural, 
automatic, heuristic, preconscious, schematic, prototypical, narrative, implicit, 
imagistic-nonverbal or experiential while the other fundamental process is often 
termed rational, thinking-conceptual-logical, extensional, conscious, 
deliberative-ejfortful-intentional, systematic, explicit or verbal ( cf. Epstein et al. 
1996 and citations there). 
In general, the dual-process models of reasoning are motivated by the 
principle of least effort ( cf. Allport 1954) which describes people's tendency to 
achieve desirable outcomes by employing as little cognitive effort as possible 
due to their feelings that their own cognitive resources like e. g. attention, 
memory or logical thinking are naturally constrained. In an environment where 
constant and complex stimuli need to be evaluated and to which an individual 
possibly needs to react it is necessary to economize on those scarce cognitive 
resources. It has been described above that such scarcity is implied by the 
bottlenecks and capacity constraints in information processing, i. e. the 
competition among simultaneous cognitive tasks for processing capacity. It is 
thus argued that the default mode of information processing relies on 
simplification and learned automatic processes like e.g. the use of heuristics that 
have been acquired over time by dealing successfully with similar situations in 
the past. These simplifications "avoid effortful expenditures of cognitive 
energy" (cf. Moskowitz et al. 1999: 28) whenever possible in order to achieve 
satisfactory outcomes. 
But how is this satisfaction level determined, what happens if it cannot be 
attained in the default mode of information processing? The underlying view in 
all dual-process models is that people seek sufficient rather than accurate 
knowledge of states, acceptable rather than optimal outcomes. As long as 
available information is seen as sufficient for a specific situation, e. g. 
explaining the motives of behavior of someone or deciding whether to undertake 
an action or not, and as long as the expected outcome of such an action is 
perceived acceptable, the default mode of processing will do. However, such 
economizing information processors become motivated to process information 
more deeply and systematically whenever a feeling of insufficiency arises, i. e. 
if their feeling of confidence in the automated heuristics and low-effort 
reasoning processes gets too low. In such situations, people will be motivated to 
take "a closer look", they will shift to more effortful, more systematic processes 
in order to overcome and alleviate this feeling of insufficiency. It has been 
argued that on the one hand such a shift generally occurs when the information 
at hand is perceived as being so inconsistent with prior structures that an 
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individual's confidence in his judgment is seriously shaken. On the other hand, 
people might willfully choose to look closer in situations where they desire 
accuracy of information and judgment ( cf. Tetlock 1985). Thus, people are seen 
to be "flexible processors", i.e. they are capable of more elaborate processing 
when they desire greater certainty. Each of the specific dual-process models that 
will be described in the next section has developed their own criteria for the shift 
of use of information processes, or their mix, so this issue will be discussed in 
detail there. 
Before presenting selected specific dual-process models, a classification of 
the nature of these models shall be attempted. The basic distinction between the 
dual-process approaches concerns the way and the degree to which these two 
fundamental systems (for simplicity they shall be called intuitive vs. rational in 
the following) interact. Under the first view, only one of these two processing 
modes is involved in a given task, the second view holds that every outcome is 
ultimately produced by both modes. Following Gilbert ( 1999), the first view 
comprises two possible designs of interaction: ( 1) the selective design where the 
specific task at hand or outside stimuli activate one of the two processing modes 
selectively while the other remains dormant and (2) the competitive design 
where both processing modes are initially activated but the one with the stronger 
activation outcompetes the other at a specific state of processing which has no 
further part in the fulfillment of the task. An example of the latter could be seen 
in analogy to the simultaneous activation of the two meanings of the word 
"bank" where the specific context quickly decides which of the meanings is 
more appropriate, the river-bank or the financial institution. Under the second 
view two alternative designs of processing mode interaction are conceivable: (3) 
the consolidative design where any outcome is always a mix of both processing 
modes to a varying degree and ( 4) the corrective design where one of the two 
processing modes, preferably the intuitive mode, gets activated first but its 
outcome is subsequently subjected to a possibly corrective intervention by the 
other, the rational mode. Table 3-2 illustrates the distinction of these four 
possible designs of dual-processing modes. 
To date the second view seems to be more prominent, therefore the majority 
of dual-process models that will be presented and discussed subsequently 
follows this view. However, the borderline between consolidative and corrective 
designs is often blurred in these specific models, in fact, as will be illustrated 
below, the described classification applies best to specific judgmental situations 
and not to entire dual-process modeling approaches. 
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Table 3-2: Features of the four elementary dual-process designs (adapted from 
Gilbert 1999: 7) 
Are both processes Do both processes control 
activated? output? 
Selective design No No 
Competitive design Yes No 
Consolidative Yes Yes 
design 
Corrective design Sometimes Sometimes 
In conclusion, the dual-process models of reasoning allow to address the often 
voiced reservation to perceive CVM respondents as fully rational decision 
makers more specifically. According to these models reasoning and information 
processing in CVM interviews can now be perceived to follow two different 
branches: the first branch conforms more to the concept of instrumental 
rationality where conscious evaluation of the available information using 
effortful sequential cognitive processes takes place, the second branch conforms 
more to the concept of procedural rationality where the "economy of cognition" 
leads respondents to employ simplifying heuristics in order to arrive at 
satisfactory outcomes. In the dual-process models the two branches are 
presumed to interact or rather to work in parallel to an extent depending on the 
specific circumstances of the cognitive task to be fulfilled. The analysis of the 
extent to which these two fundamentally different reasoning processes are 
employed during the perception and evaluation of a CVM scenario by a 
respondent, i. e. the degree of boundedly rational information processing, 
requires to look more specifically at selected dual-process models found in the 
literature. From these models the empirical survey instrument for the analysis of 
boundedly rational behavior in CVM surveys will be developed in chapter 4. 
3.3.4.2 Specific model approaches of dual-processes in the context of 
environmental valuation 
From the multitude of conceptual models of dual information processing found 
in the literature, three selected models shall be described here in more detail. In 
conjunction, these three models allow to address a great variety of aspects of 
response behavior in CVM interviews and thus form a suitable framework for 
the analysis of bounded rational information processing in environmental 
valuation. Specifically, two of the three models have developed well-tested 
psychometric instruments which allow to classify individuals regarding the 
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rationality concepts described above. These instruments shall be taken as the 
basis for the development of an empirical instrument to describe and analyze 
boundedly rational information processing in CVM. 
Both the elaboration likelihood model (ELM) developed by Petty (1977, cited 
in Petty and Wegener 1999) as well as the heuristic-systematic model (HSM) by 
Chaiken (1980) deal explicitly with the question what determines the degree to 
which individuals employ deliberative, rational reasoning versus more intuitive, 
heuristic information processing. Specifically, the ELM distinguishes two 
processes, the "routes" to persuasion referring to changes of attitudes based on 
the intensity of elaborative processing of information, i. e. the degree of 
elaboration (see above). On the one hand the "central-route" attitude changes are 
those that are brought about by "relatively extensive and effortful information-
processing activity" (cf. Petty and Wegener 1999: 42). Such "central-route" 
processing is associated with a deep scrutiny and analysis of the issues and 
information presented in order to uncover their "central merits". The term 
"elaboration" is used to suggest that people add something of their own to the 
specific information provided. On the other hand, attitude changes brought about 
by the "peripheral-route" are based on processes requiring less cognitive effort, 
such as processes that differ from the "central-route" process quantitatively, i. e. 
for example examining the same available information less carefully, or even 
qualitatively by using mental short-cuts like heuristics or schemas etc. 
Regarding the degree of employing the central versus peripheral routes the 
critical concept of the ELM is the so-called "elaboration continuum". It signifies 
the range of degrees of elaboration by an individual faced with a judgment task. 
The points along the elaboration continuum at which a given individual operates 
in a given judgment or problem are determined by the strength of motivation 
and cognitive capability to elaborate on that situation, i. e. to scrutinize and 
evaluate information, to put new information in the context of existing 
information and/or to assess the likely outcomes of decisions taken. The ELM 
supposes that the degree of elaboration is directly related to the cognitive effort 
expended in a given task. The notion of an "elaboration continuum" implies that 
people elaborate to varying degrees, i. e. although people want to hold correct 
attitudes and make correct judgments, the amount and nature of elaboration in 
which they are willing and able to engage vary both with individual and 
situational factors. 
Thus, personal motivation and mental ability are assumed to be the main 
drivers of cognitive effort, the more motivated and able people are the more 
likely they are to effortfully scrutinize all information available and relevant for 
the task at hand. However, "economy of cognition" decides to what extent the 
individual follows the peripheral and central routes of reasoning. In some 
situations where it does not "pay" to exert considerable mental effort it is 
advisable to behave as a "cognitive miser" ( cf. Taylor 1981 ), i. e. as someone 
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who tries his best to avoid cognitive effort. At other times, however, it is more 
appropriate for them to expend their cognitive resources more generously. 
Compared to the ELM, the heuristic-systematic model (HSM) operationalizes 
the least-effort principle more specifically by transforming it into a sufficiency 
principle. It is assumed that people "attempt to strike a balance between 
minimizing cognitive effort on the one hand and satisfying their current 
motivational concerns on the other" (cf. Chen and Chaiken 1999: 74). To this 
end, the authors distinguish between an individual's actual confidence that he 
has in relation to a judgmental task and the desired confidence, i. e. that level of 
confidence that the individual would personally like to have when performing 
some judgmental task. This desired level of confidence is called sufficiency 
threshold. The authors claim that individuals will exert cognitive effort up to the 
point where actual and desired confidence coincide at which point then a 
decision is taken or an attitude is formed or expressed etc. In case low-effort 
heuristic processing alone does not achieve the closure of this gap between 
actual and desired confidence or where such processing is not possible due to 
the absence of any information that might serve as a cue for the activation of a 
heuristic, people are likely to adopt systematic processing in order to close this 
gap. 
Furthermore, the HSM claims that it is in principle possible to predict whether 
a person is likely to employ either heuristic or systematic processing alone or to 
what extent and in which way those modes co-occur and interact given different 
patterns of cognitive, situational and motivational factors. On the one hand 
heuristic and systematic processing may be used in an additive way whenever 
both heuristic-cue information as well as other judgment-relevant information, 
so-called individuating information that describes a certain context in a more 
detailed and specific way, point into the same direction, i. e. are not 
contradictory. Such additivity is likely to occur for example in situations where 
consumers are asked to evaluate some product and where its brand name serves 
as a positive heuristic cue which is also in accordance with other individuating 
information about that product. In such a situation the brand name as a heuristic 
cue establishes an already quite high level of actual confidence on top of which 
some further systematic processing based on the individuating information 
closes the gap to the desired confidence. In cases where the "brand name" 
heuristic is not applicable, e. g. when the brand name is not given or that 
particular brand is not known to the person (non-availability of the heuristic) the 
level of actual confidence is quite low at the beginning so that systematic 
processing on the basis of the individuating information has to occur to a higher 
degree in order to attain the sufficiency threshold. 
On the other hand, heuristic cues like e. g. the brand name can also lead to a 
biased processing of individuating information. In this case, systematic 
processing does not only occur to a lower degree than in the example above but 
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individuating information is even seen in a more favorable light. Thus, in those 
cases when individuating information is ambiguous to some extent or even 
contradictory and would, therefore, require more complex reasoning about the 
task at hand, the presence of heuristic cues, e. g. positive ones like the brand 
name or negative ones like the doubtful quality of the source of information, can 
lead to systematic processing of the individuating information either in a more 
favorable or in a more unfavorable light. In both cases the outcome of the 
evaluation will be biased. Such effects were indeed found in experimental 
studies ( cf. Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994, Chen et al. 1996). Similar effects 
occur when people are given information on the opinions of others, e. g. of 
representatives of their own peer group, on certain task-relevant issues, so that 
the "consensus" heuristic was shown to have a large biasing effect on systematic 
processing of individuating information. 
All aspects of the ELM and HSM mentioned above are relevant in the context 
of CVM surveys. The level of motivation of a respondent to evaluate an 
environmental change scenario may depend highly on the specific good to be 
valued. In case the environmental change has a high personal relevance for the 
respondent he may be more highly motivated to scrutinize the given information 
and, thus, engage in the central route of information processing. On the other 
hand, an environmental change scenario showing a low degree of personal 
relevance may, therefore, trigger the peripheral route and lead to superficial 
information processing with a higher susceptibility to heuristic cues present in 
the scenario or payment scheme. The HSM addresses even more specifically 
the role of such heuristic cues. It highlights the role a positive heuristic cue, e. g. 
the participation of a well-known and respected non-governmental organization 
in the implementation of the environmental project, may play in the way a 
respondent processes and evaluates further project relevant, i. e. individuating, 
information. The presence of that organization may create a notion of trust 
where the respondent evaluates the given information in a more favorable light 
than he would otherwise do if that organization were not mentioned. Moreover, 
Chen and Chaiken (1999)'s findings on the consensus heuristic highlight the 
danger of including information about what other people think of project related 
issues into the questionnaire since people tend to follow the consensus in case 
they consider themselves as part of that group. 
Another important feature of the HSM in relation to CVM response behavior 
is the "multiple-motive framework" which serves as a classification for people's 
motivations to engage in heuristic or systematic processing. Three basic types of 
motivation are distinguished: (1) accuracy motivation which claims that people 
are motivated to hold accurate attitudes and beliefs, (2) defense motivation 
which "refers to the desire to hold attitudes and beliefs that are congruent with 
one's perceived material interests or existing self-definitional attitudes and 
beliefs" ( cf. Chen and Chaiken 1999: 77), and (3) impression motivation 
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referring to a social goal, the need to be perceived by others in a certain way. 
This latter type of motivation addresses the considerations of people w. r. t. the 
interpersonal consequences of expressing attitudes or making judgments. In 
order to satisfy certain impression objectives people process information 
selectively where, again, certain cues might activate heuristics like "Go along to 
get along" which suppress any more systematic processing. In a CVM context 
the presence of such a motivation type could lead to social desirability effects or 
the tendency of "yea"-saying as discussed above. 
These three different motives may be active at the same time in a specific 
decision situation. For example, a respondent in a CVM interview might 
predominantly be motivated to determine his true willingness to pay for the 
provision of improvement of some public good (accuracy motivation). At the 
same time he would like his answer to reflect his view of himself as being a 
good citizen who cares for society (defense motivation) as well as he would like 
to make a good impression on the interviewer who he assumes to expect him to 
show his care for the environment (impression motivation). All these three 
motivations will then influence the way the respondent processes the 
information presented to him in the CVM scenario. For example, informational 
uncertainties might not be strongly taken into account in the evaluation of the 
scenario due to the desire to make a good impression on the interviewer, his 
view of himself as a good citizen obliges him to contribute to the project 
although he has doubts regarding its environmental efficacy etc. Thus, the 
multiple-motive framework of the HSM corresponds well with socially 
interactive situations like CVM interviews and might help to better understand 
respondent behavior in such conflicting situations. 
Cacioppo and Petty ( 1982) and Cacioppo et al. (I 996) argue that there are 
individual differences in the degree of elaboration people generally engage in. 
Some people intrinsically enjoy thinking and problem solving, some people 
draw pleasure from effortful thought regardless of its practical use while other 
people don't. In order to measure such individual differences that do not merely 
vary between situations but as general traits between people Cacioppo and Petty 
( 1982) developed a scale which they called "Need for Cognition" (NFC), i. e. 
"the tendency for an individual to engage in and enjoy thinking". Selected 
elements of the NFC scale will later be utilized for the empirical research in this 
study. The NFC is a self-report scale where test persons are asked to rate to what 
extent given statements concerning cognitive behavior, e. g. "I really enjoy a 
task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems" apply to them. 
From a multitude of such questions, an overall score for their individual need for 
cognition is computed. As such the NFC scale represents a one-dimensional 
bipolar measure of general cognitive disposition, i. e. a high score on the scale 
implies a high tendency of the individual for central-route processing and at the 
same time a low affinity to peripheral-route processing and vice versa. It has 
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been found in various studies that the NFC scale produces a reliable measure of 
an individual's general cognitive disposition as perceived by the ELM and that it 
corresponds well to a number of objective indicators like the type of profession. 
While the ELM and the HSM already highlighted essential aspects of 
employing the two systems of reasoning in general and in the context of 
environmental valuation interviews, the integrative framework of cognitive-
experiential self-theory (CEST) developed by Epstein (1985) shall be used in 
this study as the conceptual backbone of this study. CEST shares with the other 
models the distinction of the two basic and different systems of information 
processing or reasoning: a preconscious system termed "experiential" and a 
primarily conscious system termed "rational". In general, the experiential system 
as the more basic system operates largely without much effort, employs 
associations and heuristics for rapid but mostly efficient reasoning for everyday 
life, while the rational system requires considerable cognitive resources and 
relies on a person's understanding of logical rules of inference. 
An important integrative feature of CEST is the concept of four basic needs 
which incorporates the multiple-motive framework of the HSM. According to 
Epstein and Pacini (1999) the basic needs of an individual are: ( 1) to maximize 
pleasure and minimize pain (in accordance with other psychological theories), 
(2) to maintain a stable, coherent conceptual system for organizing the data of 
experience, (3) to maintain relatedness to others and (4) to maintain a favorable 
level of self-esteem. The interaction of these four basic needs is assumed to 
determine the actual behavior where, in general, a compromise between these 
needs has to be found since it is often not possible to satisfy all of them at the 
same time. Thus, this psychological concept corresponds closely to economic 
principles where it is assumed that an individual strives to find an optimal 
balance in the consumption of a variety of goods that is limited by an available 
budget. Just as the level of consumption of one good is traded off against the 
level of consumption of another in order to maximize the individual's well-
being, the fulfillment of the basic needs is traded off so that an optimal balance 
is found for the individual. However, unlike in economics no formal theory 
w. r. t. this optimal trade off among basic needs has been developed in 
psychology so far, but the proximity to economics is striking in this respect. 
Regarding interpersonal differences in the way people process information, 
the framework of personal beliefs, i. e. theories that are established by an 
individual about himself, the world and their connections, is of particular 
importance. In the rational system these theories are explicit in the sense that an 
individual is able to consciously state and explain them ( explicit beliefs), while 
those beliefs that refer to the experiential system are not directly expressible, 
i.e. they are held implicitly (implicit beliefs) and are, therefore, often termed 
"schemas". Schemas represent generalizations that are derived from emotionally 
significant experiences of an individual in the past, they represent the 
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individual's implicit model of the world. In the context of environmental 
valuation a respondent in a CVM interview might hold the explicit belief that 
e. g. contamination of the drinking water source with bacteria will most likely 
result in many cases of diarrhea. A typical belief that is held only implicitly, for 
example, is that an interviewer engaged in a CVM survey regarding a proposed 
environmental project like the improvement of water quality in an area has a 
personal interest in that project and, in turn, expects the respondent to state a 
favorable answer. However, the respondent would most likely not be able to 
state this belief explicitly and, in fact, it would not even be correct in most cases. 
Nevertheless, it can influence his response behavior by triggering a higher WTP 
statement for the project than he actually has. 
Furthermore, in analogy to the four basic needs CEST postulates four basic 
beliefs which are formed by an individual's "intuitive assessments of the degree 
to which ( 1) the world is benign versus malevolent; (2) the world is meaningful 
(including predictable, controllable, and just) versus chaotic (including 
unpredictable, uncontrollable, and unjust); (3) relationships with others are 
supportive versus threatening; and (4) the self is worthy (including competent, 
good, and lovable) versus unworthy (including incompetent, bad, and 
unlovable)" (cf. Epstein and Pacini 1999: 464). 
This implicit model of the world as composed of an individual's basic beliefs 
influences an individual's behavior in the sense that it determines the available 
and applicable heuristics and rules of thumb in the experiential system and 
influences the degree to which an activation of the rational system occurs. For 
example, an individual holding the implicit belief that the world is largely 
chaotic will have little trust in his own possibilities to influence outcomes and 
thus little motivation to engage in effortful rational cognitive processes. 
Individual differences in these implicit beliefs form the foundations for 
individual differences w. r. t. people's employment of experiential versus 
rational information processing. Such individual differences can be captured in 
empirical instruments like the rational experiential inventory (REI) that will be 
introduced in detail in chapter 4 and from which the empirical survey instrument 
for the analysis of boundedly rational information processing in this study is 
derived. · 
In summary, this section has presented and discussed a selection of 
psychological dual-process models that directly relate to the context of 
reasoning and decision making in environmental valuation studies, specifically 
in the context of CVM interviews. The ELM distinguishes between a central and 
a peripheral route of information processing where the level of motivation of an 
individual determines the cognitive effort, i. e. the elaboration, that is expended 
on a task. The HSM becomes more explicit in the description of the various 
processes in the two modes where the use of heuristics, rules of thumb, schemas 
etc. are perceived as relatively effortless processes that are assisted by more 
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systematic reasoning only to the extent that some desired level of confidence, 
the sufficiency threshold, can be attained. Finally, cognitive-experiential self-
theory CEST can be seen as an integration of the variety of dual-process models 
into a broader coherent theory of behavior 
All of these models share the principle of economy of cognition or the least-
effort principle which states that an individual possesses limited cognitive 
resources that have to be allocated to the two information processing systems in 
such a way that a judgment of satisfactory or sufficient quality is achieved, 
where the level of satisfaction or sufficiency is determined by personal and 
individual factors. It was shown that cognitive resources may be limited in two 
ways: on the one hand the capability of an individual w. r. t. systematic 
processing in principle may be limited; on the other the short time intervals 
between judgments and decisions to be taken usually limit the possibility for 
fully systematic processing which occurs serially and is thus subject to 
bottleneck effects. Therefore, a division of cognitive load occurs between those 
tasks that can be accomplished by a mostly parallely-operating low-effort 
system using heuristics, schemas and prototypes etc. that have been learned by 
past experiences and those tasks that require effortful serial and systematic 
processing due to their novelty (lack of sufficient previous experience) or 
complexity. All models argue that such a division of labor is highly adaptive to 
real-world decision environments while nevertheless in a number of situations 
systematic judgment and decision errors occur that leave an individual short of 
optimality. 
Therefore, the dual-process models of reasoning fit the framework of bounded 
rationality as laid out in section 3.3 very well and provide a detailed cognitive 
psychological foundation for the observed limitations and non-optimal outcomes 
in real-world situations. These models also demonstrate that such behavior, even 
the obvious judgmental errors, should not be regarded as irrational behavior and, 
thus, as behavior outside the realm of economics, but that such a dual-process 
reasoning system must be regarded as an optimal adaptation to the limitations, 
both personal and situational, of the real world. As a result the insights gained 
from cognitive psychology and especially from the dual-process models of 
reasoning will be used in the research approach of this study in order to analyze 
decision making in environmental valuation under the perspective of bounded 
rationality. 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter presented and explored the rationality concept in economics and 
the development of the conceptual framework of bounded rationality in a broad 
perspective where a special focus was laid on its links to psychology. It was 
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shown how the concept of instrumental rationality forming the main paradigm 
of neoclassical economics today has evolved from the rationality postulate by 
Adam Smith explaining economic agents' actions with the pursuit of their self-
interests. The common set of rationality axioms of an agent's preference 
ordering form the foundations for analyzing economic actions in formal models. 
The main rationality principle of such preference orderings, consistency, as 
postulated by the transitivity axiom, however, has often been criticized since 
many instances of systematic violations of this principle were observed in 
economic choices in the real world. Instrumental rationality can thus be 
perceived as a normative, i. e. idealized, rationality concept. 
Observations of violations of transitivity, especially in cases of decision under 
risk and uncertainty, gave rise to efforts to extend the neoclassical rationality 
concept where special focus was laid on a more realistic perception of economic 
agents. Herbert Simon was the first to systematically include economic agents' 
limited cognitive capacities into models of rationality where he emphasized the 
role of the procedures as opposed to the outcome of decision making resulting in 
the concept of procedural rationality. Instead of cognitively effortful analytical 
reasoning the use of simplifying heuristics or shortcuts leading to satisfactory as 
opposed to optimal outcomes is highlighted in this concept. The hybrid 
rationality concepts of institutional and evolutionary rationality incorporate both 
instrumental and procedural rationality while focusing more specifically on the 
development of such heuristic decision rules. These extended rationality 
concepts are often termed "descriptive" and, in conjunction, form the 
overarching concept of bounded rationality. 
The main characteristic of bounded rationality is the co-occurrence of 
analytical and heuristic reasoning in real-world information processing and 
decision making. This puts the respective use of either reasoning processes in 
the center of research on boundedly rational decision making. Psychological 
models of reasoning, most notably from the field of modem cognitive 
psychology, provide a suitable framework for an analysis of this trade-off and 
the mental mechanisms at work. They show that the human mind performs an 
"economy of cognition" in that cognitive resources are allocated selectively to 
tasks according to whether they can be performed in a rather effortless way by 
making use of past experience and fast associations or whether they require a 
more effortful systematic processing due to their complexity, importance or 
novelty. This type of reasoning using two fundamentally different systems of 
information processing is captured in dual-process models like the elaboration 
likelihood model, the heuristic-systematic model and cognitive-experiential self-
theory 
The psychological models highlight the importance of information processing 
in CVM interviews. Cognitive psychology shows under which circumstances 
respondents may exhibit limited attention capacities due to bottleneck effects 
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and may have problems in absorbing, representing and storing scenario 
information necessary for subsequent evaluation. Heuristic cues functioning as 
signals that it may be possible for the respondent to deviate from effortful 
information processing and make use of simplifying decision rules, instead, 
were identified as the main reasons why respondents may exhibit boundedly 
rational behavior and be susceptible to the procedural biases of the CVM 
presented in chapter 2. 
The framework of bounded rationality with its connection to the 
psychological dual-process approaches to reasoning is, therefore, closely linked 
to the observed rationality problems of respondents in environmental valuation 
surveys. It provides a suitable basis for the analysis of information processing in 
CVM interviews. This task shall be approached in the following chapter. 
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4 Bounded rationality in environmental valuation 
4.1 Review and outline of the chapter 
The preceding chapters dealt with rationality as one of the central topics in 
economic decision making and put special emphasis on the role of rationality in 
environmental valuation. As was laid out in detail in chapter 2 a rational 
decision in the context of an environmental valuation interview using the 
Contingent Valuation Method requires that a respondent be able to evaluate 
whether he or she is better off after some proposed project with environmental 
consequences has been carried out than before. In addition, the response, i. e. the 
stated WTP or WT A, must be consistent with this personal evaluation of 
expected change in well-being resulting from the proposed project. It was 
shown, however, that in the practice of environmental valuation respondents 
seem to have difficulties conforming to these requirements of rational decision 
making. Often, the available time during such an interview is rather short so that 
the respondent may have trouble evaluating a complex environmental change 
scenario thoroughly enough to take all the personal consequences resulting from 
the project into account. Due to the novelty of the situation for a respondent in 
an environmental valuation interview the respondent may not even be certain 
what his preferences relating to the proposed environmental change are. 
Moreover, the design of the questionnaire, like e.g. the WTP elicitation question 
or the specific payment vehicle used, exerts a significant influence on the 
respondent's reasoning and decision making which results in numerous 
procedural biases well documented by an abundant literature. 
In order to put these findings into the general context of decision making in 
economics chapter 3 explored violations of rationality in a broader perspective. 
The biases detected in environmental valuation interviews are largely consistent 
with findings from the field of behavioral economics where the concept of 
bounded rationality is used as a more realistic perspective on human reasoning. 
Psychological decision mechanisms like the availability, representativeness and 
anchoring and adjustment heuristics made famous by Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky were shown to be responsible for a wide variety of common 
reasoning failures. A closer look at central findings of cognitive psychology then 
revealed that human beings have developed and learned mental strategies to 
cope with the complexity of reasoning and decision making situations in the real 
world enabling them to make "reasonable" decisions, however often not based 
on exact judgment, with their limited cognitive capabilities. Such decisions seem 
to make use of a two-tiered mechanism of information processing where an 
analytical system requiring rather large amounts of cognitive resources and a 
more effortless intuitive system based on experience and learned decision rules, 
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i. e. heuristics, interact in a kind of "economy of cognition". It was also shown 
in chapter 3 that such psychological models of reasoning, the so-called dual-
process models, may well be related to information processing and decision 
making in the context of environmental valuation interviews and, thus, have the 
potential to better explain and analyze procedural biases in CVM response 
behavior. 
This chapter will now build on this literature review and the connection that 
has been established between psychological models of reasoning and response 
behavior in CVM surveys in order to gain a more realistic perspective of the 
way respondents process complex information in CVM interviews where both 
time and the available information are limited in principle. As described above, 
two aspects are of particular importance in this respect: (I) how respondents 
deal with preference uncertainty, and (2) whether and to what extent respondents 
make use of an "economy of cognition" and, consequently, base their decisions 
in CVM interviews on simplifying heuristics instead of thorough analytical 
reasoning. 
In section 4.2 these two aspects will first be considered from a theoretical 
point of view. Regarding preference uncertainty, section 4.2. l will present and 
discuss a modification of the traditional neoclassical model of preference 
orderings. The concept of fuzzy preferences will be used to describe the 
uncertainty over preferences with respect to environmental goods. It will be 
shown, however, that the practicability of this approach is rather limited since it 
is technically not possible to derive proper value functions for environmental 
goods like e. g. the Hicksian Compensating Variation which would be necessary 
for a quantitative representation of environmental values. Section 4.2.2 will then 
address the issue of information processing in CVM interviews from the 
perspective of bounded rationality and the dual-process models of reasoning 
described in chapter 3. From those models a specific set of expectations 
concerning boundedly rational CVM response behavior will be formulated 
which serves as the basis for the development of empirical instruments for 
classifying and detecting such behavior. 
In section 4.3 these instruments will then be used in an empirical CVM study 
regarding the social benefits of an improvement of tap water quality in northern 
Thailand. The purpose of this empirical application is to test the usefulness of 
the developed instruments for the analysis of boundedly rational information 
processing behavior and for the development of recommendations for an 
improvement of CVM survey designs. The empirical study underlying this test 
was conducted as part of a subproject within an international collaborative 
research project in northern Thailand. Thus, section 4.3.1 will first describe the 
background and the design of the empirical research project conducted and will 
present the details of the implementation of the scales of bounded rationality 
within this project. Section 4.3.2 will present and discuss the empirical results of 
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the project in general and, in greater detail, of the bounded rationality scales 
employed. Subsequently, the implications of the empirical results of the chosen 
research approach for the design of contingent valuation studies will be 
discussed. 
4.2 Theoretical considerations 
4.2.1 Dealing with preference uncertainty: a fuzzy approach 
In section 2.2.2 of chapter 2 it was argued that it is plausible to assume that 
some respondents in CVM surveys are uncertain about their preferences toward 
environmental goods when having to state their WTP. Due to unfamiliarity with 
the good and the task to express rather abstract values people commonly hold 
for the environment in monetary terms it appears more reasonable to consider 
the existence of an uncertainty range within which respondents are not entirely 
sure whether they are truly willing to pay a particular monetary amount or not. 
Below that range respondents are certain that they would pay the proposed 
amount, above that range they are certain that they would reject to pay it. As 
was shown in the preceding chapter the methodological approaches to account 
for such a situation of preference uncertainty are manifold and deal with this 
quite uncommon situation in ways that appear rather ad hoc, i. e. they are not 
founded on an underlying coherent theory of preference uncertainty. 
The purpose of this section is to consider an existing theory of preference 
uncertainty more thoroughly and to apply it to the context of environmental 
valuation in order to (possibly) rationalize the approaches described in 2.2.2 on 
the basis of a theory of preference uncertainty. To this end, a theory of 
preferences based on fuzzy set theory shall be unearthed from the rather 
unnoticed and inaccessible niche it has been occupying in the literature, mostly 
in highly specialized journals, so far. The advantage of fuzzy set theory for a 
description of preference uncertainty is its inherent concept of vagueness or 
ambivalence. Unlike in the two-valued logic where a statement is either true or 
false fuzzy set theory, or fuzzy logic as it is often called, allows intermediate 
states where a statement is neither fully true nor entirely false, just as one would 
assume a respondent in CVM to be neither fully sure about whether he would 
actually pay a proposed amount nor entirely certain that he would definitely not 
pay it, at least for amounts falling into his range of uncertainty. Therefore, fuzzy 
set theory and the existing theory of fuzzy preferences provide a suitable starting 
point for considering preference uncertainty in the context of environmental 
valuation. 
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4.2.1.1 Fuzzy logic and fuzzy preferences 
Fuzzy set theory dates back to Lofti Zadeh (1965) who developed the concept of 
fuzzy sets building on the concept of multi-valued logic introduced by the Polish 
mathematician Jan Lukasiewicz in the 1920s. Multi-valued logic was successful 
in solving problems in quantum physics that could not be adequately addressed 
by the commonly used crisp sets of standard two-valued Boolean logic. In a 
crisp set A some x e X either is an element of some set A or it is not an element 
of that set, i. e. there exists certainty as to whether x belongs to A or not. Crisp 
sets are common in the real world: e. g. from a number of objects, let's say cars, 
bicycles and boats, it can usually be determined without doubt which ones are 
classified as land transportation vehicles and which are water transportation 
vehicles. 
In the case of a fuzzy set A, however, a given element x e X may not fully 
belong to the fuzzy set but only to some degree while it may belong to some 
degree to some other fuzzy set B , i. e. following Ott (2001: 14) a fuzzy set 
A can be defined as 
A= {{x,µA(x))I x e X} where µA(x): x~[0,l]. (4-1) 
The function µA (x) denotes the degree between 0 and 1 to which the element x 
belongs to the fuzzy set A. µA (x) is often called "characteristic function" or 
"membership function" ofx to A (cf. Zimmermann 1996). Let's consider as an 
example the set "high income", a possible category in economics. When this set 
is to be crisp we need to define a lower threshold income above which income is 
classified as "high income". It is obvious that such a threshold is purely arbitrary 
since if the figure 100,000 Euros per year is defined as threshold for high 
incomes it would be hard to justify why an income of 99,000 Euros should not 
be classified as "high income", as well. Here, "high income" could instead be 
defined as a fuzzy set where all incomes at or above 100,000 Euros assume a 
value of the membership function of 1, i.e. µA (x ~ 100,000) = 1, whereas 
values between, let's say, 50,000 and 99,999 Euros assume membership values 
to the fuzzy set A between 0 and 1, i.e. 0 < µA (50,000 $; x $; 99,999) < 1 and 
incomes below 50,000 Euros assume a membership of 0, i. e. strictly do not 
belong to the category "high income". Figure 4-1 graphically illustrates such an 
exemplary fuzzy set "high income". 
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Obviously, fuzzy sets are often used for linguistic categories that are vague by 
definition, i. e. categories without a clear natural boundary of what belongs to 
them and what does not. Another example is the classification of thermal states 
like "cool", "warm" or "hot". There is no clear boundary between these states 
since they represent subjective feelings so that a specific temperature might still 
belong to a certain degree to the state "cool" and to some degree to "warm" 
already. In these cases it has proven very useful to be able to specify the degree 
to which some element is a member of that linguistic category. However, fuzzy 
sets and fuzzy logic have also become favorite concepts in the field of 
technology whenever complex technical processes are controlled by automated 
computer programs (cf. Klir and Yuan 1995 for examples). The mathematics of 
fuzzy sets, however, has become quite complicated and is a field of fast 
development where many fundamental theorems have not yet been proven. This 
section will, therefore, make use of only simple fuzzy mathematics in order to 
illustrate the basic features of fuzzy preferences. 
An important concept of fuzzy logic necessary for a simple representation of 
fuzzy preferences are fuzzy relations ( cf. Ovchinnikov 1981, Ovchinnikov and 
Roubens 1992). In the crisp, i.e. non-fuzzy case a relation between two 
elements x, y e X is clearly determined, i. e. either x is greater than y or it is 
not, there is no ambivalence. In the case of fuzzy relations this is different: here, 
x may be greater than y only to some degree, let's say a degree of certainty. To 
some degree of certainty it may also be that y is greater than x, it is thus 
ambivalent. Formally, this can be expressed by a fuzzy relation r which is a 
mapping from the two-dimensional space X2 to the closed interval between 0 
and 1, i.e. r: X 2 ~ [ 0, 1 ]. In the case of fuzzy preferences, for example, 
such a vague comparison may occur in case the evaluation of goods is 
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ambivalent, i. e. in case an individual is uncertain regarding his preference of x 
over y. 
Fuzzy preferences can thus be defined as fuzzy preference relations ( cf. Salles 
1998: 322ff). Let x, y E X be two commodity bundles from the non-negative 
commodity space X, then r (x, y) E [0, 1] denotes the degree to which an 
individual considers x to be "at least as good" as y, i.e. x ;i:; y, whereas r (y, x) E 
[0, 1] denotes the degree to which y is considered "at least as good" as x, i.e. 
y ;i:; x. Obviously, the crisp preference relation ;i:; is the limit of the fuzzy 
preference relation r where the relation would only take values of O or 1 ( cf. De 
Wilde 2003). While it appears odd at first sight to assume that the weak 
preference relation ;i:; between two commodity bundles can only be determined 
to a degree between O and 1, the common interpretation of such a degree is how 
certain an individual is that bundle x will generate at least as much utility as 
bundle y, thus the fuzzy preference relation r (x, y) E [0, 1] represents a measure 
of preference uncertainty of the bundles x and y. This uncertainty of assessing 
whether x is at least as good as y may stem from unfamiliarity with the 
commodity bundles, i. e. some commodities have not been consumed before and 
the individual is still uncertain about the utility they generate, or it may stem 
from difficulties in comparing the utilities some of the commodities in bundle x 
generate with the utility other commodities in bundle y generate, thus a 
difficulty with the trade-off of some commodities against others. 
A fuzzy relation that satisfies the properties of reflexivity, strong 
completeness and transitivity as defined below can be considered a fuzzy binary 
preference relation ( cf. Barret et al. 1990: 198, Ott 2001: 97): 
Reflexivity: r ( x, x ) = 1 't/ x E X 
Strong completeness: r(x,y) + r(y,x) ~ 1 't/ x,yeX 
Transitivity: r( x, z) ~ min [ r( x, y ), r( y, z)] 't/ x, y, z e X 
The definition of reflexivity is straightforward and implies that there is no 
uncertainty that the same bundles are actually the same bundles. The property of 
strong completeness is already a quite strong one. It can be interpreted as a 
plausibility assumption of the individual's reasoning about the relation between 
the two bundles: the degree of doubt that x ;i:; y must be explainable at least by 
the degree of confidence that, in tum, y could be at least as good as x (i. e. 
y ;i:; x). The transitivity definition used here is the most commonly used 
definition of transitivity in the theory of fuzzy preferences and follows Barrett et 
al. ( 1990: 198). However, there are a number of alternative definitions that differ 
to some degree from the definition above ( cf. Salles 1998, Dasgupta and Deb 
1996). The meaning of transitivity is that the degree of preference of x over z 
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cannot be smaller than the weakest degree of preference of x over y or of y over 
z. If this condition were violated the individual would be "too uncertain" 
regarding his preference of x over z, i. e. the preference uncertainty between x 
and z could not be explained by the uncertainty between x and y and y and z 
alone and would thus be "irrational". 
4.2.1.2 Is it possible to assess fuzzy preferences regarding the environment? 
The theoretical concept to express uncertainty over preferences between 
commodity bundles in terms of fuzzy binary preference relations as defined 
above seems quite attractive at first sight. As opposed to other approaches of 
preference uncertainty (cf. Li and Mattsson 1995, Wang 1997) that define 
uncertainty in an ad-hoc fashion fuzzy relations allow to express uncertainty in a 
fuzzy preference ordering that fulfills the usual properties of ( quasi-)orders 
reflexivity, completeness and transitivity in their fuzzy definitions. However, 
and this is bad news for environmental valuation, no suitable concept of fuzzy 
utility functions has been derived so far from fuzzy preference orderings as 
defined above. 
The Hicksian welfare measures presented in chapter 2 forming the basis for 
expressing welfare changes resulting from changes in environmental quality are, 
however, not based on the (direct) utility function but on the expenditure 
function. But, again, it is also not possible to derive a fuzzy version of the 
expenditure function since this would require a suitable definition of a fuzzy 
utility level or an upper contour set for the expenditure minimization ( cf. 
Ahlheim and Rose 1989: 264). For the expenditure minimization problem the 
restriction, i. e. the upper contour set, must be a convex set, a requirement which 
is as such not fulfilled in the fuzzy case due to the uncertainty over preferences. 
Thus, a derivation of welfare measures in analogy to those usually employed 
when preferences are crisp, i. e. certain, remains elusive. 
It appears, therefore, that a formal treatment of preference uncertainty in the 
context of environmental valuation is not possible and that the various ad-hoc 
approaches described in chapter 2 to take such uncertainty of respondents into 
account remain the only practicable way. However, due to the lack of a clear 
reference point how such uncertainty should be treated none of the proposed 
approaches can be recommended as being a good representation of preference 
uncertainty. Moreover, the direct assessment of how certain respondents are that 
they would actually pay a proposed or stated amount of money must be seen 
very critical. It must be suspected that respondents do not want to reveal their 
uncertainty of whether to pay or not, especially not in the presence of an 
interviewer and when the good under consideration is a public good, i. e. a 
"good cause". In such a situation, respondents are likely to understate their 
uncertainty, especially when assessed after the WTP question. 
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An ideal way of assessing preference uncertainty, therefore, would be to 
avoid any personal statements regarding the level of uncertainty but, instead, to 
repeatedly assess the same respondent's WTP for the proposed project. In case 
the response varies over time one could use this information to compute a 
measure of uncertainty. However, such an approach is certainly not practicable 
since respondents would be annoyed if their WTP for the same project were 
assessed every few weeks or so. Instead, it appears more sensible to concentrate 
on indirect approaches for detecting uncertainty, i. e. some proxy variable that is 
strongly correlated with uncertainty but at the same time not as problematic to 
assess directly as the personal uncertainty statement used in many CVM 
surveys. As mentioned in section 2.2.2 the existence of preference uncertainty 
might be an important factor for explaining the occurrence of common 
procedural biases in CVM like the starting point bias, the social desirability 
effect and the embedding effect. Uncertain respondents being forced to give a 
precise WTP statement in the DC or the PC question format, for instance, are 
likely to make use of reference points, frames or circumstances of the interview 
in order to narrow down the sensible figures from their range of uncertainty. 
Therefore, the measurement of a respondent's uncertainty level might be useful 
in two ways: (1) to explain the occurrence of procedural biases, and (2) to serve 
as a test for the reliability of WTP statements in CVM surveys. 
In the following section such a proxy variable for the assessment of 
respondents' levels of uncertainty will be developed and included into an 
integrated empirical instrument to detect and classify boundedly rational 
information processing and decision making in CVM. 
4.2.2 Considering bounded rationality in environmental valuation 
Building on the research on bounded rationality in the field of cognitive 
psychology the central objective of this study is to analyze the role different 
kinds of information processing play in environmental valuation surveys. In 
chapter 3 it was discussed that responses in a CVM interview could depend 
heavily on the way information is received, stored and processed in the human 
brain and that the specific situation of such interviews puts more or less serious 
pressure on respondents' limited cognitive capacities. It can be argued that these 
limitations play an important role for the occurrence of the procedural biases 
described in detail in chapter 2. The research approach taken here, therefore, 
aims at applying the theoretical framework of bounded rationality as described 
by cognitive psychological models of reasoning and information processing to 
the context of CVM surveys in order to scrutinize the rationality assumption of 
respondents in environmental valuation interviews. It is expected that the 
adoption of this perspective leads to new insights regarding so far unexplained 
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non-rational response behavior, i. e. the observed procedural biases, in CVM 
surveys. Finally, these insights shall lead to recommendations for an 
improvement of the design ofCVM surveys. 
First, a normative view of how respondents should behave and perform in 
such interviews so that valid and reliable results are achieved will be laid out. 
This normative view will then serve as a reference for the assessment of the 
influence of boundedly rational behavior and of the impact on the validity and 
reliability of CVM results. Subsequently, the specific research questions 
following from the analysis of expected problems resulting from bounded 
rationality in CVM surveys will be developed. These research questions, then, 
will lead to the construction of an empirical survey instrument that is suited for 
detecting boundedly rational behavior and analyze specific kinds of information 
processing in empirical CVM studies. This survey instrument will be derived 
from the rational experiential inventory (REI) which is based on cognitive-
experiential self theory (CEST) presented and discussed in detail in the 
preceding chapter. In order to fit the needs and specifics of contingent valuation 
studies, the existing REI will be adapted so that a new empirical tool for the 
assessment of the degree of individual differences in the type of information 
processing and decision making in environmental valuation studies based on 
CEST will be available. 
4.2.2.1 What constitutes rationality in environmental valuation? The normative 
view 
Chapter 3 presented an ambivalent view of bounded rationality: on the one hand 
the cognitive limitations and the ensuing simplifying heuristics and mental short 
cuts were seen as sources of biases and systematic errors in human judgment 
and decision making. Many empirical experiments where people's behavior in 
decision tasks was tested against objective criteria of decision quality exhibited 
those effects consistently and a number of experimental setups that facilitate the 
occurrence of such biased behavior were identified. This is the main view of the 
heuristics and biases research program around Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky. On the other hand, as argued in line with the descriptive rationality 
concepts presented in section 3 .2.2, the employment of simplified decision rules 
represents an evolutionary adaptation to the complexity of real-world decision 
environments. In order to be able to deal with the multitude of everyday 
decisions, individuals make use of mechanisms that have turned out to be 
successful in the past. As a result, it is sometimes argued that such simplifying 
heu_ristics are not a source of bias in comparison to normative decision strategies 
but instead necessary means to achieve, on average, the best outcomes possible 
in such real-world environments (cf. Payne et al. 1993, Todd and Gigerenzer 
2003 for details regarding ecological rationality in the real world). Thus, 
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"economy of cognition" is not necessarily a source of bias, as argued by 
Kahneman and Tversky, but an ecologically rational behavior adapted to the 
structure of decision environments outside of the laboratory. As a result, there 
are two conflicting views w. r. t. the role of bounded rationality in human 
judgment and decision making and both rest on a firm experimental basis. 
The question that invariably arises is which of the perspectives on bounded 
rationality applies to the context of environmental valuation studies employing 
empirical assessment methods like for example the CVM. Under the first 
perspective any boundedly rational behavior would introduce systematic errors 
and biases into the empirical data which would result in invalid and unreliable 
benefit estimates. Under the second perspective, any use of boundedly rational 
decision making strategies would have to be considered as ecologically rational, 
i. e. the resulting estimates would have to be regarded as valid and reliable since 
they are a product of respondents' "economy of cognition" and, thus, well 
adapted to the constraints of the particular decision environment. 
From a normative perspective, however, the concept of ecological rationality 
based on the "economy of cognition" should clearly be discarded as a reference 
for the rationality of decisions in environmental valuation interviews. Since the 
aim of environmental valuation is the elicitation of people's true preferences 
w. r. t. an environmental, i. e. a public, good any type of information processing 
circumventing thorough and differentiated reasoning about the elements of a 
CVM scenario cannot be considered to be an appropriate way for individuals to 
evaluate and express their preferences. Thus, it is clearly not in the interest of 
environmental valuation surveys to allow respondents to strategically employ 
mental shortcuts and heuristic reasoning in order to deal with the complexity of 
a CVM scenario since such behavior would prevent them from expressing their 
true preferences for the proposed environmental good. Instead, a CVM survey 
should be crafted in a way that respondents are able to fully reflect on the 
proposed scenario and express their preferences on the basis of thorough 
reasoning. 
4.2.2.2 Why is bounded rationality a problem in environmental valuation? 
Having established the reference of fully rational reasoning as the rationality 
concept of choice in environmental valuation it must be discussed in what ways 
respondents in CVM surveys can be expected to deviate from such information 
processing. In chapter 2 it was shown that respondents in CVM interviews are 
susceptible to a number of procedural biases of which the most prominent are 
the embedding effect, the warm glow of giving, the hypothetical bias, framing 
effects and the starting point and range biases. The occurrence of these biases 
reflects the fact that respondents often do not behave fully rational and give rise 
to the suspicion that important scenario information is processed in some limited 
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way. As mentioned in chapter 3 an explanation for such limited information 
processing is provided by the dual-process models of reasoning which state that 
human beings try to economize on the cognitive resources employed for solving 
a decision problem. 
The heuristic-systematic model (HSM), for example, provides an explicit 
explanation for the mechanism of choosing the type and level of information 
processing based on the gap between the actual and the desired levels of 
confidence w. r. t. a decision. It is argued that actual confidence is determined 
by a quick assessment of the available information and the search for heuristic 
cues within this information that will give the decision maker a first orientation 
of how he should decide. Actual confidence will be high if one strong heuristic 
cue, i. e. a piece of information that is perceived by the decision maker to be a 
reliable indicator for his choice or a few cues pointing in the same direction can 
be found. If information is perceived to be contradictory or unreliable, or if no or 
few heuristic cues exist in a decision environment, the level of actual confidence 
will be low. The amount of systematic processing, i. e. of thorough assessment 
of the given decision situation in the light of the available information, is 
determined by the gap between this actual confidence after the assessment of 
heuristic cues and the level of confidence that this particular decision maker 
feels comfortable with in order to make a decision. 
Given the findings of the dual-process models it must be assumed that a 
similar mechanism of "economy of cognition" determines information 
processing and decision making in the context of contingent valuation 
interviews, as well. Thus, decision makers automatically search for, or at least 
are attentive to, such heuristic cues present in the information on the given 
decision problem in order to keep the cognitive effort that needs to be employed 
for the decision task as low as possible while achieving a desired level of 
confidence concerning that decision. In this line of thought the above mentioned 
procedural biases of the CVM could be interpreted as instances of simplified, 
i. e. heuristic information processing and decision making, that was triggered by 
the presence of heuristic cues in the given information and decision context. 
Non-contradictory heuristic cues would lead to an already high level of actual 
confidence and the remaining confidence gap to the confidence level desired by 
the respondent would be filled by analytical processing. Instead, an absence of 
such heuristic cues would have led to a lower level of actual confidence so that 
more analytical information evaluation processes would have been necessary in 
order to achieve the desired level of confidence. 
As has become obvious from this discussion about known procedural biases 
of the CVM a wide variety of pieces of information contained in the design and 
specification of a CVM scenario have the potential to serve as heuristic cues. 
These cues could subsequently lead to some form of limited information 
processing and decision making which is not based on the full set of the 
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infonnation provided in the contingent decision setting. As a result, it is of high 
importance to avoid heuristic cues in the specification of CVM scenarios. 
However, certain cues might not be avoidable, e. g. the context in which a 
scenario is framed. Another issue deserves attention, as well: CVM scenarios 
typically contain a considerable amount of infonnation since in a first stage the 
reference situation has to be described with all its attributes so that subsequently 
in a second stage an alternative situation to be valued can be sensibly specified. 
In order to obtain responses in CVM interviews that are based on all these pieces 
of infonnation it is necessary that this infonnation be correctly perceived and 
transferred into the working memory of the respondent. As is known from 
cognitive psychology, the bottleneck effects might limit the uptake of 
infonnation into the working memory. Further, the amount of infonnation that 
can be stored in the working memory for further processing is limited as well 
(see 3.3.3.3 on the articulatory loop and the visuospatial sketchpad). From these 
limitations of attention and memory it follows that heuristic cues contained in 
the presented infonnation gain importance the greater the load of infonnation 
becomes. 
Considering the type of boundedly rational infonnation processing in CVM 
interviews described above, what are the specific heuristics that respondents in 
such interviews may be expected to utilize? On the one hand, heuristic 
infonnation processing may be triggered by heuristic cues present in the survey 
design or the scenario infonnation and, on the other hand, simplified reasoning 
may be used in case respondents are uncertain, e. g. due to the lack of 
experience or infonnation of the environmental good or time limitations during 
the interview. As mentioned above, a fully rational respondent in a CVM 
interview would employ analytical and systematic reasoning, following the 
central route of infonnation processing, as described in the dual-process models 
like the ELM or the HSM in section 3.3.4. Such a respondent would consider all 
aspects of the proposed scenario and evaluate the consequences resulting from 
this scenario for him personally where some aspects would be likely to be of 
greater importance to the respondent than others. Subsequently, the WTP 
statement would follow directly from such an evaluation where the fonnat of the 
WTP elicitation question or the presence of an interviewer have no influence on 
the amount stated. 
This fully rational response behavior of an ideal respondent can be contrasted 
to an infonnation processing and evaluation making use of intuition and 
simplifying heuristics. First, a respondent may not engage in much consideration 
about the proposed scenario at all and state his WTP on the basis of the first 
impression he gets when the scenario is presented to him. Such a WTP statement 
would simply rest on the intuition of the respondent, his "gut feeling". Intuitive 
responses are characterized by a rather quick and effortless decision on how 
much the respondent would be willing to pay, i.e. whether to accept or reject a 
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proposed bid in the dichotomous choice format or which payment interval to 
select from the list of intervals on a payment card. Intuition may either refer to 
the quick formation of the impression the respondent gets from the proposed 
project, i. e. whether he likes it or not, or it may refer to which answer to the 
WTP question is appropriate. In the dichotomous choice format intuition may, 
for example, tell the respondent not to accept to pay any amount if the 
improvement of environmental quality in return for this payment, although in 
the future, is not sufficiently guaranteed. That means, intuition may tell the 
respondent to be skeptical regarding the proposed project and, thus, reject a 
proposed bid that would still be below his personal valuation of the scenario. In 
the case of the payment card format, intuition may tell the respondent to select 
an interval from the full range of the payment card that corresponds to his "fair 
share" in relation to his own position in society, i. e. for example select an 
interval in the mid-range in case he considers himself to belong to the middle 
income group within society. 
Second, a respondent may fail to balance the single aspects of the complex 
project scenario and consider all aspects of equal importance for his decision. 
Such behavior would reflect a lack of elaboration on the proposed scenario 
which could be a result of bottleneck effects in the acquisition of information so 
that the respondent does not even obtain a clear picture of the proposed scenario. 
Furthermore, due to the general impression the respondent gets from the 
scenario he considers it of low personal relevance so that the reasoning process 
when asked to give a monetary valuation follows the peripheral route of 
information processing. The behavior of giving equal importance to the scenario 
elements is related to the intuitive decision making mentioned above, however, 
it is characterized by a generally low personal interest in the proposed scenario. 
The reaction to the WTP elicitation question may be quite similar to the intuitive 
decision maker, though, and thus follow the route described in the preceding 
paragraph. 
A third specific type of limited information processing is the respondent who 
bases his WTP statement only on a few aspects that appear relevant to him. 
While he attributes different importance to the aspects of the scenario, just like 
the fully rational respondent would most likely do, he fails to consider the full 
set of aspects and simply concentrates on the ones that feature most prominent 
in the complex scenario. His WTP statement would, therefore, not reflect those 
aspects of the scenario that were left unconsidered. It may be argued that it is 
normal that some aspects are considered important and others not. However, a 
valid CVM response requires that all aspects are actually considered and in the 
situation where an environmental change scenario is presented with which the 
respondent has little prior experience some aspects may require deeper 
consideration before it is discovered that they actually do have some personal 
relevance to the respondent. A WTP statement based on the consideration of 
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only few aspects, therefore, reflects a tendency toward limited information 
processing and gives rise to the suspicion that not all aspects of the scenario 
were well-understood by the respondent so that the response cannot be based on 
a thorough evaluation of all aspects of the scenario. 
As mentioned above the described three specific types of limited information 
processing may be facilitated by the lack of sufficient information about the 
valuation scenario so that the respondent cannot obtain a clear picture about 
what is to be valued and by time constraints in the interview situation, especially 
when asked to think about his WTP. Both of these aspects may add to the 
respondent's feeling of being uncertain about the relevance of the scenario and, 
thus, his personal WTP for the project. Any analysis aiming at detecting the 
influence of limited information processing must, therefore, take information 
and time limitations into account, as well. 
The dual-process models of reasoning assume the existence of individual 
differences in the way cognitive resources are allocated to decision tasks. It has 
been shown that there exist individual differences in cognitive abilities (as 
measured e.g. by the intelligence quotient, cf. Anderson 2001, or the Cognitive 
Reflection Test, cf. Frederick 2005) as well as in the kind of experiences 
individuals have made in the course of their lives with the applicability of 
heuristic versus analytical information processing ( cf. Epstein et al. 1996). Thus, 
it has been shown that different individuals have developed different strategies 
regarding the application of simplifying heuristics. In addition to these 
differences inherent in the particular person, situational factors of a decision 
environment, e. g. personal involvement with the issue at hand, will lead to 
individual differences in the activation of intuitive-heuristic versus systematic-
analytical processing. As a result, it must be expected that different respondents 
will react to the same situational factors like e. g. heuristic cues contained in the 
design of a CVM study in individually different ways. Some respondents will 
process the given information mostly analytically while others make extensive 
use of the possibilities of limited information processing. The issue of individual 
differences in information processing in CVM interviews will form the core of 
the empirical research in this study. 
4.2.2.3 Research questions and hypotheses 
The discussion on the importance to consider bounded rationality in 
environmental valuation gives rise to a number of specific research questions for 
investigating the type of information processing and decision making in CVM 
interviews in practice. From the cognitive psychology literature on dual-process 
models two aspects can be extracted that form a suitable starting point for the 
derivation of such research questions: (1) the existence of an "economy of 
cognition" in real-world decision situations where individuals economize on 
106 
Oliver Frör - 978-3-631-75515-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 03:56:05AM
via free access
their limited cognitive capacities in any given task, and (2) the existence of 
individual differences in the way given information is processed. Concerning the 
latter, it was shown that individual differences exist both in the general cognitive 
disposition, i. e. whether individuals show the tendency for intuitive-heuristic 
processing in general or whether they have an affinity for systematic-analytical 
reasoning, on the one hand and differences in the way individuals deal with a 
specific decision task on the other, i. e. whether they base their decisions on the 
heuristic cues provided in that task or not. In general, one would expect that 
these two types of individual differences are systematically related, i. e. that 
those individuals having a general cognitive disposition for intuitive-heuristic 
processing will, on average, be also those who make use of heuristic cues more 
often in a specific decision task. 
Taking these distinctions as a starting point for an investigation of the 
importance of boundedly rational behavior in environmental valuation surveys, 
the following four research questions can be derived: 
(1) Do respondents in CVM interviews perform an "economy of cognition" 
and, as a result, exhibit boundedly rational information processing? 
(2) If yes, how can such boundedly rational information processing be detected 
and measured, i. e. what are suitable instruments for identifying boundedly 
rational decision makers and the types of information processing they use? 
(3) What are the relationships between those classifications of rationality and 
stated WTP on the one hand and the occurrence of procedural biases on the 
other? 
( 4) What can be learned from the investigation of the influence of boundedly 
rational information processing for the design of future CVM surveys? 
The first research question addresses the suspicion that the inconsistencies in 
CVM response behavior found in many empirical studies may in principle result 
from cognitive processes that are rooted in the selective employment of 
analytical versus limited information processing depending on respondents' 
feelings of how to optimally allocate cognitive resources to a decision task. As 
such, this research question represents the overarching direction of the research 
approach taken here. If such an "economy of cognition" is not found, i.e. if 
respondents are shown not to employ, at least to some extent, strategies of 
limited information processing as laid out in the preceding section, this cognitive 
psychological concept of dual-processes of reasoning is not suited for explaining 
the still controversial issues in CVM research. 
The second research question focuses on the issue of an empirical 
determination of boundedly rational behavior in CVM interviews. In order to 
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detect such behavior it is necessary to develop empirical survey instruments to 
be employed within a CVM survey so that specific types of information 
processing can be made visible, can be classified into general categories and can 
finally be attributed to every single respondent of the survey. Following the 
discussion of individual differences in information processing it shall also be 
determined which is the best way to describe these individual differences in the 
context of CVM interviews: either by general cognitive dispositions or by the 
task-specific differences in the use of heuristic cues. Aiming at the explanation 
of CVM response behavior, it is not evident a priori whether it suffices to 
characterize individuals by their general cognitive dispositions to process 
information more analytically or more intuitively or whether it is more 
appropriate or even necessary to consider specific task-dependent strategies of 
limited information processing. In order to explore this issue, separate empirical 
instruments for the measurement of general cognitive dispositions and of task-
dependent information processing shall be developed. As mentioned above, it 
may be expected that these two different approaches are related to each other. 
The purpose of the third research question is to scrutinize the open and 
controversially discussed issues of CVM response behavior, i. e. mainly the 
procedural biases described in chapter 2, using the newly developed empirical 
instruments for the classification and measurement of types of information 
processing in CVM interviews. First, it shall be investigated whether the general 
cognitive dispositions or the task-dependent information processing strategies 
are systematically related to the WTP stated by respondents. Again, no clear a 
priori hypothesis exists as to whether respondents exhibiting higher degrees of 
boundedly rational information processing (see section 4.2.2.2) have a higher or 
a lower WTP for environmental projects than respondents taking all aspects of a 
scenario fully into account and employing differentiated analytical reasoning. 
However, one may expect a tendency that in well-crafted and credible CVM 
scenarios thorough analytical processing will lead to higher WTP as compared 
to the limited information processors. This expectation arises from the fact that 
many aspects of environmental scenarios involving non-use values were shown 
to be rather complex and often unfamiliar to the average respondent so that these 
aspects require deeper thought before they are perceived to be of substantial 
personal relevance. Limited information processors that are characterized by a 
superficial and selective evaluation of the given scenario information, therefore, 
can be expected to attribute less personal relevance to an environmental scenario 
as compared to more analytical respondents and might state a lower WTP as a 
consequence. This rather tentative hypothesis shall be tested in the empirical 
example of this study. 
Clearer hypotheses, however, can be formulated regarding the relationships 
between the types of information processing and the occurrence of procedural 
biases in CVM. Expecting clear distinctions between analytical and intuitive 
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respondents both regarding general cogmt1ve dispositions and task-specific 
types of information processing intuitive respondents are expected to show a 
higher degree of susceptibility to biases. Regarding the starting point bias in the 
dichotomous choice question format analytical respondents should have 
developed a clearer picture about the valuation scenario and, thus, their response 
should not be influenced (as much) by the varying starting bids as the response 
of intuitive individuals (see also section 4.2.2.2). The same should hold for the 
range bias in the payment card format. As a general hypothesis, therefore, it 
shall be expected that analytical-rational respondents are less prone to 
procedural biases in CVM surveys than intuitive-heuristic respondents. This 
hypothesis will also be tested in the empirical study below. 
The fourth research question addresses the consequences of the investigation 
of boundedly rational CVM response behavior for CVM surveys. From the 
results of the empirical study below some generalizations shall be deducted that 
may tum out to be useful as a guideline for the improvement of future CVM 
survey designs. It is not the aim of this research to develop a mechanism to 
correct "erroneous" WTP statements, such an approach would require to know 
either "how wrong" the WTP statements of limited information processors are 
or, alternatively, to clearly identify untrustworthy responses and exclude them 
from the sample. Both approaches appear neither realistic nor desirable. In 
contrast, it shall be tried to improve the design of CVM surveys so that 
respondents with a tendency to employ strategies of limited information 
processing increase their use of analytical reasoning in the context of 
environmental valuation surveys. 
4.3 Development of empirical instruments for analyzing 
bounded rationality in CVM 
On the basis of the above discussion an empirical instrument to be included as a 
standardized part of an empirical CVM survey shall be developed in this section 
in order to be able to investigate the research questions stated above. In a first 
step, these instruments shall be developed in a general form in order to be 
applicable and adaptable to any empirical environmental valuation study based 
on stated preferences. In a second step, the developed instruments will be 
applied in an empirical CVM study in section 4.4 and the research questions 
stated in 4.2.2.3 will be investigated. In the following section, a measure of 
individual differences in information processing and decision making which is 
derived from cognitive-experiential self-theory will be described. This measure 
will form the basis for the specific development of the empirical instruments. 
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4.3.1 A measure for individual differences in decision making: the 
rational experiential inventory (REI) 
As the basis for the detection of individual differences in information processing 
and decision making a self-report measure developed by Epstein et al. ( 1996) 
derived from their cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST, see 3.3.4.2) will be 
used. In general, CEST proposes the existence of two fundamental and 
independent modes of reasoning, one based on intuition and personal experience 
and the other based on systematic and analytical cognitive processes. The 
interaction of these thinking styles produces the observable behavior in specific 
decision tasks, where it is assumed that while both styles are active, one usually 
dominates over the other to varying degrees. In addition, individuals are 
expected to differ in the degree to which these thinking styles are in general 
being employed, i. e. in their personal cognitive disposition. The rational 
experiential inventory (REI) was developed as a self-report measure to assess 
the degree to which individuals are confident with employing either thinking 
style in general. Further, it was designed by the authors to provide evidence for 
the assumption that the two thinking styles or information processing modes are 
actually independent from each other and interactive as postulated in CEST 
instead of being simply inversely related (like the NFC). 
In order to test the assumption of CEST that the two processing modes 
operate independently, the REI consists of two distinct sets of questions 
assumed to characterize either mode. The first set of questions refers to the 
degree to which an individual perceives to employ the analytic-rational thinking 
style. The elements of this set are taken from the Need-for-Cognition (NFC) 
scale developed by Cacioppo and Petty (1982) as a measure for the likelihood 
of elaboration in their ELM framework (see 3.3.4.2). The second set of 
questions is used for measuring respondents' tendency to employ the intuitive-
heuristic thinking style. These questions were developed by Epstein et al. ( 1996) 
and termed Faith-in-Intuition (Fl). In conjunction, the NFC and the FI question 
sets form the rational experiential inventory (REI) as a total of 31 questions 
(items) where 19 items are selected from the original NFC scale and 12 items 
make up the FI scale. These questions are presented to test persons in a self-
report test who are asked to rate each given statement on a five-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 = completely false to 5 = completely true. The items of the 
REI are listed in table 4-1 where (R) indicates that the particular item is 
formulated in reverse sense to the level of need for cognition, i. e. a high rating 
on that item would mean a low association with need for cognition. 
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Table 4-1: The Rational Experiential Inventory (adapted from Epstein et al. 
(1996: 394) 
Scale and item 
Need for Cognition (NFC) - analytical scale 
I would rather do something that requires little thought than 
something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities. (R) 
I don't like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that 
requires a lot of thinking. (R) 
I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely 
chance I will have to think in depth about something. (R) 
I find little satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
(R) 
Thinking is not my idea of fun. (R) 
The notion of thinking abstractly is not appealing to me. (R) 
I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
Simply knowing the answer rather than understanding the 
reasons for the answer to a problem is fine with me. (R) 
I don't reason well under pressure. (R) 
The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top does 
not appeal to me. (R) 
I prefer to talk about international problems rather than to gossip 
or talk about celebrities. 
Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much. (R) 
I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important 
to one that is somewhat important but does not require much 
thought. 
I generally prefer to accept things as they are rather than to 
question them. (R) 
It is enough for me that something gets the job done, I don't care 
how or why it works. (R) 
I tend to set goals that can be accomplished only by expending 
considerable mental effort. 
I have difficulty thinking in new and unfamiliar situations. (R) 
I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that 
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Table 4-1 continued 
Scale and item 
Faith in Intuition (FI) - intuitive scale 
My initial impressions of people are almost always right. 
I trust my initial feelings about people. 
When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut 
feelings. 
I believe in trusting my hunches. 
I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong even if I can't 
explain how I know. 
I am a very intuitive person. 
I can typically sense right away when a person is lying. 
I am quick to form impressions about people. 
I believe I can judge character pretty well from a person's 
appearance. 
I often have clear visual images of things. 
I have a very good sense ofrhythm. 














In empirical tests the reliabilities of the NFC and the FI scales as measured by 
Cronbach's alpha4 (a) have been found to be very good (a= .87 for NFC and 
a = . 77 for FI).Epstein et al. (I 996) present an empirical study of the REI scale 
on a set of 184 test persons in order to test its validity. For a test of the 
independence of the two postulated thinking styles, the responses of this test 
sample are subjected to a factor analysis. This statistical method is widely used 
to detect systematic patterns in datasets with many variables by exploiting the 
correlation structure between those variables. It is often employed to reduce the 
dimension of a dataset, i. e. it determines so-called latent factors which represent 
underlying, but unobservable variables. 
Factors are formed by a number of observed variables that are substantially 
correlated with each other so that it can be assumed that they in conjunction 
have a common meaning, the interpretation of the factor. Each variable is related 
to each factor to a certain degree, the "factor loading", which can be interpreted 
as how strongly the meaning of the particular variable coincides with the "real" 
meaning of the factor to be interpreted. The meaning of the factor can thus only 
be inferred to be the common denominator of meanings of all the variables, i. e. 
4 Cronbach's alpha is a statistical measure of reliability of factor scales and is based on the 
correlations between the various items of the factor. Values of .70 and higher are generally 
considered as sufficiently reliable, however, no convention of a threshold value for 
reliability exists (Janssen and Laatz 2003: 525). 
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items, that make up the particular factor. Table 4-1 shows that two factors could 
be generated or extracted from the dataset of the test sample. The numbers 
represent the factor loadings of the respective item where the bold figures 
indicate to which factor the particular item belongs, the one on which it loads 
highest. The factor loadings can assume values between -1 and 1 which can be 
interpreted as correlation coefficients of the items with the respective factor. 
Thus, in table 4-1 the items are ordered according to their strength of relation 
with the respective factor and not according to their sequence in the self-report 
questionnaire. Finally, it is possible to compute individual factor scores, i. e. a 
measure to what extent each individual is characterized by each of the extracted 
factors. 
As expected the factor analysis groups the question items according to the 
NFC set on the one hand and to the FI set on the other. Respondents with a high 
rating on one NFC item have shown, on average, a tendency to rate the other 
NFC items also high ( or low in case the item is formulated in reverse as 
indicated by (R)). The same applies for the FI items so that the correlation 
structure of the responses yields a clear distinction into two separate factors 
representing NFC and Fl, respectively. A useful property of factor analysis is 
that all factors that are extracted from the underlying dataset are statistically 
independent from each other. As a result, the score on the NFC factor is not 
systematically related to the score on the FI factor, i. e. a high NFC score does 
not imply a low FI score for any given individual. 
Therefore, Epstein et al. ( 1996) conjecture that there exist indeed two 
fundamental reasoning processes that, in general, operate independently from 
each other. At least it can be said that NFC and FI measure two different and 
independent processing modes. The very low and insignificant correlation 
between the NFC and the FI of r = - 0.07 underscores this independence. This 
implies that people should not be considered to be either intuitive-experiential or 
cognitive-rational thinkers as would have been the case if NFC and FI had been 
found to be inversely related. Rather, people must be conceived as exhibiting 
both a certain degree of need for cognition as measured by the NFC score and of 
faith in intuition as measured by the FI score. These scores can be both high, 
both low or any possible combination of the two scales (see figure 4-2). 
However, what does this independence really mean, how can it be 
interpreted? Can people be both analytical-rational and intuitive-experiential at 
the same time or, on the other end, not at all? From the formulations of the 
questions of the NFC and the FI scale in table 4-1 it becomes obvious that the 
REI does not intend to measure the actual employment of either thinking style 
objectively, i. e. to what extent individuals actually employ analytical or 
heuristic information processing. The object of measurement, rather, is the 
perception and the attitudes of individuals w. r. t. their own ease and success of 
using either mode in real life. The scores on NFC and FI mirror the experiences 
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that respondents have made in their lives with either mode. Thus, some people 
have made good experiences with analytical thinking, they enjoy problem 
solving and have, most probably, even solved problems successfully in this 
mode. At the same time, they have confidence in their intuitions and hunches 
when it comes to making judgments and taking decisions. 
Figure 4-2: Possible combinations of NFC versus FI scores 
NFC 
FI 




Such people like individual A in figure 4-2 would, thus, score high on both 
scales of general cognitive disposition. However, when actually taking decisions 
in a specific task context they would apply the tradeoff of information 
processing modes as indicated by the concept of economy of cognition laid out 
by the dual-process models in chapter 3. Here, the actual degree of employment 
of one mode versus the other depends critically on the structure of and the 
information provided in the specific task. The presence of heuristic cues would 
activate simplifying rules and analytical processing would be used to close the 
confidence gap (see chapter 3). However, the employment of cognitive 
resources would differ substantially from other kinds of people who score high 
on NFC and low on FI (individual B) or vice versa (individual C), or even score 
low on both scales (individual D). Those people have different levels of 
confidence in their information processing modes and perceive either one of the 
two modes as less reliable for decision making or they may even have little 
confidence in their cognitive abilities, analytical or intuitive, altogether due to 
continuous lack of success with their decisions. 
A reasonable interpretation of the NFC and FI scores would be, therefore, that 
they measure the cost of information processing in terms of cognitive resources 
employed in either processing mode where the higher the score on the scale the 
lower the cost associated with the respective mode. For example, when an 
individual scores high on FI but low on NFC like individual C in figure 4-2 it 
indicates that the cost of analytical information processing is perceived as 
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relatively high, i. e. relative to his own intuitive-experiential processing and 
relatively higher than someone else who scores higher on NFC and, therefore, 
has more ease with and confidence in such processing. In a specific task 
individual C would generally tend to rely to a higher extent on heuristic 
processing if made possible by the presence of heuristic cues where such 
heuristic processing would also generate a higher level of confidence than would 
be the case for other people scoring higher on NFC. High NFC indicates the 
ability to question the outcomes of heuristic processing and probably correct 
them in the light of other individuating information (see 3.3.4.2). The "relative 
cost" of such analytical processing as perceived by the individual would then 
determine the degree to which it is employed in specific tasks. 
When comparing the cognitive dispositions of individuals A and D for which 
analytical processing has the same cost relative to heuristic processing the 
difference of processing in specific tasks would result in different levels of 
confidence in their decisions. Individual A must be expected to be quite 
confident of his decision, i. e. quite sure that his decision was correct, since he 
feels that he can rely on his intuitions and likes to employ more effortful 
cognition to scrutinize his hunches and to carefully consider the available 
information. Individual D, on the contrary, the classical cognitive miser, has 
little trust in either processing mode and would, therefore, be expected to have 
little confidence that his decision will actually be correct. Thus, staying within 
the terminology of the HSM it is expected that individuals A and D differ in 
their desired levels of confidence in decision making. 
The REI is, therefore, considered to be a suitable starting point to develop 
measurement instruments for the assessment of individual differences in 
cognitive dispositions in CVM studies. In the following section, the REI as 
specified above will be adapted and extended in order to fit the research 
questions stated above. 
4.3.2 Adaptation of the REI to the context of the CVM 
The main objective of a measurement instrument of bounded rationality is the 
analysis of individual differences in heuristic information processing in CVM 
surveys. Considering this objective, it is necessary to analyze respondents' 
information processing on two levels: first, in analogy to the REI a method to 
measure respondents' general dispositions to engage in intuitive-experiential and 
analytical-rational information processing needs to be available. Such a task 
independent scale provides an indication of respondents' thinking styles 
regardless of the task at hand. Second, an instrument for the measurement of 
heuristic versus systematic information processing specific to the actual task that 
respondents have to perform is needed, in this case the particular environmental 
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valuation study using the contingent valuation methodology. This task 
dependent scale of information processing creates the basis for an identification 
of the specific activation of heuristic responses due to the heuristic cue 
information provided in the specific CVM design as laid out in section 4.2.2.2. 
Thus, in conjunction the two individual scales of information processing 
generate a pattern of individual information processing and decision behavior 
that takes both the general dispositions to employ either thinking styles and the 
specific situation of a particular CVM task environment with its heuristic cues 
into account. 
As laid out in section 4.2.2.3 it is not unreasonable to expect that the two 
individual scales of information processing are correlated to a certain extent due 
to the fact that respondents with a high propensity for intuitive-experiential 
processing are likely to employ such a thinking style in the specific CVM 
interview as well. Thus, it could be argued that one single scale on respondents' 
information processing types would suffice for detecting boundedly rational 
behavior in CVM studies. However, it was argued by all of the dual-process 
models of reasoning and the models of boundedly rational decision making 
described extensively in chapter 3 that "economy of cognition" implies that 
individuals adapt their information processing to the specific decision 
environment. In environments providing a high number of non-contradictory 
heuristic cues such intuitive-experiential processing would be facilitated so that 
people would be expected to exhibit a higher degree of employment of heuristics 
independently of their general types. On the contrary, if only few or 
contradictory heuristic cues are given, actual confidence will be low and 
decision makers will have to make up for this by employing more cognitive 
resources for systematic, analytical-rational information processing and decision 
making. Hence, although they may be correlated to some degree, the two 
separate indicators for individual thinking styles and information processing, 
one general and one specific to the task at hand, are necessary for the 
investigation of bounded rationality in CVM interviews. In an ideal CVM design 
where only a minimum number of heuristic cues is present so that procedural 
biases are avoided the task dependent scale is expected to indicate very low 
levels of heuristic processing while the task independent scale of general 
individual thinking styles still exhibits the usual distinction within the general 
population. 
The task independent scale of information processing is adapted from the REI 
to fit the context of the interview situation of an environmental valuation study 
better than the original version. First of all, the original REI contains too many 
items, i. e. the application of the full REI scale would be unreasonable in a 
typical CVM interview since it would take too much time in relation to the 
remaining questions and respondents would be reluctant to answer due to the 
obvious lack of connection between the issue of environmental valuation and 
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thinking styles. Therefore, the first task was to select from the REI a small 
number of representative items that could then be further adapted. Second, 
environmental valuation interviews are typically characterized by time pressure 
since such an interview almost always represents an unwanted interruption of 
other tasks the respondent is momentarily engaged in. Therefore, it is desirable 
to introduce the issue of information processing and decision making under time 
pressure into the task independent measure. This aspect is included in the 
original REI only to a limited extent. 
Table 4-2 presents a suitable question for the elicitation of such a task 
independent scale. In this question, respondents are told in a short introductory 
passage that the researcher is interested in the individual decision making 
process. Subsequently, the respondent is asked to what extent some statements 
regarding his personal attitude are true, i. e. the respondent is expected to give 
an individual rating of how much these statements apply to him. Here, a five-
point Likert scale where e.g. "l" means "not true at all" and "5" means "fully 
true". Depending on the general intellectual background of the sample 
population it is also conceivable to use smaller or larger scales. In question 1, 
items A, B, D and E represent reformulations and summaries of question items 
from the NFC scale of the original REI (see above) where it was focused on 
those question items that had shown a high factor loading in table 4-1. It is 
expected that four items eliciting the same underlying thinking style in different 
alternative formulations should be sufficient for the purpose of this concise 
instrument. Items were reformulated for better understandability in many socio-
economic and educational contexts. However, it must be expected that E might 
not be applicable in all societies, as will be seen later in the empirical study 
performed in Thailand. 
Item C refers to an individual's role and behavior in a social context with the 
intention to elicit a respondent's tendency to be a leader or a follower and, 
connected to this, the ease of being persuaded in a social context. It is closely 
related to the original REI item "I generally prefer to accept things as they are 
rather than to question them" but it was intended to focus on the aspect of 
behavior in a group. Items F and I refer to the issue of information processing 
and decision making under time pressure and are related to the original REI item 
"I don't reason well under pressure". Items G and H are directly taken from the 
FI scale of the original REI since they were considered to be suitable and 
concise formulations. Also here, the items with the highest factor loadings were 
concentrated on. Item J is based on the FI-item "I can usually feel when a person 
is right or wrong even if I can't explain how I know" used in an interpersonal 
context. However, for the purpose of this study it was reformulated to fit 
intuition in a more general context, i.e. independent of judgments w. r. t. 
people. Altogether, this compilation of 10 items is expected to be a suitable 
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basis for computing a measurement scale of general task independent 
information processing types to be included in any CVM survey questionnaire. 
Table 4-2: Task independent scale - the question items 
Question I: 
I would like to know how you reached your decision. How true are the 
following statements regarding your personal attitude? 
A Thinking hard and for a long time about something bores me. 
B I enjoy doing something that challenges my thinking abilities like for 
example playing chess (or some other typical game that requires hard 
thinking). 
C In a group of friends I generally trust the arguments of others without 
always questioning where they come from. 
D A complex problem is a challenge to me rather than a nuisance. 
E Doing quizzes and cross-word puzzles are a pleasant form of 
entertainment for me. 
F Time is money, so I take decisions quickly. 
G I believe in trusting my hunches. 
H My initial impressions of people are almost always right. 
I I hate to make important decisions under time pressure. 
J Often, when I take decisions, I don't know why but I feel that I'm right. 
The second, i. e. task dependent measurement scale of information processing 
and decision making, is not based on any pre-existing scale. It was specifically 
developed for the task of measuring the level of response behavior based on 
heuristic cues contained in a CVM design and is oriented at the expected limited 
information processing strategies described in section 4.2.2.2. In an introductory 
sentence people are told to reconsider the way they had taken their decision 
whether or not (or alternatively how much) to contribute to the proposed 
environmental project. They are then asked to state whether the items given are 
true or false. The question items developed for the task dependent scale are 
listed in table 4-3. 
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Table 4-3: Task dependent scale - the question items 
Question 2: 
When you think about your decision whether and how much to contribute 
to the proposed project, are the following statements true? 
A I made my decision based on my first feeling about this program right 
after it was presented to me. 
B I really thought very hard about every single aspect of the program before 
making a decision of how much to pay. 
C The first impression that I had about this program changed on a second 
thought. 
D I would have liked to have more time for making a decision about my 
contribution to this program. 
E All aspects were equally important for my decision. 
F With the given information about the project I found it very hard to make a 
good decision. 
G There are so many aspects in this project but only a few of them were 
really relevant for my decision. 
H Even if I had had more time available for thinking about this program I 
don't think that my decision of how much to contribute to it would have 
been different. 
Items A, B, E and G refer to the amount of information that was considered in 
the decision making process where item A stresses particularly the role of 
intuition, i. e. the immediate associations with the presented project. In general, 
it is expected that respondents who state to have used little information 
processing reveal a high degree of response to heuristic cues. Item C addresses 
the process of a correction of the first impression, i. e. the immediate 
associations of the experiential system, by the analytical-rational system. This 
refers to the possible corrective design of dual-process models (see 3.3.4.1 ). A 
"yes"-answer would thus indicate a high degree of analytical-rational 
processing. Items D and H refer to the available time in this specific task, i. e. 
whether the respondent felt to be under time pressure. Time pressure would 
indicate a high degree of heuristic information processing. Analogously, item F 
addresses the respondent's perception of whether sufficient information was 
provided. It is expected that respondents who say "yes" to this question were not 
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seduced to short cut decision making by the presence of heuristic cues. 
Altogether, the items compiled in question 2 (table 4-3) are considered to 
represent a number of important aspects of possible heuristic decision making 
specifically in CVM studies. With slight adaptations of the formulations of these 
items, this question could be incorporated as a heuristic cue test in any CVM 
survey questionnaire. 
Summarizing the main topics of discussion and developments of this chapter 
up to now, sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 have applied the insights gained from the 
cognitive psychological models of reasoning to the context of environmental 
valuation studies employing the contingent valuation method. It has been 
discussed that due to the purpose of environmental valuation studies to assess 
the social value of a public good that will be of benefit for the considered 
society as a whole it is of great importance for the validity and reliability of 
CVM results that responses be based on a consideration of all the presented 
information and as little economizing behavior resulting from heuristic cues 
present in the CVM design as possible. It is thus the general objective of the 
research approach followed in this study to develop an instrument that is suited 
to analyze the influence of the different forms of information processing on 
responses in CVM studies. Ideally, the developed instrument should serve to 
provide guidelines as to how future CVM design can be improved so that the use 
of strategies of limited information processing is minimized. 
To this end two separate measurement scales based on individual differences 
in information processing and decision making were developed, where the task 
independent scale elicits the general disposition to employ the intuitive-
experiential and the analytical-rational thinking styles and the task dependent 
scale elicits the degree to which simplified and limited information processing 
was actually applied in the specific CVM study. Factor analytic evaluations of 
the two separate sets of questions are expected to reveal patterns of information 
processing and decision making types both on the general, task independent and 
on the specific, task dependent level. 
In the remainder of the chapter, these newly developed scales of bounded 
rationality will be applied in an empirical CVM study of a household tap water 
improvement program in northern Thailand. This study will demonstrate in 
detail how these measurement scales are to be used and whether the theoretical 
expectations associated with the particular response behavior to the items 
contained in the scales will be confirmed. 
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4.4 An empirical example 
4.4.1 Background of the empirical research project: The Uplands 
Program 
The empirical CVM survey for applying and testing the scales of bounded 
rationality developed in the preceding sections was conducted as a part of a 
research project which fonned a subproject within the Collaborative Research 
Center (Sonderforschungsbereich, SFB) 564 funded by the Gennan Science 
Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) from July 2003 to June 
2006. This SFB represents an international and interdisciplinary conjunction of 
research projects with the aim to advance scientific knowledge for sustainable 
land use and rural development in the regional context of mountainous 
Southeast Asia (Uplands Program). The research areas of this SFB are located in 
northern Thailand around the provincial capital of Chiang Mai and in northern 
Vietnam mainly in the province of Son La. Since the part of subproject F 1.2 on 
which the present empirical application of the scales of bounded rationality is 
based is exclusively located in Thailand, only the general research aspects of the 
Thailand part of the SFB 564 will be presented here subsequently. 
In Thailand, research on the sustainability of fruit tree production systems in 
the uplands with a focus on lychee, longan and mango as the dominating fruits 
represents the thematic core of the SFB. In particular, possibilities for an 
increase in farmers' incomes from these production systems under the condition 
of preventing adverse effects to the fragile mountainous ecosystems and 
downstream lowland communities are investigated. Apart from issues of off-
season fruit production, improved fertilization and pest management, erosion 
control measures and post-harvesting technologies one focus of the research 
collaboration is on social science and economic aspects in order to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of the institutional circumstances under which 
such farming activities in the uplands occur. In this respect land use activities 
that are perfonned in the uplands and have shown to be associated with adverse 
environmental consequences for lowland communities in the valley bottoms or 
at the outlets of the respective water catchments are of particular concern since 
they give rise to ample discussions within the Thai society about such negative 
externalities. Subproject Fl.2 deals with these upstream-downstream 
externalities in particular by analyzing the social benefits arising from an 
improvement of this situation in a specific water catchment. This approach and 
its specific empirical research will be described in the following. 
121 
Oliver Frör - 978-3-631-75515-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 03:56:05AM
via free access
4.4.2 General research ideas and hypotheses of the subproject in 
northern Thailand 
4.4.2.1 Problem definition 
Farming activities in the uplands of northern Thailand are associated with a 
number of adverse effects on the local environment. These include ( 1) the 
application of pesticides that are harmful to organisms in the surrounding 
ecosystems and to human health, (2) the occurrence of soil erosion due to a lack 
of vegetation covering the steep fields and plantations on the mountain slopes 
and (3) large amounts of water used for irrigation. These effects have 
consequences for communities that are located in lowland areas downstream due 
to their connection to the upstream farming areas by the rivers of the water 
catchments carrying the load of pesticides and sediments. Under these 
circumstances, lowland communities are usually affected by the upstream 
farming activities in a variety of ways: pesticide contamination of the water 
bodies from which the water for household use is taken, red color of the 
household water especially during the rainy season, contamination of fruits and 
vegetables consumed by the households, the accumulation of pesticides in the 
surrounding ecosystem harming animals and plants living there and periodical 
water shortages toward the end of the dry season. 
Subproject Fl.2 on which the empirical application of the scales of bounded 
rationality is based considers the situation of a particular water catchment that is 
characterized by the typical situation described in the preceding paragraph. The 
water catchment under consideration, the Mae Sa valley, is located about 20 to 
45 kilometers north-west of the provincial capital of Chiang Mai in northern 
Thailand. Its total area comprises 147 km2• The main river flowing through this 
valley is called Mae Sa river. In the town of Mae Rim, a suburban area of about 
26,237 households (official 2003 data) located 10 - 15 kilometers north of 
Chiang Mai, the Mae Sa river flows into the Ping river, one of the main streams 
of northern Thailand passing the city of Chiang Mai on its way to the South. A 
three-dimensional scheme of this water catchment based on GIS-data is 
provided in figure 4-3. 
The empirical objective of this subproject is to assess the social value 
accruing to a specified part of the population of Mae Rim from a project to 
improve the quality of the household tap water supply so that it would be safe at 
all times to drink tap water without further treatment. Furthermore, no water 
shortages or low water pressure should occur at any time. Before specifying the 
details of such a project the situation of household water supply in Mae Rim 
needs to be described more closely. In Mae Rim water use is complicated by the 
existence of parallel systems of water supply. As a most important source for the 
provision of household tap water there is the publicly owned municipal water 
122 
Oliver Frör - 978-3-631-75515-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 03:56:05AM
via free access
provider, the Mae Rim Water Works (MRWW). For a number of approximately 
4500 households in Mae Rim that are located within the area marked "study 
area" in figure 4-3 MRWW uses surface water of the Mae Sa river as their 
exclusive water source. Thus, these households are most directly affected by the 
farming activities in the upland areas. The households in other areas of Mae Rim 
receive their water from the Ping river. The water taken from the Mae Sa river is 
treated to drinking water quality, without, however, taking into account the 
pesticide concentration which cannot easily be reduced by common water 
treatment processes. The water reaching the households, however, has already 
deteriorated in quality due to the existence of holes and leaks in the water 
distribution system which is a patchwork of pipes of different materials and 
different age. Through these leakages biological contaminants can enter the 
distribution system and pollute the tap water leading to episodic outbreaks of 
diarrhea and other diseases in certain areas. Due to this unreliable water quality 
of the MRWW tap water most households refrain from using it for drinking or 
even cooking and buy bottled water instead. Either they buy it in the stores 
themselves or they have it conveniently delivered to their homes. 
Figure 4-3: Three-dimensional view of the study area in Chiang Mai province, 
northern Thailand, schematic delineations of the Mae Sa water 
catchment and the survey area 
(Source: The Uplands Program, map composed by Peter Elstner) 
Apart from the MR WW tap water system there exist two further systems or 
possibilities of household water supply in certain areas. Some villages within the 
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municipality of Mae Rim have established their own village water systems, 
usually simple systems where water is pumped from the ground water body, 
stored and treated by simple means and subsequently distributed to the 
households. This water, however, cannot be used for drinking. Some 
households, moreover, have established their own systems of water supply by 
drilling a well or installing a ground water pump. Some households are 
connected to the MR WW system as well as to their village water system, others 
use MRWW water and water from their own sources. Only those 4500 
households connected to the MR WW distribution system receiving their water 
from the Mae Sa valley are taken as the relevant population for this empirical 
study. 
Given this complex situation of household tap water supply an improvement 
of water quality to the level where it can be directly consumed for drinking and 
cooking in the households at all times requires two sets of measures: first, the 
distribution system of MR WW needs to be repaired, modernized and 
continuously maintained in order to avoid biological contamination during 
distribution, second, upland farming activities have to be changed and improved 
to an extent where they do not adversely influence the quality of the Mae Sa 
river from which the water is taken, i. e. techniques have to be applied that 
reduce pesticide and sediment loads substantially. A program that ensures the 
complete implementation of these two kinds of measures would finally lead to 
the desired quality of household tap water. Additionally to these direct benefits 
to the MRWW customer households indirect benefits would accrue to those 
households as well as to the entire population of Mae Rim and to the people 
living in the upland farming areas: (1) less pesticides would accumulate in the 
ecosystems creating a benefit to future generations, (2) less pesticide residues 
would be contained in fruits and vegetables from the upland farming areas, and 
(3) soils in the uplands would be conserved due to reduced soil erosion. Whereas 
the direct benefits of drinkable water quality in the households constitute solely 
use values, the benefits described in (1) to (3) constitute mainly non-use values 
to the MR WW customers since those benefits are to the largest part experienced 
by other households including those that are not connected to the MR WW 
system or even by future generations. In this respect, the measures proposed 
here would lead to the improvement of both a private good and a public good. 
The described problem state of municipal household tap water quality where 
part of the problem arises from a negative external effect created by upland 
farming and the other part from a partly rotten distribution system in the 
lowlands forms the basis for an empirical valuation study employing the 
contingent valuation method. The empirical aim of this study consists in the 
assessment of the direct and indirect benefits accruing to those households 
connected to the MRWW system using the Mae Sa river as a water source. 
Apart from the empirical aim, this study pursued a number of methodological 
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aims in relation to the applicability of the CVM in the socio-economic and 
cultural context of Thailand and in relation to the possibility to develop a 
methodology to conduct valid and reliable CVM mail surveys. These 
methodological issues are treated in detail in Ahlheim et al. (2007); most of 
them shall not be presented and discussed here since they are not directly related 
to the specific topic of this study. Nevertheless, two of these methodological 
issues are of importance for this research. They shall be briefly touched on here 
since they form part of the empirical design of the CVM study described in 
detail below. 
The first of these methodological issues is the testing of the performance of 
two alternative WTP elicitation question formats in the Thai context, i. e. the 
dichotomous choice (DC) question format and the payment card (PC) format 
(for a detailed discussion of such question formats see chapter 2). The second 
methodological issue arises from the well-known social desirability effect and 
the results of a previous comparison between a CVM study conducted with 
personal interviews and as a mail survey where the mail survey yielded much 
lower WTP results (detailed results will be shown below). In search for an 
explanation for this result it was hypothesized that the observed difference is due 
to the social desirability effect in that respondents give an answer that they 
consider socially desirable, i. e. that the interviewer wants to hear. This 
phenomenon should disappear if respondents are given the opportunity to state 
their WTP secretly on a separate sheet of paper so that their response would not 
be known to the interviewer. This latter assumption will also be tested in the 
empirical study conducted here. In the following the empirical design of the 
CVM study will be specified in detail. 
4.4.2.2 The empirical design 
The questionnaires employed in this CVM study consist of five parts (the 
complete questionnaire is provided in the appendix). The first part contains 
warming-up questions in order to reduce tensions that the respondent might feel 
due to the sudden interview situation and in order to obtain specific information 
on household water use. A number of questions are asked w. r. t. the purposes 
the MRWW water is used (washing, bathing, gardening, cooking, drinking etc.), 
how long the household has been connected to the MRWW system, whether 
particular problems like low pressure and interruptions of water service occur 
and how frequently they are experienced. Moreover, information is obtained on 
the household's primary source of drinking water and why that specific source 
was chosen. Subsequently respondents are questioned on their opinions 
concerning the water quality and the service of MR WW and whether they worry 
about catching specific water-borne diseases if they were to drink the MR WW 
water. 
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Box 4-1: Scenario description of the tap water improvement program 
Chiang Mai University, the University of Hohenheim and the Mae Rim Water Works 
MRWW are currently surveying water users' interests in the program "Drinkable Tap 
Water-Clean Stream". 
What is the idea of the program? 
The idea is that all MRWW customers should enjoy an uninterrupted supply of tap 
water which is also drinkable. 
How can this idea be achieved, what needs to be done? 
"Drinkable Tap Water-Clean Stream" consists of two main programs which are the 
improvement of the MRWW distribution system and an improvement of upstream 
water quality as the source of the MRWW water. 
Why are these improvements necessary? 
An improvement of the MRWW distribution system is necessary because of frequent 
pollution with biological pollutants in the area due to broken pipes in the distribution 
system. Biological pollutants might cause diarrhea or other diseases. The broken pipes 
are also responsible for frequent interruptions of water service which occur in some 
parts of Mae Rim. 
An improvement of upstream water quality is necessary to ensure that MRWW receives 
good water for treatment and distribution to the households. There are two main 
problems regarding the upstream water quality: the first is the red color of the water 
which occurs often in the rainy season and the second is the contamination with 
pesticides which might lead to severe health damages like for example cancer. The red 
color of the water is caused by soil erosion in the uplands of the Mae Sa valley. 
Pesticides in the water are an immediate consequence of their high use in the uplands of 
the Mae Sa valley. As you can see from this map, your tap water originates exclusively 
from the rivers of the Mae Sa valley. 
How is the program implemented? 
The program "Drinkable Tap Water-Clean Stream" should be implemented in the 
following way: First, the pipe system should be mended and maintained so that 
biological pollution and interruption of water supply would stop. Second, an effective 
soil conservation program should be implemented so that soil erosion would be stopped 
in the uplands. Third, pesticide use in the uplands should be reduced for example by 
employing a more adapted and targeted pest control system. 
Who will carry out the proposed measures? 
MRWW will carry out the improvements of the water distribution system. Chiang Mai 
University will carry out the measures that lead to an improvement of upstream water 
quality. This will be done in cooperation with the upstream communities and farmers. 
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Box 4 continued: 
Do only MRWW water users benefit from the program? 
If these proposed measures were carried out benefits for the whole population of Mae 
Rim would result. For example, this program would also reduce the contamination of 
fruits and vegetables with pesticides. Also, the accumulation of pesticides in the 
surrounding ecosystems would be stopped so that future harm to plant and animal life 
will be prevented and the health of future generations will not be threatened by these 
pesticides. Therefore, from the proposed measures the whole population of Mae Rim 
and future generations in this area would benefit. 
Who will guarantee that the program really works out? 
MRWW will test the tap water quality regularly at the households and will post the test 
results immediately in each affected community of Mae Rim. There will be a 
responsible person at MRWW that you can contact for any questions and problems you 
might have regarding the tap water supply. 
The second part of the questionnaire contains the scenario description. Along 
with this verbal description respondents are shown a set of photographs 
illustrating the mentioned issues in order to provide a better visualization and 
perception of the scenario information. The exact scenario description as 
presented to the respondents by the interviewer is given in box 4- l. In order to 
be able to perceive the verbally described scenario elements respondents are 
subsequently asked to rate the eight scenario elements according to how 
important they are to them personally on a five-point Likert scale. For further 
reference, these eight scenario elements are: (I) no interruptions of water 
service, (2) no biological pollutants in the tap water, (3) no pesticides in the tap 
water, (4) no red color of the water, (5) less soil degradation in the uplands, (6) 
no accumulation of pesticides in the ecosystems, (7) less pesticides in fruits and 
vegetables, and (8) reduced health threats to future generations. 
The third part of the questionnaire contains the description of the hypothetical 
payment scheme and finally the willingness-to-pay elicitation question, which is 
the core element of the CVM. In this part respondents are told that carrying out 
the measures proposed in the scenario description would involve costs the 
financing of which needed to be secured before the proposed program can be 
started in order to achieve the envisaged water quality improvement. As a means 
of financing the program people are told that it is intended to increase the water 
fees that MR WW customers have to pay for a specified period of 5 years. The 
English translation of the wording presented to the respondents in Thai language 
reads as follows: "Since these measures are costly their financing has to be 
secured before such a program can be implemented. Therefore, it is 
intended to increase the water fee for the tap water supply for the next five 
years to get the program started." This formulation of the payment scheme 
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stresses the fact that this program has not been decided on, yet. The subsequent 
WTP elicitation question is worded so that respondents should realize that the 
implementation of the program would somehow be influenced by their 
willingness to contribute to its financing. 
As mentioned above, two different types of elicitation question formats were 
to be tested in this study, the dichotomous choice (DC) and the payment card 
(PC) format. For each format it was also intended to test whether procedural 
biases like the starting point bias or "yea"-saying in the DC format or the range 
and centering bias in the PC format occur since they would indicate boundedly 
rational behavior or limited information processing in response to heuristic cues 
included in the specific elicitation question design. For the DC version, 
therefore, a wide range of bids, i. e. starting bids well below and well above the 
expected range of the true WTP, should be used in the bid design in order to 
detect such distorting effects on response behavior. In pretests a first indication 
about the realistic range of bids was obtained which could be used for the bid 
design. For the PC version, at least two different ranges of specified bid 
intervals should be used so that the influence of the upper cut-off point on the 
bid chosen by the respondent can be determined. From these considerations a 
split-sample design following the scheme depicted in figure 4-4 was developed. 
Figure 4-4: Split sample design of the WTP elicitation question 
WTP elicitation question 
Dichotomous choice Payment card 
For the DC question the DeShazo format (see chapter 2) was selected due to 
findings in an earlier CVM study in the same problem context that responses to 
the double-bounded DC format were highly susceptible to anchoring effects. 
Table 4-4 compiles the bid design of the 5 questionnaire versions selected for 
the DC sample and the bounds of the two PC questionnaire versions where the 
cut-off bid signifies where the range of specified bid intervals ends and above 
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which an open interval is left. The detailed specification of bid intervals of the 
payment card is given in the appendix. 
After the description of the payment scheme (see above) respondents are 
asked the WTP elicitation question either in the DC version (anonymous or non-
anonymous) or in the PC version (anonymous or non-anonymous). The non-
anonymous question with the DC format for version 1 (see table 4-4) reads as 
follows: "If, as a consequence, your water bill increased by altogether 25 
Baht per month for the next five years, would you support this program?" 
If the respondent answers "yes" the interview proceeds to the next question. If 
the respondent answers "no" a follow-up question using the lower follow-up bid 
(see table 4-4) is asked: "If instead the monthly water bill increased by only 
12 Baht, would you then be willing to support this program?" After the 
response to the follow-up question the interview proceeds to the next question. 
Table 4-4: Bid design of the DC and the PC elicitation question formats 
(monetary values in Thai Baht /month) 
Dichotomous choice Payment card 
version first bid follow-up bid version starting bid 
25 -----. 12 small 0 
2 50 -----. 25 large 0 
3 100-----. 50 
4 200 -----. ioo 





In the anonymous version of the DC question the respondent is given a sheet 
containing the question with the first bid and is asked to check either the "yes" 
or the "no" box. Subsequently, the interviewer hands the respondent a second 
sheet with the follow-up question and is asked to check one of the boxes. 
Obviously, someone who has already checked "yes" on the first sheet would also 
check "yes" on the second. These sheets are then put into a "ballot box" 
indicating presumed anonymity of the response. 
The formulation of the PC elicitation question reads as follows: "We would 
now like to ask you how much money your household would be willing to 
contribute to the program. Please, select from the following list the highest 
increase in your monthly water bill you would be willing to tolerate for the next 
five years if the improvements described above were realized." Here the 
respondent receives either the small or the large version as described in table 4-
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4. In the anonymous version the respondent receives a separate sheet of paper 
containing the question and the respective payment card on which he could 
check the payment interval that contains his personal WTP. After the WTP 
elicitation question the respondent is asked how difficult it was to find an 
answer to this question. Subsequently, the respondent is asked to rate on a five-
point Likert scale how important given statements were for his answer to the 
WTP question, i.e. these statements indicate the reasons for the stated WTP. 
The statements were formulated so that all respondents regardless of their 
response to the WTP question could answer them. The understandability of 
these formulations were tested in an extensive pretesting process. 
In the fourth part of the questionnaire a number of questions concerning 
respondents' attitudes w. r. t. the environment, the role of government, the 
financing of public goods, the importance of money in their everyday lives and 
their donation behavior are asked. Further, respondents should rate their incomes 
and their households' economic situations in comparison to others and are asked 
how worried they are w. r. t. a number of personal and public aspects. This part 
of the questionnaire also contains the two questions forming the newly 
developed measurement scales of bounded rationality. Finally, in the fifth part 
the usual socio-economic and demographic questions are asked. This part also 
contains questions regarding households' indebtedness since it might be a 
determinant of stated WTP. 
4.4.2.3 The measurement scales of bounded rationality in northern Thailand -
research implementation in the survey design 
The scales of bounded rationality are implemented in the empirical design of 
this study in the form of two separate questions within the fourth part of the 
questionnaire. In order to maintain a suitable "choreography" of the interview 
the question containing the items for the task independent scale was positioned 
right after the respondents had given their response to the WTP elicitation 
question and had just rated the level of difficulty of responding to it. The general 
form of this question as presented in table 4-2 (see 4.3.2) was slightly adapted to 
fit the specific cultural context of Thai society. In this respect, item E " Doing 
quizzes and cross-word puzzles are a pleasant form of entertainment for me" was 
considered not to be applicable in Thailand since Thai people usually do not 
undertake such activities for entertainment that are well known in Western 
societies and e. g. even in Japan Gust consider the Sudoku quizzes for that 
matter). Therefore, this item was changed and reformulated even in reverse sense 
to fit Thai people's liking of watching entertainment programs on television. Thus, 
the following formulation was chosen: "Documentary programs on TV annoy me 
so that I often switch to a different channel". The other items were considered 
suitable in the context of Thailand. In the questionnaire, respondents are asked to 
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rate the degree to which these statements are true for them personally on a five-
point Likert scale where "l" means "not true at all" and "5" means "fully true". 
The task dependent scale of bounded rationality was placed separately from 
the question containing the items of the task independent scale with a number of 
other questions in between so that the respondents would not consider these two 
questions to be related to each other. Therefore, the question containing the 
items described in table 4-3 (see 4.3.2) forms the conclusion of part four of the 
questionnaire just before the standard socio-economic and demographic 
questions begin. All items of this questions were considered to fit the Thai 
context so the question was included into the questionnaire just as presented in 
table 4-3. 
4.4.2.4 Practical implementation of the survey 
The sample for this survey was selected from the list of MR WW customers that 
receive their household tap water exclusively from the Mae Sa river. These 
households are located along 5 different water distribution lines which coincide 
quite well with particular neighborhoods of Mae Rim with a certain socio-
economic structure. For example, one distribution line delivers water into a 
residential area that consists of houses and apartments built for housing athletes 
of the Southeast Asian Games in the year 1995 which are now predominantly 
used by government officials. Another distribution line exclusively serves the 
residential area of a military camp and so on. Therefore, the different 
questionnaire versions of the described split sample design were allocated to 
these neighborhoods according to their relative frequencies in the population of 
MR WW customers so that the selected households constitute a representative 
sample of the population under consideration. 
The development of this survey and of the survey questionnaire followed a 
step-wise procedure that, apart from the usual expert interviews, in-depth 
interviews with households from the survey population and several waves of 
pretests where the questionnaire was tested on a limited selection of households 
and subsequently revised, also consisted of a participatory element of survey 
design. For this process, respondents of a previous CVM mail survey on the 
same project scenario were invited to join a series of group meetings with other 
respondents from the survey population in order to receive further information, 
discuss issues of the scenario of particular importance to them and comment on 
problematic issues of the questionnaire design. By means of these group 
discussions the researchers of this subproject intended to identify issues of 
conflict, resentments that respondents might have regarding certain aspects and 
questions, and taboos that respondents are reluctant to address. The mentioned 
aspects are considered to have the potential to distort the responses of CVM 
respondents and were attempted to be eliminated from the questionnaire. Details 
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concerning the technique and the results of this participatory procedure are 
given in Ahlheim et al. (2007). 
The survey was conducted from the end of July to the beginning of September 
2005 by students of the Chiang Mai University who had been trained as 
interviewers for CVM surveys by the researchers of the project. Altogether, 55 
interviewers were recruited, trained and employed. This large number of 
interviewers should result in a situation where effects caused by particular 
interviewers are negligible. Altogether, 823 households were interviewed from 
which 798 valid responses to the WTP elicitation questions were obtained. The 
distribution of interviewed households according to the split-sample design 
illustrated in figure 4-4 is given in table 4-5. 



























This section presents the empirical results of the research project. Before dealing 
with the results of the two scales of boundedly rational information processing 
and decision making, those general results obtained from this CVM study shall 
be highlighted that form the basis for the analysis of bounded rationality. First, 
the sample population shall be characterized by its socio-economic and 
demographic features in order to obtain an indication of the situation of the 
households under consideration. Second, the WTP results as assessed by the 
various procedures in the split-sample design shall be presented and discussed 
and the variables and factors that were found to systematically influence these 
WTP estimates shall be considered. Subsequently, the results of the scales of 
bounded rationality shall be analyzed in detail and their usefulness for 
explaining inconsistent response behavior shall be investigated. 
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4.4.3.1 Socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the respondent 
population 
Within the surveyed population of 823 household heads, male and female 
respondents were roughly equally represented with a percentage of 52% female 
and 48% male respondents. Exactly two thirds (66,4%) of the respondents had 
children or grandchildren. The values for the mean and standard deviation of 
household size, age and monthly household income are given in table 4-6. 












14522 Baht (::::: 290 €) 
Household sizes ranged from 1 to 9 individuals per household, where 2-, 3- and 
4-person households were the most frequent with ca. 23 % each. 15% of the 
households were single households and roughly another 15% of households had 
5 or more members. Age of respondents ranged from 13 to 92 where those 
respondents below 18 years of age were excluded from the sample since they 
were considered not to be the household head in charge of economic decisions. 
The distribution of rough income classes is given in figure 4-5 which also 
contains the relative frequencies of the categorical variables of the sample 
population. 
From b) in figure 4-5 it can be observed that while all classes of education are 
included in the survey, respondents holding a Bachelor degree are by far the 
most frequent. This evident overrepresentation of respondents with a Bachelor 
degree is obviously due to the very high frequency of officials in the sample, a 
peculiarity of the survey population chosen for this study. Since the survey 
sample is drawn from the list of MRWW customers for which no record of 
socio-economic and demographic variables exist the selected sample's 
representativeness can, unfortunately, not be verified by the usual comparison 
with the distribution of these variables within the general population. 
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Figure 4-5: Relative frequencies of categorical socio-economic and 
demographic variables 


















d) Marital status 
4.4.3.2 Estimates of willingness-to-pay for the tap water improvement program 
The ultimate aim of a CVM survey is the assessment of the willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) of the survey population. The estimates of WTP of this survey scenario 
are given in table 4-7 where the two elicitation question formats DC and PC 
were evaluated separately using a variety of different data evaluation methods. 
First of all, the data were analyzed separately according to anonymity or non-
anonymity of the elicitation question and jointly (last column). Second, for the 
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DC format two different types of data from the DC dataset were used for the 
evaluation: ( 1) single-bounded: only the responses to the first bid were used for 
the estimation of WTP since this estimate is free of anchoring effects introduced 
by a follow-up question, (2) DeShazo: the full set of responses to the elicitation 
question, i. e. the responses to the first bid as well as the responses to the (lower) 
follow-up bid in case of a rejection of the first bid were used for estimating 
WTP. The comparison of the DeShazo-based estimate with the single-bounded 
WTP estimate would reveal the existence of effects of the response to the 
follow-up bid anchoring on the response to the first bid. For the estimations 
using the Maximum-Likelihood estimator (see chapter 2) a probit model was 
used. 
Third, the PC format was also analyzed in two different ways: (1) a probit 
model representing the probability of a respondent choosing a particular bid 
interval was used to generate WTP estimates, this represents the usual procedure 
for PC data, (2) WTP estimates were computed simply as the averages over the 
midpoints of the respective bid intervals that were chosen by the particular 
respondents. This latter method which is not as precise as the probit model in 
( 1 ), however, is not dependent on any distributional assumptions, i. e. whether 
the error terms are distributed normally or in an extreme value kind etc. and is 
thus less prone to distortions emanating from wrong statistical assumptions. In 
table 4-7 all WTP estimates are given as averages (means) over the sample 
populations in Thai Baht per month, the 95%-confidence intervals are provided 
in parentheses underneath the WTP estimates. The computation of these 
confidence intervals follows the bootstrap procedure as described by Park et al. 
(1991). 
From table 4-7 a number of interesting facts can be discerned and need to be 
interpreted. First, while there is a tendency of anonymous responses yielding a 
slightly lower WTP estimate the difference between these two forms of 
questioning is not significant as can be clearly seen from the 95%-confidence 
intervals. This applied both to the DC and the PC formats. The larger 95%-
confidence intervals for the anonymous DC estimates is due to the sample size 
of anonymous being much smaller than the non-anonymous one. The difference 
in PC sample sizes is not as pronounced. Due to the non-significance of 
anonymous versus non-anonymous WTP responses the data can be pooled and 
an overall estimate for each question format is, thus, computed. Second, the 
comparison of the estimates based on the single-bounded data with those based 
on the DeShazo data confirms the expectation that the response to a lower 
follow-up bid is not prone to anchoring behavior on the first bid in contrast to a 
response to a higher follow-up (see chapter 2). From table 4-7 it can be seen that 
the 95%-confidence intervals of the DeShazo estimate are slightly narrower than 
those of the single-bounded estimate so that the DeShazo estimator is more 
efficient and should, thus, be employed for the analysis of the DC data here. 
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Third, the comparison of the WTP estimates for the PC question data show 
that the probit model and the model based on interval midpoints yield the same 
results for average (mean) WTP. Thus, the assumption of normally distributed 
error terms seems a sensible one although the probit model (and also the logit 
model) always implies that some households have a negative WTP for the 
proposed program which is counterintuitive since it is hard to imagine that 
anyone should experience a loss in utility if such an improvement program were 
realized, even at no cost. If WTP is to be strictly limited to the non-negative 
domain, other distributions like the log-normal or certain extreme value 
distributions (Weibull etc.) would have to be employed. However, as indicated 
by the WTP estimates of the PC format data normally distributed errors seem to 
be an appropriate assumption here. The smaller confidence intervals of the 
estimates of the midpoint method arise from the simplifying assumption that 
respondents have exactly this midpoint WTP while they actually have only 
chosen a more or less large interval in which their WTP lies. Again, anonymous 
answers exhibit a tendency to be lower than non-anonymous ones, however, this 
trend is not significant. 
Table 4-7: Average household WTP for the tap water improvement scenario 
(Thai Baht per month) 
Willingness-to-pay 
(95%-confid. interval) 
Question non- anonymous overall 
format anonymous ( non-anonymous 
and anonymous) 
DC Single- 198 198 198 
bounded (159-239) (141-261) (167-232) 
DeShazo 201 193 198 
(176-227) (154-226) (176-219) 
PC Probit 71 66 69 
(46-94) (47-82) (53-83) 
midpoints 72 65 69 
(59-85) (54-76) (60-78) 
A fourth and very astonishing result from table 4-7 is that WTP estimates from 
the DC format are almost three times as high as those estimated from the PC 
format. However, this result is in line with the literature where many studies, 
though not all, have found the tendency of DC yielding higher WTP estimates 
than PC. As explained in chapter 2 this tendency is usually explained by "yea"-
saying (Frew et al. 2003: 157) and cognitive dissonance (Blarney et al. 1999: 
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127, Akerlof and Dickens 1982) where respondents experience a conflict 
between the feeling to support the proposed program because they approve of it 
in general and the feeling to reject it due to the costs involved that they, in 
principle, perceive as too high. In case the first feeling wins the conflict the 
respondent will accept a bid that exceeds his "true" WTP. This discrepancy of 
WTP estimates between elicitation question fonnats will be discussed in more 
detail below in the context of the analysis of procedural biases and the role of 
bounded rationality. 
4.4.3.3 Determinants of willingness-to-pay 
Apart from the figures of WTP for the particular tap water improvement 
program we were interested in those variables and factors systematically 
associated with the amount of WTP, i.e. which have the potential to explain the 
variation of WTP observed in the population. These variables and factors 
represent the detenninants of WTP. They can be obtained from the responses to 
questions contained in the CVM questionnaire that are then used as explanatory 
variables in econometric regression models. Some of these variables can be 
directly taken from the questions, e. g. socio-economic and demographic 
variables like sex, age, education etc. In the case of many other questions, 
especially the attitudinal questions containing a large number of individual 
question items, it is necessary to perform some reduction of dimension of those 
items, i. e. to integrate question items with similar but slightly different 
meanings into one factor that can then be used as an explanatory variable in the 
regression model. Such dimension reduction is conveniently achieved by 
employing factor analysis. As already laid out in some more detail in section 
4.3.1 this statistical method exploits the correlation structure among the various 
items of a question and groups those together that, among the respondent sample 
population, vary systematically. These groups of variables, the so-called factors, 
can then be interpreted to carry a common meaning where this meaning of the 
factor can only be indirectly inferred from the meanings of the constituent items. 
Subsequently, for each individual in the dataset a factor value is computed as an 
aggregation of the individual's responses to the single question items making up 
the factor. These factor values can then be used in the regression analysis where 
the factor serves as a regular explanatory variable. 
Here, several explanatory variables and factors extracted from attitudinal 
questions are used. In the following, the expression in parentheses in capital 
letters refers to the name of the variables used in the model and listed in table 4-
8. With respect to the socio-economic and demographic variables it is 
hypothesized that WTP systematically varies with the sex of the respondent 
(SEX), and positively with household income (INCOME), age (AGE), 
household size (HHSIZE), the education level (EDU), whether a respondent is 
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married (MARRIED) and whether he or she has children/ grandchildren or not 
(CHILD). Further, since officials are clearly over-represented in the sample a 
variable indicating whether the individual is an official or not is added 
(OFFICIAL). Further, it could be expected that WTP increases systematically 
with the actual water bill the household pays for MRWW water (MRWWBILL) 
since the more it uses this water the more it would benefit from an increased 
quality. Similarly, higher expenses for bottled drinking water (BOTTBILL) 
should increase WTP since more money is to be saved if the MRWW quality 
increases to potable water quality. However, WTP should decrease the better the 
quality of the MRWW water (MRWWQUAL) is perceived to be at the moment 
since the necessity of an improvement should be lower when the quality is 
already good. In contrast, the more water users worry about catching water-
borne diseases (the factor WATERWORRIES) the more they are expected to be 
willing to pay for a quality improvement. Two factors were extracted from the 
question concerning the reasons for the stated WTP where the first 
(IMPROVEMENT) refers to the importance of an increase of private and public 
benefits resulting from the program and the second (COST REDUCTION) 
points to the importance of the possibilities of saving on bottled water and the 
increased convenience from not having to buy bottled water any more. 
Concerning the perception of difficulty of decision making (DIFFICULT) it is 
expected that stated WTP decreases with an increasing feeling of difficulty since 
the respondent becomes uncertain and aims at being on the safe side. 
With respect to attitudinal variables a large number of question items and 
factors could be expected to systematically influence WTP. However, an 
exploratory statistical analysis revealed that only few significant effects exist so 
that only a limited number of factors was chosen to be included into the 
explanatory model. Among these factors is a factor indicating donation attitude 
(DONATION) constituted of the items "I find it difficult to say 'no' if a friend 
asks me a favor" and "It gives me a good feeling if I donate money". Two 
factors indicating the respondent's attitude about money were included where the 
first (SAVING) included the items "I build up savings because I want to have 
security for the future / because I want to leave something for my children" and 
would be expected to be negatively related with WTP in contrast to the second 
factor (HAPPINESS) consisting only of "Even with more money for myself I 
would not be happier than now" because such persons would care little about 
money and are, thus, expected to give it away more easily. In table 4-8 the 
parameter estimates and the statistical significance levels (p-values) are given 
for a prob it model of the DeShazo-dataset for the DC sample and a prob it model 
of the PC sample. Positive signs of the coefficients indicate a positive influence 
of the respective parameter on stated WTP, a p-value smaller or equal to 0.1 
indicates statistical significance at 10%, a p-value smaller or equal to 0.05 
significance at the 5%-level. 
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From table 4-8 it can be seen that only surprisingly few variables or factors 
seem to have a significant effect on stated WTP. This is especially the case for 
the PC model where the usual socio-economic and demographic variables are 
not at all significantly related to WTP. For the DC model those variables and 
factors that were found to have significant explanatory power show the expected 
sign: the higher the education level, the higher the MR WW water bill, and the 
more the improvements of private and public benefits were rated to be important 
reasons for WTP the higher the stated WTP. As well, respondents with children 
or grandchildren care more for this program than respondents without those. In 
contrast, the more difficult respondents perceived the valuation task to be and 
the more they strive to save money the lower the stated WTP. All these effects 
confirm the expectations. It is surprising, however, that household income 
shows no significant effect, although it carries a positive sign. Income is usually 
a strong and reliable variable to explain variations in WTP, but in this regression 
model its association with WTP is obviously lower than that of other 
explanatory variables so that no significant effect of income could be detected 
here. 
Most of the socio-economic and demographic variables in the PC model, 
although not significantly, point into the same direction as those of the DC 
model, which is a reassuring fact. In the PC model it is surprising that 
DONATION exhibits a negative influence on WTP, opposite to what was 
expected. This finding is hard to explain, it may be argued, however, that 
respondents with a high DONATION score, i. e. rating high on its constituting 
items "I find it difficult to say no if a friend asks me a favor" and "It gives me a 
good feeling if I donate money", satisfy these feelings already by selecting some 
bid interval on the payment card, although it is low, and don't consider what this 
program is really worth to them. This interpretation is supported by regression 
results in 4.4.3.6 below. As expected, however, those respondents with a high 
score in the variable HAPPINESS which refers to respondents' feelings of not 
being happier even if they had more money exhibit a significant tendency to 
state higher WTP values in the payment card format. 
These general data about the sample and the estimates of WTP and 
explanatory variables as well as factors provide an overview of the response 
behavior in this CVM study and form the basis for subsequent investigations 
concerning boundedly rational behavior and the employment of limited 
information processing in this study. In the following the responses will be 
evaluated w. r. t. the scales of bounded rationality developed in section 4.3.2. 
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Table 4-8: Parameter estimates of the explanatory variables (covariates) of 
WTP for the DC and for the PC samples* 
Dichotomous choice Payment card 
Parameter Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
SEX -16.97 .9038 81.33 .4787 
INCOME 0.0435 .4002 0.46 .2757 
AGE -2.19 .7360 -8.70 .1466 
HHSIZE -27.33 .6171 15.40 .7825 
EDU 108.75 .. .0077 57.36 .1657 
MARRIED 18.30 .9211 -255.41 .1799 
CHILD 619.53°* .0040 261.64 .1916 
OFFICIAL -262.77 .1109 -175.04 .2981 
MRWWBILL 0.53. .0816 0.43 .3234 
BOTTBILL 0.087 .9086 0.84 .1308 
MRWWQUAL -18.64 .7944 -10.97 .8936 
WATER WORRIES 0.o15 .8473 0.o15 .8614 
IMPROVEMENT 233.98 .. .0114 272.16 .. .0106 
COST 90.46 .2755 149.53 .1694 
REDUCTION 
DIFFICULT -384.10 .. .0000 -47.17 .5815 
DONATION 108.01 .3167 -226.53°* .0111 
SAVING -279.79 .. .0016 41.02 .6505 
HAPPINESS 117.24 .2658 213.80·· .0233 
** means significance at the 5%-level, • significance at the 10%-level. 
4.4.3.4 The measurement scales of bounded rationality 
At this point the focus of this study will now tum to the practical application of 
the bounded rationality scales developed above. First, the responses to the 
questions containing the items for the task independent and the task dependent 
scales of bounded rationality shall be evaluated using factor analysis as 
described in the previous section. The first objective is to be able, for both 
measures, to extract meaningful factors from the correlation structure of the 
responses to the question items. Interpretable and meaningful factors form the 
prerequisite for any further analysis using these developed scales. Next, the 
relationship between the task independent and the task dependent scales shall be 
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investigated as it is expected that they correlate to a certain degree since 
individuals who show a general disposition for heuristic information processing 
might also exhibit a more pronounced use of such heuristics resulting in limited 
information processing in a specific task. Third, it will be attempted to find 
variables and characteristics within the dataset that could be used for explaining 
the observed individual differences in information processing, i. e. the 
determinants of the task independent and the task dependent information 
processing and decision types. Subsequently, the relationship between WTP and 
the two different scales shall be explored in detail. As mentioned above, while 
the a priori expectation that a higher level of boundedly rational information 
processing and decision making is negatively related to the amount of stated 
WTP is only tentative, it is expected that a systematic relationship between 
intuitive-heuristic processing and typical procedural biases of the CVM exists. It 
will be explored which of these biases mentioned in chapter 2 can be attributed 
to the bounded rationality of respondents. Finally, the results of this 
investigation shall be used to derive recommendations for the improvement of 
future CVM survey designs. 
The task independent scale 
In the questionnaire of the present CVM study ( see appendix 7 .1) the question 
containing the items of the task independent scale of bounded rationality was 
question number 9 (see page 224), whereas the task dependent items are 
contained in question number 18 (see page 228). This numbering shall be used 
as a shorthand reference for the two different scales from now on. As a first task, 
question 9 was subjected to a factor analytical evaluation as described above. 
From the various procedures that are available for such a task and that differ 
slightly in their methodology, for the present study the principal components 
method was used for factor extraction. This option represents the most 
frequently used standard in factor analysis. However, it was tested whether 
employing alternative options like e. g. the principal-axis method would lead to 
qualitatively different results which was not the case here. Furthermore, for the 
rotation of the extracted factors necessary to obtain interpretable factors the 
commonly-used Varimax-method was chosen. The Bartlett test of sphericity 
clearly shows that the correlation matrix of the question items is not an identity 
matrix (p < 0.001) so that the matrix contains enough systematic correlations 
between the items to allow an extraction of factors. Also, the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin test (KMO) for sample adequacy yields a value for inter-item correlations 
of 0.6 which is sufficiently high, however not ideal. Four factors show an 
eigenvalue greater than 1 which indicates that each of these four factors can 
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explain more of the variance in the data than any single variable by itself.5 
Altogether, the four extracted factors explain 59.5% of the variance. However, 
the item "Documentary programs on TV annoy me so that I often switch to a 
different channel" was excluded from the dataset since it was found to be not 
sufficiently related to one of the extracted factors. Recall that this item was 
adapted from the general formulation of the task independent measure in section 
4.3.2 due to the fact that quizzes and crossword-puzzles are not common in 
Thailand. 
Table 4-9 presents the 4 extracted factors from the items in question 9 except 
the "television"-item. The figures in the rows pertaining to each question item 
represent the respective item's factor loading on factors I to 4. The factor 
loading of an item can range between -1 and 1, it indicates the item's correlation 
with the respective factor, i. e. the degree to which the item "belongs" to the 
factor. It is desirable to extract factors from the dataset so that each item loads 
high on only one factor and low on all the others so that the meaning of each 
factor can easily be inferred by the question items. From this it follows that each 
item forms a constituting element of that factor on which it loads highest. In 
table 4-9 the factor loadings in the rotated factor matrix are ordered where the 
items between the vertical lines represent those items belonging to the respective 
factor. The last row in table 4-9 contains the consistency measures for each 
factor measured by Cronbach's alpha (cf. Janssen and Laatz 2003: 525). 
Cronbach's alpha measures the degree between O and 1 to which the items in one 
factor measure the same construct. It shows here that the first factor has the 
highest internal consistency, however, the value of 0.62 is still below the usually 
desired consistency level of 0. 7. The consistencies of the other three factors are 
rather low which indicates that the respective factors represent a construct with 
quite a broad meaning. 
From table 4-9 the semantic meanings of the four factors extracted from 
question 9 can be derived. The factors TIFl, TIF2 and TIF4 are relatively easy 
to interpret, TIF3 is more ambivalent and less clear cut. TIFl obviously 
indicates intuition, i. e. the positive feelings toward intuitive reasoning and the 
trust in one's judgments. TIF2 is the systematic antipode of TIFl indicating a 
liking of effortful cognitive processes, therefore TIF2 could reasonably be 
named "analytical-rational". TIF4 groups those kinds of information processes 
that indicate a minimum employment of cognitive effort for information 
processing and decision making. Those people who generally think that hard 
thinking is boring and who want to take decisions quickly and not waste much 
5 The criterion of eigenvalues greater than 1 is a common criterion for factor extraction and 
is used to determine the appropriate number of factors extracted. Eigenvalues smaller than 
1 indicate that this factor has less explanatory power than the single variables in the set so 
it should not be extracted from the correlation matrix. 
142 
Oliver Frör - 978-3-631-75515-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 03:56:05AM
via free access
time on thorough thinking fit the picture of the "cognitive miser" rather well (see 
3.3.4.2). This type of individuals thus bears close resemblance to the dominating 
view of human information processing under the "heuristics and biases" 
program described in chapter 3. Recall that this type of people was found to be 
prone to a wide variety of reasoning biases and use of simplifying heuristics. 
Thus, this factor must be considered promising for the detection of effects of 
boundedly rational decision making, i. e. the occurrence of procedural biases in 
CVM. 
Table 4-9: Factor loadings of the task independent bounded rationality scale 
Task Independent Factors (TIF) 
TIFl TIF2 TIF3 TIF4 
"intuitive" "analytical- "cautious" "cognitive 
Items (abbreviated) rational" miser" 
Initial impressions are 
.031 .125 -.051 
usually correct 
I trust my hunches .021 .095 
I like challenges -.086 -.130 
Complex task is 
-.017 .170 .040 
challenging 
I don't like time 
.096 .038 -.118 
pressure 
I know it's right .227 .153 .327 
I follow the group .396 .147 
Thinking is boring -.068 -.233 
Time is money so I 
.256 .388 -.079 
take decisions quickly 
Consistency 
(Cronbach's aleha} .62 .36 .23 .14 
The extraction of four factors with an eigenvalue greater than one thus also 
indicates that there is a systematic distinction between the intuitive type of TIF 1 
and the cognitive miser type of TIF4. This distinction can best be demonstrated 
by the factor loadings of the item "Thinking is boring". Not only does it load 
positively and highest on the "cognitive miser" factor indicating its strong 
association with this type, it also loads quite high negatively on the "analytical-
rational" factor which indicates that those people who consider hard thinking 
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boring definitely do not appreciate complex and challenging tasks. Since this 
item loads practically not at all on the first factor "intuitive" it can be seen that 
people who trust their intuitions and feel that these are actually correct are not of 
the cognitive miser type. The interpretation of TIF3 is not so straightforward. 
While its highest loading item "I hate to make important decisions under time 
pressure" suggests that this factor is associated with a high degree of reflection, 
the strong association with "Often, when I take decisions, I don't know why but I 
feel that I'm right" which is also to a considerable degree related to TIF 1 
"intuitive" and TIF4 "cognitive miser" reveals that TIF3 pertains to intuitive, 
however slow, information processing. Individuals loading high on this factor 
need their time to explore their intuitions, however, these stand in clear contrast 
to "initial impressions" or "hunches" as in TIFl which seem to be a kind of fast 
intuitions. This slow processing is also documented by the negligible loading of 
"Time is money so I take decisions quickly", an item even considerably 
associated with the "analytical-rational" factor TIF2. Furthermore, their behavior 
in groups stands in clear contrast to the other factors' characteristics, especially 
those of TIF 1, in that TIF3 is associated with a particularly low susceptibility to 
social or group influences. Considering that group leaders are often those who 
come up with persuasive thoughts or propositions quickly, TIF3 indicates a 
reluctance to get carried away by such behavior of others and rather stick to their 
own, albeit slower thought processes. In conclusion, this factor can, therefore, be 
named "cautious". 
Since the items in question 9 are derived from existing items of the rational 
experiential inventory (REI) described above ( cf. Epstein et al. 1996) where a 
few items have been reformulated and others have been added, it would be 
desirable to test whether the set of the REI items applied in this particular CVM 
study is able to replicate the same factor structure of the original REI. To this 
end, the responses to those five items taken from the original REI, i. e. items A, 
B, D, G and H in table 4-2, are evaluated separately using factor analysis. The 
results are listed in table 4-10. 
As can be seen, only with the reduced items considered central to the original 
REI it is possible to replicate the two-factor structure distinguishing clearly 
between the two factors where the factor REI 1 in table 4-10 corresponds to the 
"intuitive-experiential" factor called faith-in-intuition (FI) in Epstein et al. 
(1996) and the factor REI2 corresponds to the "analytical-rational" factor 
derived from the need-for-cognition (NFC) scale based on Cacioppo and Petty 
(1982) as described above. The differentiation into the two factors is rather 
clear-cut as can be seen by the mostly very low factor loadings of the items not 
belonging to the respective factors in table 4-10. Again, this structure reveals 
that the cognitive miser type indicated here by the item "Thinking is boring" is 
hardly associated with the "intuitive-experiential" factor but is in fact the lower 
end of the "analytical-rational" factor as can be seen from its strong negative 
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factor loading there. This correct replication of the original 31-item based REI 
factors by the simplified 5-item selection consisting of reformulated and slightly 
context-adapted REI items is reassuring and indicates that such measures of 
cognitive effort and information processing can also be applied in the cultural 
context of Thailand which has never been tried before. 
Table 4-10: Factor analytical results of the REI items only 
Items (abbreviated) 
I trust my hunches 
Initial impressions are usually 
correct 
I like challenges 
Complex task is challenging 
Thinking is boring 
Consistency 
(Cronbach's alpha) 

















Regarding the more detailed TIF-scale, does the extraction of four factors in 
table 4-9 invalidate the assumption of the dual-process theories described in 
chapter 3 postulating only two fundamental types of information processing? I 
argue that this is not the case as indicated by the robust two-factor structure 
found for the items in table 4-10 where only the central items of the REI were 
used instead of the augmented and adapted set of question items in question 9. 
Rather, the three separate low-cognition factors found in table 4-9 represent 
three ways of employing such simplified information processing where TIF 1 
refers strongly to the concept of "ecological rationality" as defined by Todd and 
Gigerenzer (2003) since trust in those intuitions is expressed, TIF3 refers to 
slow and more consciously employed intuitive processing and TIF4 stands for 
personal cognitive limitations ("Thinking is boring") and impatience ("Time is 
money so I take decisions quickly"). Thus, these three separate factors stand as a 
whole for the wide variety of cognitive processes characterized by low effort 
and decision making based on intuition and simplified heuristics. 
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The task dependent scale 
The second instrument for measuring and classifying the bounded rationality of 
CVM respondents, the task dependent scale, is based on the items contained in 
question 18. Before performing factor analysis on this question, it is useful to 
take a look at the responses to the single question items. These results are 
illustrated in table 4-11. 
Table 4-11: Results of the single question items of question 18 (missing 
responses are neglected) 
When you think about your decision whether and 
how much to contribute to the proposed project, are 
the following statements true? % Yes %No 
A I made my decision based on my first feeling about 81.1 18.0 
this program right after it was presented to me. 
B I really thought very hard about every single aspect 44.6 54.5 
of the program before making a decision of how 
much to pay. 
C The first impression that I had about this program 24.7 74.2 
changed on a second thought. 
D I would have liked to have more time for making a 62.6 35.6 
decision about my contribution to this program. 
E All aspects were equally important for my decision. 84.7 14.2 
F With the given information about the project I found 63.3 35.4 
it very hard to make a good decision. 
G There are so many aspects in this project but only a 57.7 40.9 
few of them were really relevant for my decision. 
H Even if I had had more time available for thinking 70.1 28.6 
about this program I don't think that my decision of 
how much to contribute to it would have been 
different. 
The percentages of "yes" and "no"-responses to the single question items already 
reveal a number of interesting points. First, respondents seem to be highly 
affected by intuitive and heuristic information processing and decision making 
as is indicated by the high percentage of "yes"-responses to items A, E and, to a 
lower degree, G. These three items correspond to the expected three different 
types of limited information processing laid out in section 4.2.2.2. Thus, the first 
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research question, i. e. whether respondents in CVM surveys perform some 
"economy of cognition", can clearly be answered positively. The degree of such 
limited information processing is even surprisingly high, especially regarding 
items A and E. Further analysis of the influence of bounded rationality on 
response behavior in CVM surveys seems, therefore, highly relevant. Second, 
the percentage of "yes"-responses to items D and F concerning the available 
information on the scenario and the time for decision making indicates that more 
than 60% of the respondents felt a limitation in at least one of the two aspects 
during the interview. These two items could well be interpreted as an indirect 
assessment of respondents' uncertainties regarding their valuation of the 
proposed environmental change since limited time and information prevent them 
from evaluating the scenario sufficiently in the light of their preferences. 
The data presented in table 4-11, however, do not show the combinations of 
responses to the single question items for each respondent. Certain combinations 
of responses may be considered inconsistent and should, therefore, be treated 
with reservation. Specifically, it would be expected that a respondent answering 
"yes" to item A chooses "no" for item C since a decision based on the first 
impression would be inconsistent with a change of this impression after having 
had a second thought about it. Equally, a respondent answering "yes" to item E 
would be expected to respond "no" to item G since plausibility suggests that 
either all aspects are equally important or only few aspects are relevant but not 
both. A substantial part of respondents was found not to conform to these strict 
plausibility requirements. Thus, respondents seemed to have trouble 
understanding the meaning of the question items correctly leading to 
inconsistent response patterns. This result sheds substantial doubt on the validity 
of the responses to the task dependent question items. Nevertheless, the data 
from these items shall be used for an analysis of limited information processing 
in the CVM, but the results need to be interpreted carefully. 
However, in contrast to the analysis of the task independent scale, the 
responses to the task dependent question items are analyzed separately w. r. t. 
the WTP elicitation question format used. Such an approach appears necessary 
since it must be expected that information processing in the two elicitation 
formats will be different, at least during the part when respondents evaluate the 
proposed scenario in monetary terms. An indication that different reasoning 
processes are used is given by significant differences between the responses of 
the DC and the PC respondents regarding question items A, B and F. In the 
following, therefore, the results of the task dependent question items using 
factor analysis will be treated separately. 
For the DC dataset the Bartlett test of sphericity (p < 0.001) and the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin test (KMO = 0.649) indicate that the responses to this question are 
well suited for factor analysis, the KMO-value is even higher than the one for 
the responses to question 9. Three factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1 were 
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extracted. In conjunction, they are able to explain 60.2 % of the variance in the 
dataset. For the extraction of factors item H was omitted from the analysis since 
it turned out not to be clearly related to any one of the extracted factors. An 
inclusion of item H would, therefore, have weakened the interpretation of the 
factors. Table 7-12 presents the respective items, factors and factor loadings for 
the DC dataset. 
Table 4-12: Factor loadings of the task dependent bounded rationality scale 
(DC) 
Task Dependent Factors (TDF _ DC) 
Items (abbreviated) TDFl DC TDF2 DC TDF3 DC 
"uncertain" "analytical" "elimination" 
Would have liked more time 
.148 -.071 
for the decision 
Good decision is very hard 
.133 -.026 
with the given information 
All aspects were equally 
-.398 .138 
important 
Thought hard about every 
.384 .097 
single aspect 
First impression changed on a 
.018 .127 second thought 
Decision is based on first -.228 .107 
feeling 
Only few aspects were 
.013 .031 




The grouping of the question items into three factors and the respective factor 
loadings provide interesting insights into the thought and decision processes of 
the respondents in this specific CVM task context. The first factor TDFl_DC 
contains as the two highest loading items those referring indirectly to 
respondents' uncertainties over their preferences (see above), TDFI_DC shall 
thus be termed "uncertain". It is interesting that item E "All aspects are equally 
important" is contained in this factor indicating that respondents in the DC 
question format exhibit a tendency to undifferentiated information processing 
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when they feel uncertain due to information and time limitations. At the same 
time, item B "Thought hard about every single aspect" is clearly related to 
TDFl_DC as well, however to a lower degree. This item seems to contradict 
item E which suggests only superficial information processing. Item B, 
however, needs to be treated with reservation since it is rather prone to social 
desirability since respondents might be reluctant to admit to the interviewer ( or 
to themselves) that they have not thought hard about every single aspect of the 
proposed scenario. 
TDF2_DC refers to information processing and decision making based on 
thorough thoughts and considerations of the given scenario and the payment 
scheme. Respondents with a high factor score on this factor take into account all 
the given information and don't let themselves be guided by their first 
impressions as indicated by the negative factor loading of the item "Decision 
based on first feeling". They are even able to revise their first impression when 
they think more thoroughly about the program. This item indicates the corrective 
influence of the "analytical-rational" over the "intuitive-experiential" systems, a 
key feature of the dual-process models of reasoning. The high loading of the 
item "Thought hard about every single aspect", although not a primary element 
of TDF2 _ DC, underscores the analytical nature of this factor, however, as 
mentioned above, this item needs to be treated cautiously. Another item grouped 
primarily with TDFl_DC seems to play an important role here, too. With the 
high negative loading of "All aspects were equally important" this TDF2_DC 
indicates the ability to make trade-offs among the project's features where some 
are perceived more important than others. Thus, the limitations of time and 
information do not seem severe for TDF2-respondents. 
Finally, TDF3 _DC as a single-item factor stands for the third kind of limited 
information processing described in section 4.2.2.2 as indicated by the high 
loading on its constituting item "Only few aspects were relevant for the 
decision" and the very low loading of "Thought hard about every single aspect". 
Therefore, information processing and decision behavior as indicated by TDF3 
is assumed to follow the most prominent elements of the scenario while 
eliminating the others from further consideration early in the process. Such a 
decision heuristic here could be called "elimination-of-aspects" (EOA) since 
entire elements of the valuation scenario are only "peripherally" processed and 
eliminated from consideration early on. In addition, the very low factor loadings 
of the "uncertainty" items show that TDF3 _DC-respondents are quite certain 
regarding the outcome of such peripheral processing. 
The PC-partition of question 18 is also well-suited for factor analysis as 
indicated by Bartlett's test of sphericity (p < 0.001) and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
test (KMO = 0.692). Here, question item H was also omitted from the analysis. 
For the PC-partition four separate factors were extracted which are able to 
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explain more than 72 % of the variation in the data. Table 4-13 shows the result 
of the factor analysis of question 18 for the PC-dataset. 
Table 4-13: Factor loadings of the task dependent bounded rationality scale 
(PC) 
Task Dependent Factors (TDF _PC) 
Items (abbreviated) TDFl PC TDF2 PC TDF3 PC TDF4 PC 
"uncertain" "analytical" "equal" "elimination" 
Good decision is very 
hard with the given .035 -.034 .064 
information 
Would have liked more 
.045 .071 .096 time for the decision 
Thought hard about 
.400 .142 -.050 every single aspect 
Decision is based on 
.045 -.137 -.084 
first feeling 
First impression changed 
.230 -.123 -.021 
on a second thought 
All aspects were equally 
.083 .025 -.026 
important 
Only few aspects were 
.098 .045 -.026 
relevant for the decision 
Consistency 
.65 -.55 (Cronbach's alpha) 
The single question items are grouped into the factors in a similar way as in the 
DC-partition. However, here item E "All aspects were equally important" is 
extracted as a separate factor and, as can be seen from its low loading on 
TDFI_PC "uncertain", it is not at all related to preference uncertainty as was the 
case for the DC-partition of question 18. TDF3 _PC is thus termed "equal". This 
slightly different grouping of the items by the factor analytical procedure 
suggests that PC respondents, on average, try harder to evaluate the given 
information even when they feel uncertain due to information and time 
limitations than DC respondents. This might be the result of being forced to 
select a WTP interval from a list in the payment card format rather than simply 
accept or reject a proposed bid in dichotomous choice. In the following, the 
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relationships between the task independent and the task dependent scales shall 
be explored. 
Relationship between the two scales 
On the basis of the extracted factors respondents of the CVM survey can be 
classified as to the degree to which they are associated with each of the factors, 
i. e. the factor analytical method computes individual factor scores for each 
respondent signifying the degree to which he belongs to each factor. These 
factor scores represent the values of the variables to be used in further regression 
models where the extracted factors serve as explanatory variables. A similar 
employment of factor scores was described in the full regression model where 
factors of the attitudinal variables were used as explanatory variables in the 
model in section 4.4.3.3. These factor scores for each individual respondent can 
now be used for analyzing the relationship between the two measurement scales 
of bounded rationality. 
As mentioned above, it would be expected that the two scales are correlated to 
some degree, i. e. that on average those respondents showing a tendency for 
behavior based on intuition as classified by the TIF scale also exhibit a tendency 
for limited information and heuristic behavior in the particular CVM task and 
vice versa. Table 4-14 shows the bivariate correlations using the Pearson 
correlation coefficient between the four factors pertaining to the task 
independent scale and the task dependent factors for the DC and the PC-
partitions of the dataset. 
On the whole, the correlations between the task independent and the task 
dependent factors are very weak and mostly insignificant. This finding clearly 
questions the expectation that, on average, the general cognitive disposition of 
individuals is systematically related to their use of limited information 
processing in specific tasks. Two significant correlations, however, are plausible 
and shall briefly be highlighted here. For the DC-partition TIF4 "cognitive 
miser" is significantly correlated to TDF3 "elimination" indicating that 
respondents who have a tendency to employ as little cognitive resources as 
possible try to reduce complex decision problems like the one to evaluate a 
CVM scenario to a much simpler task by concentrating only on a few important 
elements of that scenario. It is interesting, though, that PC respondents who 
were classified as cognitive misers show no such behavior. A cautious 
interpretation of this different behavior between the two question formats would 
be that whereas cognitive misers consider it sufficient in a DC format to process 
information superficially, i.e. concentrate on the most important aspects, the 
requirement to select a specific interval in the PC format activates more 
differentiated reasoning about the scenario. Consequently, a cognitively miserly 
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PC respondent feels forced to consider the proposed scenario more completely 
and thoroughly than if the DC elicitation format were used. 
Table 4-14: Correlations among the task independent factors (TIF) and the task 
dependent factors (TDF), levels of significance are given in 
parentheses (p-values) 
Factors TIFl TIF2 TIF3 TIF4 
"intuitive" "analyt.- "cautious" "cognitive 
rational" miser" 
TDFl DC .000 -.006 -.042 -.065 
"uncertain" (.992) (.893) (.377) (.171) 
TDF2 DC .030 .019 .002 .099 
"analytical" (.534) (.694) (.962) (.037) 
TDF3 DC -.018 .-045 .038 .096 
"elimination" (. 701) (.342) (.422) (.044) 
TDFI PC .157 -.056 .003 .089 
"uncertain" (.004) ( .311) (.959) (.107) 
TDF2 PC .048 .000 -.017 .002 
"analytical" (.389) (.999) (.761) (.964) 
TDF3 PC -.099 -.034 .095 -.005 
"equal" (.071) (.538) (.085) (.928) 
TDF4 PC -.053 .103 .026 .059 
"elimination" (.341) (.061) (.640) (.281) 
Another difference between response behavior of PC and DC respondents is 
indicated by the significantly positive correlation between TIFl "intuitive" and 
TDFl PC "uncertain" whereas no such correlation was found for DC 
respondents. Here again respondents in the DC format, especially if classified as 
intuitive, seem to be at ease with their "yes" or "no" response to the proposed 
bid, the lack of information and time does not seem to limit their confidence in 
the given answer to the WTP question. In contrast, the task to select an 
appropriate interval in the PC format seems much more demanding for intuitive 
respondents where it is not sufficient to use intuition, or their hunches, to either 
accept or reject a proposed bid. As stated above, the selection of a specific 
interval from a list requires to use more cognitive resources than in the DC 
format resulting in a stronger feeling of uncertainty, here. Thus, the correlations 
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between task independent and task dependent factors found here suggest that the 
PC format is more demanding for respondents, especially for those relying to a 
large extent on intuitive reasoning and limited information processing like the 
cognitive misers. 
It is surprising, however, that a significantly positive correlation between 
TIF4 "cognitive miser" and TDF2_DC "analytical" was found since the two 
factors were expected to represent opposite concepts of information processing. 
Furthermore, no correlations could be detected between TIF2 and TDF2 so that 
the general cognitive disposition for effortful analytical reasoning is completely 
unrelated to analytical information processing in the task dependent case. These 
results shed considerable doubt on the validity of the responses to the question 
items A and C of the task dependent scale. As will be demonstrated in the 
further analysis below this doubt seems to be warranted. 
4.4.3.5 Characteristics of the task independent and task dependent types 
In the following section, the systematic relationships between the socio-
economic and attitudinal variables of the respondents and the two measures of 
bounded rationality will be investigated. The purpose of this analysis is to 
observe whether clear and interpretable pictures that might characterize the 
various information processing types emerge from the data of this survey. There 
are few clear a priori expectations regarding these relationships. However it can 
be hypothesized that, in general, the higher the disposition for analytical 
thinking the higher are the levels of education and income since most good 
positions in professional life require a sufficiently high level of analytical 
ability. At the same time it can be expected that cautious individuals have a 
higher tendency to save money for their children and for their personal security 
in the future. Cognitive misers, on the contrary, are expected to perform worse 
in terms of education levels and incomes and will probably save less money for 
the future. Concerning the "soft" attitudinal variables assessed in this survey like 
the perception of the role of government, the attitudes toward money and 
donations, their worries etc., no clear expectations exist so that no specific 
hypothesis shall be formulated here. 
The task independent type 
For the decision types as defined by the task independent scale of bounded 
rationality there exist a considerable number of relationships with attitudes and 
socio-economic characteristics that confirm the classification introduced above 
and explain their behavior through these characteristics. This analysis was 
conducted by computing the Pearson correlation coefficients between the 
individual factor scores of the task independent factors and a number of 
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attitudinal and other variables that were assessed in part four and five of the 
CVM questionnaire. Here, a brief verbal description of the variables 
characterizing and, especially, distinguishing the four different types shall be 
given; the detailed correlation tables can be found in the appendix. In general, 
the factor scores of the TIF were correlated to some question items of donation 
attitude ( question 11 ), the role of government in environmental regulation and 
management (question 12), the economic self-classification of the households 
(questions 13 - 15), attitude toward money (question 16), issues of worry 
( question 17), debts ( question 19) and selected socio-economic items of question 
20. 
Ofall the four task independent decision types the TIFl "intuitive" type is the 
one that least stands out of the full dataset of respondents, so it can be 
considered the type occurring most frequently. However, in some attitudes this 
type significantly differs from the average respondent. Concerning his attitudes 
towards donations, for example, this factor rates significantly higher on almost 
all items, in particular his behavior in comparison to the other types seems to be 
influenced by donations being an established habit in society and an increase of 
his "boon", a kind of personal spiritual account in Buddhism, thus indicating that 
this type is particularly driven by social conventions. Furthermore, his tendency 
to make promises to others that he knows he will not keep in the end suggests a 
high degree of myopia, i. e. not taking future consequences of present actions 
sufficiently into account. When asked about the role of government in 
environmental protection and regulation he concedes that government should 
play an important role but that it is usually not effective and too late in 
regulation policies. In relation to personal and societal issues they might be 
worried about, respondents loading high on this factor seem to be particularly 
worried about their own economic situations and their health. From a socio-
economic and demographic perspective slightly more women than men are 
associated with TIF 1, they are slightly older and less educated. In conclusion, 
this type is closely associated to the average respondent but seems to be 
particularly adapted to the demands of society, probably because of a particular 
need for personal security as expressed by his high degree of worries concerning 
personal issues as compared to most of the other types. 
Regarding the variables at hand, the TIF2 "analytical-rational" type can be 
clearly distinguished from the average respondent and from all other types, 
especially from the TIF4 "cognitive miser" type. In relation to their donation 
attitudes individuals of this type are particularly concerned of what others think 
of them, however, just as the cognitive miser they don't seem to be influenced 
by donations being a habit in society and by an increase of their "boon". 
Concerning the role of government they approve of raising taxes for 
environmental protection significantly more than all other respondent types. 
This is also reflected in their attitudes on public spending and financing of 
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public goods since they approve significantly more of the public financing of 
libraries, swimming pools and theaters. In relation to other households they view 
their incomes and economic situations consistently as better and consider their 
incomes to be fair. This view is clearly due to their significantly higher levels of 
education and income. Therefore, money does not play such an important role in 
their lives. Although they spend most of it for personal consumption they don't 
view money to be as important for being happy as other types do and they also 
state to a significantly higher degree that they would not be happier if they had 
more money. This attitude is also reflected in their worries since they worry 
particularly little about their economic situations and the security of their 
incomes in the future. Instead, as TIF3 "cautious", they worry particularly about 
the environment and other political and social issues. From a demographic point 
of view, significantly more men than women in this sample belong to this type, 
especially unmarried ones. In conclusion, individuals of this type have a 
particularly positive feeling about themselves and feel that they are in control of 
things which seems to stem from their high levels of education and income and 
their greater independence from other people, e. g. family. 
The TIF3 "cautious" type is even more distinct from the average respondent, 
overall he shows a more negative view of the world and is thus more careful. He 
is particularly concerned about keeping promises once made, an attitude that 
distinguishes him clearly from the other types. At the same time he is 
disillusioned about obtaining help from others when in need. His view of the 
role of government is even worse than that of TIFl "intuitive" and TIF2 
"analytical-rational", but in contrast to the latter he is particularly against raising 
more taxes to improve environmental protection. He is also particularly 
concerned that such goods as discotheques, the railroad, swimming pools, the 
water supply and the telephone system not be financed by public money. 
Concerning his economic situation in comparison to other households he usually 
classifies himself to be better off, which he actually is. This might be due to his 
attitude toward money which exhibits more care to save for the future and keep 
out of debts e. g. by avoiding instalment purchases or bank loans in comparison 
to the other types. While this type doesn't seem to worry much about issues 
relating to himself, he is particularly worried about the environment, world 
peace, the political situation of the country, the erosion of moral values, social 
justice, corruption and foreigners in the country, i. e. he shows a particularly 
high degree of worry in relation to public issues. This high level of worry might, 
therefore, also be the reason for the significantly higher rate of childlessness 
despite the significantly higher rate of being married. Overall, this type is 
characterized by a feeling of lack of control, i. e. fear of influences of the outside 
environment that are possibly harmful so that the individuals of this type seem 
to put more emphasis on precaution and provision for the future and always 
remain on the alert to do things correctly. 
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Finally, the TIF4 "cognitive miser" type was found to differ in particular from 
the TIF2 type. In his donation attitude he seems to care little about established 
habits in society, however he expects help in return when he is in need. In 
relation to the role of government he holds the view that it doesn't play an 
important role in environmental regulation and in contrast to the other types he 
does not perceive law enforcement as ineffective. It seems that his care for 
environmental issues is rather low which carries over to an uncritical opinion of 
the role of government there. Instead, he is more concerned with personal issues 
which is reflected in his worries about his own economic situation and the 
security of his income. This high level of worries concerning the personal 
situation seems to stem from the importance he attributes to money and his 
obvious inability to deal with it in a satisfactory way. He considers money to be 
highly important for being happy and therefore spends most of it. Individuals of 
the cognitive miser type have significantly more debts with money lenders, 
presumably at high interest rates and, as TIF3 "cautious", significantly worry 
more about their debt levels. Therefore, it is not surprising that they consider the 
economic situation of their households worse in comparison to others. It is 
noteworthy that TIF4 is significantly associated with approving of public 
financing of the water supply system, an aspect that might relate to their WTP 
for the current project. From a socio-economic and demographic point of view 
women are slightly more associated with TIF4 than men in this sample, as well 
as slightly larger household sizes (only moderately significant), lower levels of 
education and income (moderately significant). In conclusion, this "cognitive 
miser" type shows a high degree of myopia which can be seen from his attitude 
towards money and his spending and borrowing behavior. He cares much about 
private issues but not particularly about public ones which might be due to his 
significantly lower level of education, as well. Thus, this type stands in clear 
contrast to the other decision types, particularly to TIF2. 
The task dependent type 
For the task dependent types the analysis of correlations between factor scores 
and attitudinal and socio-economic variables does not reveal patterns that are as 
clearly interpretable as for the task independent types. This result could already 
be expected from the lack of systematic relationships between the TIF and TDF 
in table 4-14. However, a few insights can nevertheless be gained from such an 
analysis. TDFl_DC "uncertain" shows an interesting pattern in its donation 
attitude: this type is significantly associated with having difficulties to say "no" 
to a friend's request for a favor and with promises that are not intended to be 
fulfilled. Such attitudes could serve as an indicator for the social desirability 
effect in CVM interviews. TDFl-type people even like to buy things on 
installment more often than others while stating significantly more often that 
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more money would not make them happier. Again, such attitudes w. r. t. money 
are problematic in the context of the CVM. TDFl_PC shows similar 
characteristics, however his particular difficulty to say "no" and his lower 
income levels are not significant (see appendix). Instead, TDFl_PC is 
significantly positively associated with stating that they cannot afford to pay 
more money, that government is responsible and that they have severe doubts 
regarding the scenario, i. e. attitudes that might indicate protest responses. 
For the TDF2_DC "analytical-rational" type only very few significant 
correlations with personal attitudes were revealed. Decision makers of this type 
worry significantly less concerning public issues like the erosion of moral values 
and peace in the world than the other types. This tendency to be particularly 
little worried about public issues is even more pronounced for TDF2_PC than 
for the DC respondents. Also, TDF2_DC respondents consider incomes more 
often as unfair and save less for the future than the other types. Furthermore, this 
factor is significantly negatively correlated with the level of income. In addition, 
TDF2_PC respondents are significantly older and less educated than the other 
types. 
Finally, TDF3 _ DC "elimination of aspects" shows an interesting pattern 
w. r. t. the attitudes regarding public spending. This type of decision making is 
significantly positively associated with approving of financing goods like 
electricity and water supply as well as the postal and telephone service with 
taxpayers' money. Since TDF3_DC is not significantly associated with a low 
social and economic status so that they could benefit from this public financing 
to a higher proportion than others, these attitudes on public spending indicate 
that TDF3 _ DC-type decision makers might exhibit a general tendency to 
eliminate important aspects from their considerations, just as they seem to have 
done in the present CVM interview. Regarding the PC-partition, respondents 
neither the "equal importance" nor the "elimination" types show any 
interpretable pattern of characteristics. 
In summary, the analysis of the characteristics of the task independent and the 
task dependent types leads to the following conclusions: for the task 
independent factors, i. e. the factors regarding the general cognitive dispositions 
of individuals, rather clear patterns emerged from the correlation analysis with 
socio-economic and attitudinal variables assessed in the survey. The a priori 
expectations were confirmed in that the analytical-rational type TIF2 was 
significantly associated with higher levels of education and income, the cautious 
type was shown to save more money than the other types and the cognitive 
miser turned out to be poorer and less educated. For the task dependent factors 
describing types of information processing in specific decision situations the 
patterns were much weaker and harder to interpret or they were even non-
existent. The characteristics of the "analytical" TDF2-type were rather counter-
intuitive since, as opposed to the task independent TIF2 "analytical-rational", 
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concerns toward public goods were particularly low. This result puts the validity 
of question items A and C of question 18, i. e. the items forming TDF2, in 
question. 
These findings concerning the socio-economic and attitudinal characteristics 
of the two different measurement scales of bounded rationality lead to the 
question which of the two scales is better suited for a classification of bounded 
rationality in decision making: the one that classifies information processing and 
decision making types in general irrespective of the actual task at hand or the 
one that refers specifically to such a task, like e. g. the current CVM survey. 
This question shall be pursued in the following by analyzing to what extent each 
of these measurement scales can explain the observed variations of stated WTP 
and the occurrence of selected procedural biases. 
4.4.3.6 Bounded rationality and WTP 
In 4.4.3.3 regression models for explaining the systematic variations of WTP as 
assessed by the DC and the PC format were presented, and from a number of 
variables and factors that were expected to affect stated WTP those showing a 
significant influence were detected. This section will build on those results and 
investigate whether the developed scales of bounded rationality show significant 
explanatory power in such regression models. However, the a priori expectations 
of the direction of such an influence on WTP are not as straightforward as was 
the case, for example, for the explanatory variables and factors in the models 
shown in table 4-8. For most of those variables, clear expectations existed, either 
from experience with previous CVM studies or from plausibility considerations. 
Since these bounded rationality scales have not been investigated yet, especially 
not in the context of the CVM, such hypotheses cannot be based on prior 
experience, thus, hypotheses need to be derived from theory. 
In principle, there are two different reasons why stated WTP of respondents 
could be systematically related to their type of information processing and 
decision making. The first reason is that their preferences regarding the 
proposed water quality and environmental improvement differ systematically. 
Such differences might have arisen from different kinds of information 
processing of environmentally related information in their lives prior to the 
CVM survey potentially leading to different levels and kinds of general 
environmental problem awareness. This conjecture is warranted by significant 
differences between the various bounded rationality factors w. r. t. the rating of 
the importance of scenario elements in question 5 of the CVM questionnaire. 
TIF 1 "intuitive" is significantly negatively related to the importance of less 
accumulation of pesticides in the ecosystem and clearer color of the water (see 
appendix for detailed correlation results), while TIF2 "analytical-rational" only 
rates interruptions of water service as significantly less important than the other 
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types. TIF3 "cautious" is significantly positively related to the importance of all 
aspects of the scenario while TIF4 "cognitive miser" is significantly negatively 
related to the importance of most of the aspects. Just from this information it 
would be expected that both TIFl and, especially, TIF4 show a negative 
association with WTP whereas TIF3 shows a positive association. 
The second reason concerns the type of information processing during the 
CVM interview and is, therefore, based on the findings from the dual-process 
models of reasoning in chapter 3. As mentioned above, scenarios of 
environmental change are often quite complex and many consequences of 
environmental degradation, for example, are unfamiliar to the average 
respondent. Some elements of a scenario, e. g. in this case the lower 
contamination of ecosystems with pesticides, may not have conspicuous benefits 
to the respondent, at least not at first sight and thought. Consequently, such 
elements are attributed a lower value when the respective information is 
processed superficially as compared to when the respondent has taken some 
cognitive effort to scrutinize this element more thoroughly as to whether it might 
be of personal relevance to him or not. While during a CVM interview the 
possibility to obtain further information on the elements of the scenario is 
limited a respondent who thinks about the benefits of an element more 
thoroughly may remember prior information about the importance of this 
element, e. g. that pesticides kill aquatic organisms which, in turn, are necessary 
for an abundant fish population in a river. Limited information processors that 
are characterized by a superficial and selective evaluation of the given scenario 
information, therefore, can be expected to attribute less personal relevance to an 
environmental scenario as compared to more analytical respondents and might 
state a lower WTP as a consequence. This hypothesis shall be tested 
subsequently by employing the bounded rationality factors as explanatory 
variables in the WTP regression model. 
Tables 4-15 and 4-16 present the results of the regression models including 
the various scales of bounded rationality for the DC and the PC datasets, 
respectively. For each dataset, only those explanatory variables and factors were 
included in the models that showed a significant association with WTP in table 
4-8 (see section 4.4.3.3). In tables 4-15 and 4-16, model I contains these 
variables in conjunction with the task independent factors TIFI to TIF4, model 2 
uses the cognitive type factors based on the original REI items only (REI 1 and 
REI2) and model 3 considers the task dependent factors TDFl_DC to 
TDF3 DC in the case of the dichotomous choice format and TDFI PC to - -
TDF4_PC in the case of the payment card format. 
From table 4-15 it can be seen that some of the task independent factors of 
bounded rationality are statistically significant variables for explaining the 
variations of stated WTP across the DC respondents. In particular, as expected 
TIFl "intuitive" shows a significantly negative effect on WTP, although slightly 
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above the 5%-level, whereas TIF2 "analytical-rational" shows a strongly 
positive significant effect on WTP. The other two factors are not significant in 
this model, thus, against the expectation, the "cognitive miser" seems not to be 
significantly related to the amount of WTP. As expected, these influences are 
replicated in model 2 using the more aggregated REI-factors. REil which stands 
for the "intuitive-experiential" type shows a strongly negative significant 
association with WTP as does TIFl, and REI2 referring to the "analytical-
rational" type exhibits a positive association with WTP, just as TIF2 with which 
it has most question items in common. The statistical significance is, however, 
not as strong. The first important result is, thus, that the task independent scale 
has explanatory power w. r. t. WTP on top of the existing significant 
explanatory variables that form the core of the regression models. That is, 
controlling for the effects of the variables education, children, amount of water 
bill, assessment of difficulty with the valuation task, reasons for the contribution 
and attitudes toward money the amount of WTP is significantly determined by 
the general type of information processing. 
Second, the tentative hypothesis that more effortful analytical reasoning 
should lead to a higher WTP is supported here for the DC dataset. Third, the 
aggregated REI-measure of decision types seems to perform just as well as the 
four TIF, thus the disaggregation of the general "intuitive-experiential" factor 
into three separate factors related to effortless, intuitive information processing 
and decision making seems not to add to the explanatory power of the smaller 5-
item REI measure in this study. However, the TIF might tum out to be useful for 
the identification of procedural biases, which will be investigated below. 
Surprisingly, none of the three factors of the task dependent scale turned out to 
be significantly related to WTP in the model specification of model 3, however 
TDF2 "analytical" and TDF3 "elimination" are not very far above the 10% level 
of significance. When the TDF were used as the only explanatory variables in 
the regression model, however, TDF2 "analytical" showed a significantly 
negative effect on WTP. This effect, thus, is already contained in the core 
explanatory variables, particularly in the highly significant positive effect of 
education (EDU) on WTP so that TDF2 does not add significant explanatory 
power to the model. This negative effect of TDF2 could have been anticipated 
by its significantly negative correlation with the level of education found above 
where it has been shown that processing according to TDF2 is not associated 
with the analytical-rational type of TIF2. Again, this negative association 
between TDF2 "analytical" and stated WTP is not plausible adding further doubt 
to the validity of this task dependent factor. 
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Table 4-15: Bounded rationality scales as explanatory factors of WTP for the 
DC dataset 
Model 1 Model2 Model3 
Variable/ Factor Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
EDU 89.59 .. .0048 90.39 .. .0039 108.54 .. .0005 
CHILD 621.95°* .0001 621.43 .. .0001 592.50·· .0001 
MRWWBILL . 76 .. .0014 . 76 .. .0010 .84 .. .0002 
DIFFICULT -380.1 .. .0000 -373.42 .. .0000 -371.53°* .0000 
IMPROVEMENT 153.ot· .0153 155.90 .. .0128 144.76 .. .0153 
SAVING -168.5 .. .0195 -175.11·· .0119 -212.15°* .0023 
TIFl "intuitive" -132.07' .0723 - - - -
TIF2 "analyt.- 144.67 .. .0324 - - - -
rational" 
TIF3 "cautious" -19.01 .7570 - - - -
TIF4 "cognitive 25.13 .7138 - - - -
miser" 
REil "intuitive- - - -164.74 .. .0240 - -
exp." 
REI2 "analyt.- - - 124.20· .0562 - -
rational" 
TDFl "uncertain" - - - - 10.07 .8858 
TDF2 "analytical" - - - - -89.95 .1669 
TDF3 "elimination" - - - - -89.11 .1649 
Chi-square 782 (df=12, 781 (df=l0, 786 (df=l l, 
p<0.01) p<0.01) p<0.01) 
** means significance at the 5%-level, • significance at the 10%-level. 
For the PC regression model the results are not as strong as for the DC model 
presented in table 4-15. While the signs of the coefficients are similar, now both 
TIFl "intuitive" and TIF3 "cautious" exhibit a negative effect on WTP, albeit 
not highly significant. This result, however, confirms the expectations. In 
contrast to the DC dataset, TIF2 "analytical-rational" seems not to be 
significantly related to WTP. But in a reduced regression model excluding the 
factors DONATION, IMPROVEMENT and HAPPINESS as explanatory 
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variables the analytical-rational factor TIF2 shows a positively significant 
relation with WTP and, at the same time, the significance of the negative effect 
of TIFl "intuitive" is much higher. A number of interpretations can be 
considered from these results. First, the results of the task independent factors in 
the PC dataset support the interpretation of the DONATION factor in 4.4.3.3 
since its surprising negative effect on WTP is strongly correlated (p < 0.000 I) 
with the "intuitive-experiential" type. This means that these respondents seem to 
satisfy their need to do others a favor and to donate money by selecting some 
low bid interval on the payment card and stop considering the proposed program 
much further. Thus, the possibility to select a low amount while still being able 
to contribute could be regarded as facilitating heuristic behavior in the PC 
format leading to an incomplete evaluation of the entire program to be assessed. 
Second, the significantly negative association between TIF I and stated WTP in 
addition to the effect of DONATION supports the hypothesis that limited 
information processing, i. e. following one's intuitions, results in a lower 
valuation of an environmental change scenario, at least in this CVM study. Since 
this effect occurs both in the DC and in the PC versions of the survey this seems 
to be a rather robust result. 
Third, the missing statistical significance for TIF2 "analytical-rational" as 
opposed to the DC regression model in table 4-15 can be explained by its close 
correlation with the factor HAPPINESS ("Even with more money I would not 
be happier") which seems to have more explanatory power in this model. Thus, 
the effect that analytical respondents scrutinize the scenario elements more 
thoroughly than the other cognitive types and, consequently, state a higher WTP 
is much weaker when the PC elicitation format is used. Only if the factor 
HAPPINESS is excluded from the model does TIF2 show a significantly 
positive effect on stated WTP. Fourth, the significantly negative relation ofTIF3 
"cautious" with WTP in the PC dataset as opposed to the DC dataset indicates 
that in the PC question format slow but intuitive information processing leads 
respondents to "play safe" and select a significantly lower WTP interval on the 
payment card. It can, therefore, be hypothesized that this behavior constitutes 
one of the main reasons for the discrepancy of WTP between DC and PC 
question formats often found in the literature (see chapter 2 on the discussion of 
the different elicitation question formats). 
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Table 4-16: Bounded rationality scales as explanatory factors of WTP for the 
PC dataset 
Model l Model2 Model 3 
Variable/ Factor Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
DONATION -181.66 .. .0415 -198.01 .. .0177 -135.44 .. .0384 
IMPROVEMENT 345.89 .. .0002 337.22°* .0004 214.20 .. .0095 
HAPPINESS 198.42 .. .0317 204.97 .. .0254 121.00· .0534 
TIFl "intuitive" -103.43* .0795 - - - -
TIF2 "analyt.- 64.63 .2868 - - - -
rational" 
TIF3 "cautious" -98.44. .0864 - - - -
TIF4 "cognitive -21.63 .6723 - - - -
miser" 
REI l "intuitive-exp." - - -105.89 .. .0477 - -
REI2 "analyt.- - - 54.20 .3406 - -
rational" 
TDF l "uncertain" - - - - -54.76 .3767 
TDF2 "analytical" - - - - -30.34 .6039 
TDF3 "equal" 54.38 .3757 
TDF4 "elimination" - - - - -27.13 .6568 
Chi-square 2408 (df=9, 2411 (df=7, 2412 (df=9, 
p<0.01) p<0.01) p<0.01) 
** means significance at the 5%-level, ' significance at the I 0%-level. 
Not surprisingly, the results for the REI-factors are similar to those ofTIFl and 
TIF2 for the PC responses. While TIFl shows a negative relation with WTP 
indicating that also in the PC format heuristic information processing seems to 
have a negative effect on the stated contributions to the project proposed here, 
TIF2 is, again, not significant. In the reduced regression model, however, a 
strongly significant effect leading to higher contributions can be observed. In 
contrast to the DC dataset where the TIF-set did not generate insights not 
already observed from the much shorter REI, the TIF3 "cautious" factor seems 
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to have additional explanatory power for responses to the PC question format. 
Just like in the DC regression models, no significant associations between the 
TDF scale and stated WTP could be found for the PC model, not even in the 
absence of any other explanatory variables or factors in the regression models. 
Thus, the bid intervals selected by respondents in the PC format seem, on 
average, not to be systematically influenced by the scores on the task dependent 
bounded rationality factors. In the following section it will be attempted to use 
the scales of bounded rationality for an analysis of the occurrence of procedural 
biases in CVM surveys in the light of cognitive factors of information 
processing and decision making. 
4.4.3.7 Detection of procedural biases and their relation to the measures of 
cognitive type 
In section 4.2.2 a number of procedural biases that frequently and consistently 
occur in CVM studies are listed and discussed. In particular, these were the 
warm-glow effect and associated with it the embedding effect, the hypothetical 
bias, the social desirability effect, the starting point bias in the DC format, the 
range bias in the PC format and framing effects of the scenario description. It is 
one of the aims of this study to reassess and try to explain some of theses 
frequent biases in the light of bounded rationality and to attempt to find ways to 
mitigate them in future CVM designs. For the assessment of these biases the 
newly developed measurement scales of bounded rationality that are employed 
for the first time in a CVM study shall be used. Specifically, it shall be assessed 
whether there exist differences in the occurrence of these biases between the 
various groups of information processing types, i. e. between the task 
independent types TIFl to TIF4, between the REI-based types and between the 
task dependent types (TDF) in the DC and the PC elicitation question formats. 
A quantitative assessment of the occurrence of the mentioned procedural 
biases, however, can only be performed for those for which a suitable split 
sample design exists in this study. This is due to the fact that for such an 
assessment of procedural biases it is necessary to compare the WTP estimates 
for each split sample version, i. e. it is investigated whether statistically 
significant differences between these estimates occur for a certain cognitive type 
of the respondent group used for the WTP estimation or not. Therefore, only 
three out of the procedural biases mentioned above will be assessed in this study 
due to the limitation of the present split sample design: (1) the starting point bias 
in DC, (2) the range bias in PC, and (3) the social desirability effect via the 
anonymity I non-anonymity sample split. For an assessment of the remaining 
biases and effects a suitable split sample design would have to be developed 
which was not done in the CVM study underlying this research. In order to test 
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for the occurrence of these three biases and their relationships with the measures 
of cognitive type the following procedure is employed: 
Classification of respondents into cognitive types: each respondent of the dataset 
will be classified to belong primarily to one specific cognitive type, this is done 
for each of, the three alternative scales, i. e. each respondent is classified 
according to the TIF, the REI and the TDF. The respondent will belong 
primarily to that type on which he has the highest factor score. 
Detection of the extent of procedural biases for the full dataset: the full dataset 
of DC respondents will be subjected to a test of starting point bias and of the 
social desirability effect; equally, the full dataset of PC respondents will be 
subject to a test ofrange bias and of the social desirability effect. 
Detection of the extent of procedural biases for each cognitive type: in analogy 
to the previous step the respondents of each cognitive type of each of the three 
bounded rationality scales will be subjected to the respective test of procedural 
biases. Finally, these results will be compared between the types of each scale. 
Table 4-17: Number of respondents classified in each cognitive type factor {DC 
format) 
Factor # of resp. Factor # ofresp. Factor # of resp. 
TIFI 122 REIi 223 TDFI DC 169 
TIF2 124 REI2 238 TDF2 DC 131 
TIF3 105 TDF3 DC 160 
TIF4 108 
Total 459 461 460 
Table 4-18: Number of respondents classified in each cognitive type factor (PC 
format) 
Factor # of resp. Factor # of resp. Factor # of resp. 
TIFl 83 REIi 165 TDFl PC 98 
TIF2 77 REI2 164 TDF2 PC 61 
TIF3 83 TDF3 PC 58 
TIF4 86 TDF4 PC 107 
Total 329 329 324 
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Table 4-17 shows the classification of the respondents into the respective 
cognitive types for each bounded rationality scale for the DC dataset, table 4-18 
shows the classification for the PC dataset. 
The first procedural bias to be investigated using the bounded rationality scales 
is the starting point bias frequently observed in the DC format. As explained in 
chapter 2 this bias presumably stems from respondents' tendency to accept a 
proposed bid regardless of their true WTP, the classical "yea"-saying, or if the 
respondent feels that accepting the proposed bid is the only way of showing his 
support for the program although the bid is perceived as rather high ( cognitive 
dissonance). It is argued here that the more people tend to rely on low-effort 
cognitive processes the more they are expected to be influenced in their response 
behavior by heuristic cues like a starting point. High-effort processes are, thus, 
necessary to override the influence of heuristic cues like e. g. the starting bid in 
that respondents reflect more deeply about their true WTP which they need to 
compare to the given starting bid. Therefore, the hypothesis can be formulated 
that such starting point bias in the DC format occurs more often or to a larger 
extent among respondents belonging primarily to the intuitive types like TIF 1, 
TIF3, TIF4, or alternatively REil in the domain of the task independent scales 
and to TDFl and TDF3 in the domain of the task dependent scales. In contrast, 
it would be expected that TIF2, REI2 and TDF2 are less susceptible to this kind 
of behavior so that no significant bias should be found here for these types. 
In order to test for significant starting point biases, the following procedure 
shall be performed: the full bid range of five starting bids (25, 50, 100, 200 and 
400 Baht, respectively) with their subsequent lower follow-up bids is divided 
into two separate but overlapping ranges. The lower range comprises the four 
lower bid versions, i. e. 25 to 200 Baht, and the upper range comprises the four 
upper bid versions, i. e. 50 to 400 Baht. Subsequently, average WTP is estimated 
separately for each of the partial datasets, i. e. in the lower range case all 
respondents having received a questionnaire with a starting bid of 400 Thai Baht 
are excluded from the estimation of WTP while in the upper range case those 
with a starting bid of 25 Baht are excluded. In case starting point bias exists in 
the full dataset the WTP estimated from the lower range should be significantly 
lower than the WTP estimated from the upper range because in the lower range 
the rather extreme bid of 400 Baht cannot distort the WTP estimates upwards by 
"yea"-saying or the above mentioned acceptance to show support (for a similar 
approach to detecting starting point bias in the single-bounded DC format cf. 
Boyle et al. 1998: 54). 
In a simulation study where the true WTP of hypothetical respondents were 
known and responses to the proposed bids were generated by observing whether 
the bid was below or above this true WTP so that starting point bias is 
nonexistent by definition, it could be shown that the estimated average WTP 
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should be the same regardless of the use of the upper or the lower range for 
estimation (simulation procedure and results are available from the author). 
Thus, it is expected that using the dataset of the CVM survey in Thailand no 
significant differences between the lower and the upper range estimates of WTP 
are found for the "analytical-rational" types TIF2 and REI2, as well as for the 
"analytical" type TDF2. The results of this procedure are listed in table 4-19. 
First for the full sample (all respondents) and then for each subsample of 
decision types (see table 4-17 and 4-18 above) the average WTP and the 
respective 95%-confidence intervals were estimated both for the lower and the 
upper ranges of bids. WTP estimates are considered to be significantly different 
between the two bid ranges at the 5%-level if the estimate of the lower range is 
not contained in the confidence interval of the upper range and vice versa. 
Therefore, if this condition is violated for at least one of the estimates the WTP 
estimates are not significantly different at the 5%-level. 
From table 4-19 it can be seen that as expected there exists a significant 
starting point bias for the full dataset of "all respondents". However, the 
hypothesis stated above is not confirmed since all three "analytical-rational" 
decision types TIF2, REI2 and TDF2 show these significant differences of WTP 
estimates as well. Thus, those type of respondents seem not to be immune and 
should be considered to be as much susceptible to starting point biases as the 
other intuitive types. Instead, the intuitive type TIF3 "cautious" exhibits non-
significant starting point bias. 
The lack of significant starting point bias for TIF3, however, is not easily 
explained. The differences between the estimated WTPs for the lower and the 
upper range groups are still substantial ( ca. 32%) so that the observed effect of 
the starting bids is obvious, however not significant at the 5%-level. It is also 
noteworthy that for the cognitive types TIFl, TIF2 and TIF4 the WTP-estimates 
using the upper ranges are between 45% and 55% higher than the lower range 
estimates. In the case of TIF3-type respondents the observed smaller influence 
of the starting bid on the WTP response could be attributed to their general 
carefulness and their uneasiness with tasks performed by government (see 
4.4.3.5), of which MR.WW is clearly considered to be a part due to its being 
publicly owned. Such attitudes could explain the much higher rejection rate of 
the high 400 Baht bid ( ca. 60%) in comparison to the other types ( only ca. 40% ). 
Furthermore, since TIF3 is characterized by a particular aversion of following 
the group (see table 4-9) it can be hypothesized that TIF3-respondents regard the 
proposed bid as some kind of "consensus" figure which they must particularly 
scrutinize before accepting it for themselves. In conclusion, it seems, therefore, 
that these "cautious" respondents are most critical toward the starting bid which 
would explain that their WTP responses are less influenced by the particular 
value of the bid than the other types, including the ones considered "rational". 
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Table 4-19: Determination of the starting point bias for the DC format 
Cognitive type starting bid WTP (95% confid. bias 
factor range interval) 
all respondents 25 - 200 132(119-147) yes 
50 -400 196 (172 - 220) 
TIFl 25 - 200 119 (95 - 141) yes 
50 - 400 181 (122 - 240) 
TIF2 25 - 200 148 (121 - 190) yes 
50 - 400 214 (158 - 271) 
TIF3 25 - 200 140 (110 - 193) not 
significant 
50 - 400 185 (128 - 240) 
TIF4 25 - 200 130 (103 - 162) yes 
50 - 400 202 (154 - 254) 
REil 25 - 200 110 (95 - 126) yes 
50 - 400 159 (125 - 193) 
REI2 25 - 200 166 (141 - 207) yes 
50 - 400 234 (197 - 279) 
TDFl DC 25 - 200 117 (96- 143) yes 
50 - 400 182 (132 - 225) 
TDF2 DC 25 - 200 108 (87 - 130) yes 
50 - 400 167(117-213) 
TDF3 DC 25 - 200 163 (138-200) yes 
50 - 400 220 (183 - 262) 
The tests for the social desirability effect and for the range bias follow a 
different concept from the one for the starting point bias. Here, dummy variables 
can be used in the WTP regression model for indicating a particular treatment of 
the split sample design. In the case of the social desirability effect a split sample 
between an anonymous WTP question and a non-anonymous WTP question is 
used in the survey where it is expected that anonymous responses are free of 
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social desirability effects, thus forming a point of reference against which the 
regular, i. e. non-anonymous, response can be compared. The dummy variable 
assumes a value of 1 in case of anonymity and a value of 0 in the regular non-
anonymous case. Table 4-20 shows the coefficient estimates of this dummy 
variable in regression models for each cognitive type. A negative coefficient 
indicates a lower WTP estimate for anonymous responses versus non-
anonymous responses, thus, if the coefficient is found to be significantly 
negative a significant social desirability effect is indicated. 
Table 4-20: Determination of the anonymity and range biases 
DC Anonymity PC Anonymity PC Range 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
all -.06 .6087 -.07 .5719 .11 .3660 
respond. 
TIFI -.17 .4531 -.17 .4820 .21 .4320 
TIF2 .05 .8555 -.40 .1822 .02 .9364 
TIF3 .20 .4341 -.35 .1026 .25 .3543 
TIF4 -.27 .2992 -.02 .9333 -.03 .8822 
REil -.12 .4731 -.03 .8522 .17 .3355 
REI2 .03 .8424 -.12 .4836 .03 .8265 
TDFI DC -.03 .8901 
TDF2 DC .29 .1780 
TDF3 DC -.46* .0504 
TDFl PC -.13 .6835 -.07 .7695 
TDF2 PC .35 .2740 .08 .7364 
TDF3 PC .21 .4574 -.02 .2656 
TDF4 PC -.46* .0604 -.07 .7695 
Variables marked • are significant at the I 0%-level. 
For testing the PC responses w. r. t. the range bias sometimes postulated in the 
literature a dummy variable indicating the two different PC designs was used. A 
value of O for this dummy variable indicates a cut-off value of 400 Baht (small 
range) and a value of 1 stands for a cut-off value of 2000 Baht (large range) on 
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the payment card. The results of this test are shown in table 4-20 in the last two 
columns titled "PC Range". Here, a positive sign of the coefficient stands for a 
higher estimated WTP in case the PC design with a cut-off value of 2000 Baht 
was used, thus, a significantly positive coefficient of the PC range dummy 
variable indicates a significant range bias for the particular cognitive type. 
According to the results listed in table 4-20 only two significant effects of 
anonymity in the WTP elicitation question were observed from the data in this 
study. While in the domain of the task independent information processing and 
cognitive types no significant effects of anonymity on stated WTP could 
detected neither for the DC format nor for the PC format, a clearly negative and 
significant effect of anonymity was found for the respondents belonging 
primarily to the task dependent factor "elimination" (TDF3_DC and TDF4_PC), 
i.e. those respondents who answered "yes" to the question whether only few 
aspects of the scenario were relevant for their decision. Those respondents seem 
to be guided by social desirability in their responses in that they state a 
significantly higher WTP both in the DC and in the PC format in case an 
interviewer is present in person. However, the significance of this effect is not as 
strong for the PC format as for the DC format. Consequently, the respondents 
considering only few aspects of the scenario appear to have the tendency to 
follow the desirability cue and answer on the basis of their urge to state what the 
interviewers would most likely want to hear from them. 
However, the question remains whether the responses of the other types, 
including REI and TIF, where no significant differences between regular and 
anonymous WTP responses were detected are free from the social desirability 
effect so that social desirability plays no role, at least not a significant one, for 
these types. Alternatively, it could be argued that the reason why no differences 
were detected is that these types simply did not believe that their answers would 
remain unknown to the interviewer. This would, indeed, have been the correct 
guess since the interviewer was instructed to open the box containing only one 
completed questionnaire together with some blank sheets of paper right after the 
interview and then to transfer the secret responses into the respondent's 
questionnaire. So, did those respondents anticipate this fake anonymity and thus 
state socially desirable responses in both cases? In this study, there is no 
possibilities to clarify this question so that it may be assumed that no social 
desirability effects exist in the responses of these other types. 
Concerning the results for the PC format table 4-20 is rather clear: no social 
desirability effects and no range bias were found on the level of all respondents 
where all cognitive types are lumped together. On the specific level of the task 
dependent types, however, it emerges that TDF4_PC "elimination" is 
significantly influenced by the presence of an interviewer. Contrary to a number 
of empirical CVM studies where significant range biases were found, the 
respondents in this study in northern Thailand seem hardly to be influenced by 
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the range of the payment card intervals. In the PC case, therefore, only few 
additional insights into response behavior could be obtained by analyzing the 
responses of the different cognitive types separately. Overall, in the case of the 
starting point bias and the social desirability effect the separate analysis revealed 
significant differences regarding the cognitive types' response behaviors in this 
study so that additional insights for explaining the occurrence of these biases 
could be gained. 
4.5 Discussion and implications of the empirical results of the 
study 
This study represents the first application of bounded rationality scales in the 
context of the contingent valuation method. The empirical results presented so 
far are suited to give clear answers to the first three research questions laid out 
in section 4.2.2.3. The fourth question regarding the implications of the results 
of this study for the design of future CVM surveys remains to be discussed in 
this section. However, first the main results concerning research questions (I) to 
(3) shall be highlighted in the following. 
The first research question concerning the existence of an "economy of 
cognition" in CVM surveys is to be confirmed. This result is derived from the 
responses to the items to the task dependent scale of bounded rationality. A 
substantial number of respondents confirmed that they made use of some of the 
simplifying heuristics postulated in section 4.2.2.2, namely following their 
intuitions ("gut feelings"), giving equal weight to the elements of the scenario or 
considering only the most important or prominent ones while neglecting others. 
The results given in table 4-11 demonstrate that between almost 60% to more 
than 80% of respondents made use of these heuristics at least to some extent. 
Consequently, a further analysis of the consequences of such an "economy of 
cognition" for the benefit estimates and for the occurrence of procedural biases 
in CVM is warranted. 
The second research question dealt in greater detail with the issue of detecting 
such intuitive and heuristic response behavior in CVM interviews and measuring 
the extent to which it is used in order to enable an analysis of its consequences 
for WTP responses. To this end two separate approaches were undertaken. The 
first approach focused on the individual differences in people's general cognitive 
dispositions, i. e. their personal tendencies to process information more 
intuitively using effortless heuristic reasoning or more analytically using more 
effortful cognitive processes. The empirical instrument for classifying and 
measuring these dispositions was based on well-validated cognitive 
psychological scales, the Need-for-Cognition scale (cf. Cacioppo and Petty 
1982) and the Faith-in-Intuition scale (cf. Epstein et al. 1996). In order to be 
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applicable in CVM interviews these scales were shortened by selecting only the 
most important question items for the empirical instrument used here. For the 
second approach a new empirical instrument aiming at the direct elicitation of 
respondents' types of information processing used in the specific task of 
evaluating a CVM scenario was developed. The question items of this 
instrument are based specifically on the expected heuristics that CVM 
respondents might use when considering and valuing the proposed scenario. 
This instrument included also question items focusing at the indirect elicitation 
of respondents' uncertainties since it was argued before that preference 
uncertainty may be a prerequisite for the use of heuristic behavior and the 
occurrence of procedural biases (see 4.2.1). 
Concerning the validity of the scales it was shown that both approaches, i. e. 
the task independent approach focusing on the general cognitive dispositions as 
well as the task dependent approach, produced a meaningful factor structure 
when subjected to a factor analytical procedure. This means that it was possible 
to interpret the extracted factors as representing the common concepts, e. g. 
intuitive and analytical information processing, made up by their constituting 
single question items. The task independent scale was subdivided into the more 
comprehensive TIF-scale consisting of 10 items and the narrower REI-scale that 
consisted only of the 5 most important items from the original NFC and FI-
scales. It was found that each of the three scales considered divided into one or 
more intuitive factors and a rational factor, where the TIF separates the intuitive 
factor of the narrower REI into three more disaggregated factors due to the 
addition of five further question items. Thus, as already indicated by the dual-
process theories in chapter 3 it was demonstrated that "intuitive-experiential" 
information processing and decision making is not a homogeneous way of 
thinking but comes in different facets each of which applies to a special aspect 
of intuition. 
The TIF-scale per se produced coherent results and interpretations of the 
cognitive types in general, as was demonstrated by the emergence of clear and 
interpretable pictures of these types by correlating them to the socio-economic 
and attitudinal characteristics assessed in the survey. The task dependent scale 
was shown to be more problematic since the dataset contained a high degree of 
contradictory responses so that the validity of some of the question items of that 
scale is highly questionable. This seems to be particularly true for the three 
question items B "I really thought very hard about every single aspect of the 
program before making a decision of how much to pay", A "I made my decision 
based on my first feeling about this program right after it was presented to me" 
and C "The first impression that I had about this program changed on a second 
thought". The strong association of item B with the uncertainty items seems 
counterintuitive so that it is suspected that respondents answering this question 
were influenced by social desirability. While items A and C are, as expected, 
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strongly negatively correlated and, thus, contained with opposite signs in the 
same factor TDF2 interpreted as "analytical", the response behavior of this 
factor and its correlation with other personal characteristics of the respondents 
contradict this interpretation. Thus, the question items of the task dependent 
scale need to be improved if this scale is to be used to analyze cognitive aspects 
of response behavior in CVM surveys in the future. 
Concerning the third research question several interesting results were 
obtained from which new insights into different kinds of information processing 
and response behavior stemming from individual differences in cognitive 
characteristics of respondents can be gained. First, for the DC elicitation 
question format the tentative hypothesis that the higher the tendency of 
respondents toward analytical-rational information processing the higher their 
WTP and the higher the tendency toward intuitive reasoning the lower their 
WTP was supported. For the PC elicitation format significantly negative effects 
on stated WTP could only be found for the two factors TIFl "intuitive" and 
TIF3 "cautious", TIF2 "analytical-rational" was found to be positive but not 
significant in the regression model. The task dependent factors had no 
significant association with WTP in neither of the question formats. These 
results show that the different kinds of information processing and reasoning can 
be significant determinants of WTP. In particular, they underscore the necessity 
that respondents be given the opportunity and be encouraged to process and 
evaluate the scenario information thoroughly. As expected here, superficial 
intuitive evaluation of the scenario results in a significant tendency to 
underestimate the social value of environmental improvement scenarios. 
Second, new insights were gained concerning two of the three procedural 
biases analyzed: ( 1) the starting point bias in the DC elicitation question format 
and (2) the social desirability effect both in the DC and in the PC formats. While 
the responses to the DC question on the whole showed a significant starting 
point bias, the occurrence of this bias seems to depend on the type of 
respondents' general cognitive disposition. No significant starting point bias was 
detected for the group of respondents who are classified as belonging primarily 
to the TIF3 "cautious" type indicating that such a general cognitive disposition, 
i. e. a particular aversion to time pressure and group decisions, facilitates the 
thorough and critical scrutiny of the starting bid in a DC elicitation question. 
This finding is in contrast, however, to the a priori hypothesis that the more 
analytical-rational factor TIF2 would be less susceptible to the starting bid. It 
was shown that TIF2-type respondents are influenced just as much by the 
starting bid in a DC question as the intuitive respondents and the cognitive 
misers who were thought to be particularly vulnerable to this bias. Since 
analytical or rational information processing is not a solution for the problem of 
the general occurrence of starting point bias in the DC format the results of the 
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present study further add to the strong reservations regarding the use of this 
format in CVM surveys. 
The analysis of the social desirability effect was the only instance where the 
task dependent scale produced any meaningful results. In a comparison of WTP 
responses between settings where these responses were given either 
anonymously or in the regular, i. e. non-anonymous, way no significant 
differences between the two treatments were found for the DC or the PC format. 
A disaggregated analysis differentiating between the cognitive characteristics of 
respondents revealed, however, that those respondents belonging primarily to 
the task dependent "elimination" type stated a significantly higher WTP in case 
they gave their answer directly to the interviewer, i.e. non-anonymously. While 
the exact reason for this anonymity effect needs to be investigated further it can 
already be deduced here that the presence of an interviewer who they want to 
please with their response seems to be a decisive element of the CVM setting for 
respondents considering only a few elements of a scenario and neglecting others. 
The differentiated analysis also shows that while no over-all social desirability 
effect is detected a particular subset characterized by its type of task specific 
information processing may be significantly influenced by social desirability 
nevertheless. 
While it was expected that in analogy to the starting point bias in the DC 
format respondents would be influenced by the particular range of specified 
WTP intervals on a payment card no such range bias, not even for certain 
subsets of respondents classified according to their cognitive characteristics, was 
found in this study. This result underscores the suitability of the payment card 
format in contrast to the dichotomous choice format in CVM surveys. The 
classification of respondents regarding their cognitive characteristics, both in a 
task independent way focusing on their general cognitive dispositions and in a 
task dependent way, forms, therefore, a suitable basis for a more thorough 
analysis of the occurrence of biases in CVM surveys and for the development of 
improved survey designs. 
On the whole, the analysis of CVM response behavior using the cognitive 
characterization of respondents lead to the following conclusions regarding the 
suitability and practicability of the three measurement scales employed. The task 
independent approach proved to be well suited for the analysis of CVM 
responses w. r. t. the influence of cognitive factors. The characterization of 
respondents according to their general cognitive dispositions contributed to an 
explanation of both the amount of WTP and the occurrence of the starting point 
bias in the DC format. Here, the more comprehensive scale TIF including a 
number of question items not contained in the original NFC and FI scales from 
which the more aggregated REI factors were derived proved to be particularly 
useful. In the TIF scale the general intuitive reasoning processes were further 
disaggregated into "intuitive", "cautious" and "cognitive miserly" types where 
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especially the "cautious" type was less susceptible to the starting point bias. 
Thus, it is recommended that the more comprehensive TIF scale is preferable to 
the more aggregated REI scale. 
In contrast to the task independent approach, the performance of the task 
dependent type approach was not very successful. This result is rather surprising 
since it was expected that this kind of measure that is built to fit the information 
processing and decision context of the CVM more closely would provide a 
number of additional insights into CVM response behavior. While the decision 
types that could be extracted from the responses to the question items seemed to 
be meaningful at first sight, almost all further analyses employing this measure 
did not yield conclusive or plausible results. Especially, almost no correlations 
were found between the TIF and the TDF scales. The most surprising result in 
this respect was the analysis of the determinants of TDF2 which was classified 
as the "analytical" processing type. It would have been expected that this factor 
is rather closely related to the "analytical-rational" factor TIF2. However, this 
was not the case which was obvious from a lack of correlation between the 
respective factor scores (see table 4-14) and from entirely different socio-
economic and attitudinal determinants. TDF2-type respondents are less 
concerned of public issues, have lower levels of education and rate their 
households' economic situations as worse in comparison to others. This is in 
sharp contrast to the determinants of TIF2, the "analytical-rational" type in the 
TIF-framework. Furthermore, in the DC-partition TDF2 correlates weakly but 
significantly with TIF4, the cognitive miser, which is also rather 
counterintuitive. Furthermore, none of the TDF-types exhibited significant 
effects on WTP in any of the regression models of the DC or the PC format. The 
only useful result obtained from the task dependent framework was that those 
respondents who seemed to base their valuation decisions on only few aspects of 
the scenario showed to be particularly susceptible to the presence of an 
interviewer which was detected by the significantly negative effect on WTP of 
the anonymity dummy variable (see table 4-20). 
Therefore, the present empirical study of bounded rationality measures 
supports the use of the task independent approach for measuring information 
processing and decision making types whereas the task dependent approach, 
however close it may be to the context of the CVM, cannot be recommended for 
further use, at least not on the basis of the results of this study in Thailand. The 
rather general task independent measures were shown to be well suited for 
analyzing the effects of different types of information processing on stated WTP 
and, in at least a few instances, were found to be useful for detecting 
problematic issues of CVM design. Thus, this approach should be pursued 
further in future CVM surveys. 
Finally, concerning the fourth research question, the results discussed above 
lead to a number of recommendations for future CVM surveys. The first 
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recommendation is to abandon the dichotomous choice elicitation question 
format and use the payment card format, instead. This recommendation results 
from the finding of the almost ubiquitous starting point bias where even those 
respondents classified as primarily analytical-rational were significantly 
susceptible to the proposed starting bid. The high degree of respondent 
uncertainty as measured by the proportion of "yes"-responses to items D and F 
of the task dependent scales might be a reason for this susceptibility. The DC 
format, therefore, should only be used if it can be assured that respondents are 
sufficiently certain of their preferences toward the environmental good and of 
their evaluation of it. Here, the mentioned question items D and F of the task 
dependent scale could provide a useful guidance. 
Second, the finding that intuitive and superficial information processing when 
evaluating a CVM scenario was significantly associated with lower WTP leads 
to the recommendation that more emphasis must be laid on the investigation of 
possibilities to enable and encourage respondents to process the scenario 
information more thoroughly. This recommendation is not meant as an 
advertisement of the scenario since it is not the purpose of environmental 
valuation to obtain the highest valuation possible. Rather, it accounts for the 
suspicion that the benefits of elements of an environmental change scenario that 
are unfamiliar to the respondent are often not obvious at first sight and, as a 
result, are easily neglected in the evaluation of the scenario. It is certainly 
difficult to devise new ways of increasing the information processing depth 
during a CVM interview. Clearly, it is no solution to simply provide more 
information to the respondent since the average CVM scenario is already quite 
complex and contains a lot of information to be processed. However, it is 
important to provide this information in a way that is on the one hand easy to 
digest for the respondent and on the other focused on aspects that were found to 
illustrate the benefits, i. e. the personal relevance of the scenario to the 
respondent. One promising way to find such appropriate ways of information 
presentation is certainly to base the scenario preparation and formulation more 
on participatory group processes like focus groups or group meetings with 
respondents who have already been interviewed in a pretest round. Such group 
processes where individuals can interact, exchange information and points of 
view and from which insights regarding the aspects of personal relevance can be 
gained lie at the core of the PYM briefly described in chapter 2. 
The third recommendation follows from the result that a significant social 
desirability effect of respondents of the "elimination" type was observed both in 
the DC and the PC formats. Hence, for the response to the WTP elicitation 
question the interviewer should provide the respondent with the possibility to 
state his willingness-to-pay anonymously, e. g. by the possibility to indicate the 
payment interval on a payment card on a separate sheet of paper which is then 
deposited into some kind of ballot box. While this procedure is certainly just an 
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illusion of anonymity, it has proven to be quite suitable in practice so that it 
should be employed as a simple way to eliminate or at least reduce effects of 
social desirability during CVM interviews. 
The fourth and final recommendation following from the research in this 
study is to use the scales of bounded rationality developed here as a tool for 
analyzing datasets of CVM responses regarding respondents' depth of 
information processing and the occurrence of procedural biases. So far the 
significantly negative association between intuitive cognitive factors and stated 
WTP is only a preliminary result and it cannot yet be generalized that it is a 
characteristic feature of respondents employing strategies of limited information 
processing like intuition or neglect of information. Therefore, this hypothesis 
should be tested in CVM studies using different kinds of valuation scenarios and 
it should also be tested in different countries to account for cultural differences. 
The lack of such significant effects, however, could serve as a criterion for the 
rationality of CVM responses. While the use of the task independent approach 
can be recommended here due to the demonstration of its plausible factor 
structure and explanatory power only selected items of the task dependent 
approach, e. g. the items for an indirect assessment of respondents' uncertainty 
and the items regarding the specific use of limited information processing like 
equal weighting or elimination of aspects, should be used. The task dependent 
approach must, therefore, be subject to further investigation in the future. 
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5 Summary and conclusions 
The main objective of this study is to scrutinize economic concepts ofrationality 
in the context of environmental economic valuation. Continuing methodological 
and procedural concerns toward one of the most widely used valuation methods, 
the survey-based contingent valuation method (CVM), make an analysis of the 
rationality ofresponse behavior in such surveys necessary. Using the concept of 
full rationality commonly adopted in economics as a reference point, an 
alternative rationality concept based on a less normative but instead more 
realistic perspective on human information processing and decision making is 
applied in this study to analyze the rationality of responses in CVM surveys. 
Such a concept based on modem cognitive psychological research has already 
been developed and was widely analyzed in the recent decades in the fields of 
economic psychology and behavioral economics under the name of bounded 
rationality. As the name already suggests the basic premise of bounded 
rationality is that economic agents in real world decision environments are 
characterized by limitations of their cognitive capacities that prevent them from 
acting fully rational in the normative sense of standard economic models. 
As it turns out, however, such cognitive limitations may result in decision 
making that is quite well adapted to the structure of decision environments in the 
real world. But how should and how do respondents behave in environmental 
valuation surveys that are just simulations of real-world decisions and what are 
the consequences of bounded rationality for the validity of such survey results? 
Almost 50 years have passed since 1978 Nobel laureate in economics Herbert A. 
Simon first coined the expression "bounded rationality" setting off a wide 
variety of research in the disciplines of economics and psychology. This study 
aims at an exploration of how this conceptual framework can contribute to better 
understand respondents' behavior in CVM surveys in order to recommend 
changes of the design of such surveys leading to more rational responses and, 
consequently, to better benefit estimates of environmental change scenarios. 
After the presentation of the main theme of this study in the introductory first 
chapter, the second chapter presents the theoretical foundations of 
environmental economic valuation and summarizes the state-of-the-art of 
environmental valuation methods. The welfare theoretic foundations of the 
valuation of environmental changes are described from which the direct 
valuation methods are derived as suitable approaches to capture use values as 
well as non-use values of environmental goods so that, in principle, the total 
economic value of an environmental change can be assessed. Among these 
direct methods the contingent valuation method (CVM) is the most prominent 
and most widely applied method. Hence, the subsequent analysis focuses on this 
particular valuation procedure. The basic idea of the CVM as a direct valuation 
method is to create a hypothetical market for the environmental good under 
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consideration on which the households of a particular study area are given the 
possibility to purchase that good, just as they generally do for market goods in 
their everyday lives. However, since this simulated market involves household 
interviews asking people their willingness-to-pay (WTP) for an improvement of 
the environmental good no real transactions are observed to reveal the 
households' true preferences. Such hypothetical decisions are problematic, 
consequently, the CVM approach creates a number of theoretical and procedural 
concerns that put its validity for an assessment of environmental values in 
question. 
Despite decade-long empirical research a multitude of methodological issues 
remain open and call for a further investigation to which the present study aims 
to contribute. One core question still open to debate is the most suitable format 
of the WTP elicitation question. While in the early days of the CVM an open-
ended WTP question asking respondents the maximum amount they would be 
willing to pay for an improvement of an environmental good was very popular 
due to simplicity of the statistical methods required for its evaluation a shift to 
closed-ended questions has occurred in the 1980s. In these questions 
respondents are presented a payment proposal (a bid) which they can either 
accept or reject to pay. On the basis of these dichotomous choices which were 
thought to better resemble every day purchase decisions an average WTP of the 
population can be estimated by making use of quite complicated statistical 
methods relying on idealized assumptions. An alternative to this dichotomous 
choice format (DC) is the payment card (PC) resembling open-ended questions 
where respondents are given a list of payment intervals from which they can 
choose the one containing their WTP. While better resembling purchase 
decisions in the store, DC responses were found to be significantly and quite 
strongly influenced by the amount of the payment proposal in that respondents 
anchor their responses on that amount initially presented to them. 
This observation called the rationality of CVM responses fundamentally into 
question since it indicated that respondents were not simply giving their "true" 
WTP but a response that constituted some mix of preference evaluation, 
uncertainty effect and possibly psychologically determined biases. It has been 
argued for example that respondents are influenced by the presence of the 
interviewer in that they are motivated to please him or her with their answer to 
the WTP question. Thus, the reasons for such anchoring behavior in the DC 
format, and possibly other biasing effects in the PC format as well, might be 
found in the specific perception of the WTP question. Other biasing effects like 
the influence of the hypothetical nature of the purchase, the embedding of the 
specific environmental good to be valued into a larger or symbolic 
environmental good, the budget constraint of the households and related income 
heterogeneities or varying household sizes have been addressed in the literature, 
however, they have not been conclusively solved. All these effects of 
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inconsistent and unexpected responses to CVM questions represent violations to 
the commonly assumed postulate of fully rational decision making. It is, 
therefore, promising to analyze these biases from the perspective of the 
rationality of respondents by making use of the more realistic concept of 
bounded rationality mentioned above. 
An important candidate for the explanation of the mentioned procedural 
biases of CVM estimates is the issue of preference uncertainty. Some authors 
argue that respondents in a CVM interview do not hold clear and retrievable 
preferences for environmental goods in relation to market goods. This stems 
from a lack of experience with using a novel environmental good or with the 
monetary valuation task as such. These authors have developed ad hoc valuation 
procedures aiming at accounting for respondents' preference uncertainty. All of 
the approaches found in the literature rely on some kind of self-reported 
response certainty or confidence measure either given after responding to the 
WTP question (post-decisional certainty measure) or while considering their 
answers to various payment card intervals (multiple-bounded dichotomous 
choice). The results of the latter approach reveal that "yes"-responses to ordinary 
DC questions contain a considerable degree of uncertainty as to whether the 
respondents would actually pay that amount whereas open-ended and PC 
questions seem to induce significantly more cautious response behavior. 
Preference uncertainty, therefore, seems to play an important role for boundedly 
rational responses in CVM so that this issue is analyzed jointly with the effects 
of cognitive limitations mentioned above. 
Chapter 3 deals with rationality concepts in economics and as such forms the 
conceptual core of the present study. In order to provide a suitable starting point 
for the further analysis of rationality an overview of rationality concepts in 
economics is given. It is shown how the currently prevalent assumption of full 
rationality in economics developed from Adam Smith's postulate that economic 
agents act in pursuit of their own self-interest. Starting with Alfred Marshall, 
rational economic action is subsequently described by a formal set of axioms 
where the well-known preference theoretic axioms of reflexivity, completeness 
and transitivity form the basis of most microeconomic models today. These sets 
of rationality axioms constitute the normative basis for rational economic choice 
behavior from which the normative objective of optimization, in the case of 
households the maximization of utility ( or expected utility in the case of risk and 
uncertainty), is directly derived. 
This normative rationality concept has been, however, widely criticized as 
being unrealistic since economic agents were shown to consistently violate some 
of the underlying axioms in experiments or even in real world economic 
decisions. Based on these findings the normative rationality concept with its set 
of axioms is contrasted to a number of alternative, more descriptive concepts of 
rationality that have emerged in the literature. As an antipode to full or 
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instrumental rationality, the concept of procedural rationality focuses not on the 
rationality of the final outcome of an economic decision but on the way, i.e. the 
procedure, economic decisions are taken. Here, the cognitive limitations of 
decision makers play the decisive role and, consequently, have to be taken into 
account for explaining decision making. Although procedurally rational 
decisions may not lead to optimal outcomes from the perspective of full 
rationality, the way they were taken, i. e. the procedure, is considered rational 
when considering the limitations ofreal-world decision makers. 
Two rationality concepts that contain elements both of full or perfect 
rationality and of procedural rationality are the concepts of institutional 
rationality and evolutionary rationality. Institutional rationality distinguishes 
between two modes of behavior, a rule-following and a purpose-seeking one. In 
this concept it is argued that rule-following behavior has developed from 
purpose-seeking behavior that has proven to be successful in certain situations 
and has, therefore, formed an institution to which a large part of individuals in a 
society adhere. Such institutional rule-following behavior is rational in the sense 
that scarce cognitive resources are saved for those purposes for which no 
successful institutions have yet been found. Vernon Smith's concept of 
evolutionary rationality resembles institutional rationality. However, Smith 
perceives institutions as the outcome of an evolutionary process where economic 
actions that have proven successful and robust courses of action need not have 
developed from a conscious, purposeful and thoughtful behavior but may be the 
results of random variations of rather naive reasoning. All these alternative 
rationality concepts have in common that they perceive economic decisions to 
be embedded in a context, either of simple cognitive limitations or of a historical 
process of development of rules, where Adam Smith's notion of self-interest is 
not strictly interpreted as optimization but as a weaker form of utility-generating 
behavior. Therefore, these three concepts shall be subsumed under the common 
name of bounded rationality in this study. 
The bounded rationality concept and the economic models building on it have 
developed largely in parallel to the research and modeling of standard 
neoclassical economics with its normative view of full rationality for the past 50 
years. Bounded rationality forms the basic assumption of behavioral economics 
which combines research approaches from the neighboring fields of economics 
and psychology in order to obtain models of economic decision making that can 
account for the numerous violations of full rationality observed in practice. 
Thus, bounded rationality rests on empirical findings in economics and 
psychology that a multitude of judgment and decision making situations exist in 
which people were shown not to adhere to the rationality axioms mentioned 
above so that their behavior does not conform to the predictions of full 
rationality. Rather, people were found to exhibit reproducible systematic biases 
in their behavior which seemed to result from making use of a variety of 
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strategies of limited information processing resulting in so-called heuristic 
procedures preventing well-reflected and fully rational judgments and decisions. 
Explanations for such systematically biased behavior can be found in research 
findings from the field of cognitive psychology which investigates the 
mechanisms of perception, information processing and decision making of the 
human mind. Cognitive psychology, therefore, provides a suitable framework 
for analyzing boundedly rational behavior in CVM surveys. The observed 
behavior seems to be rooted in the dual-process nature of information processing 
in the brain. Various cognitive psychological models claim that scarce cognitive 
resources for information processing are allocated to two fundamentally 
different systems of reasoning resulting in a kind of "economy of cognition". 
One system often called heuristic or intuitive-experiential performs relatively 
effortless information processing relying on stored situational rules and mental 
shortcuts while a second system called analytical or systematic is occupied with 
effortful reasoning processes requiring conscious thought and largely serial 
processing. It is argued that such a dual-process system is the result of an 
evolutionary process of the human mind so that a maximum of information 
processing can occur with the given limitations of cognitive resources. While in 
some situations effortless heuristic processing may lead to systematic reasoning 
errors a number of authors demonstrate the ecological rationality, i.e. the 
adaptivity, of such behavior in many real world judgment and decision 
situations. Thus, the cognitive psychological models of dual-process reasoning 
conform well to the institutional and evolutionary rationality concepts 
mentioned earlier. 
In chapter 4, then, the role of bounded rationality is analyzed specifically in 
the context of environmental valuation employing the CVM. Earlier, two 
separate issues were identified to contribute to the observed inconsistencies in 
CVM responses: preference uncertainty and strategies of limited information 
processing. In chapter 2 a number of ad hoc approaches for dealing with 
preference uncertainty and deriving adjusted estimates of benefits were 
presented. However, those approaches do not rest on a well-defined theory of 
preference uncertainty. Therefore, it is investigated here whether the concept of 
fuzzy preferences might be suited for taking preference uncertainty into account 
more appropriately. In the fuzzy preference approach the assertion that one good 
x is at least as good as a different good y is not necessarily made with certainty 
but on a continuous scale between 0 and 1 where 0 represents certainty that x is 
not at least as good as y and 1 represents certainty that x is indeed at least as 
good as y. Any degree in between represents uncertainty and allows for the case 
that, instead, y could to some degree be also at least as good as x. Thus, the 
approach of fuzzy preference relations represents a generalization of the case of 
full certainty of prefiuences where the assertions of preference can only carry 
the values of0 or 1, i.e. are either true or false. 
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For fuzzy preferences a set of rationality axioms in analogy to the reflexivity, 
completeness and transitivity axioms mentioned above exists that allows to 
describe preference uncertainty by a fuzzy preference ordering. However, the 
fuzzy preference approach precludes the concept of a utility function and also of 
the expenditure function from which the traditional measures of economic 
welfare changes like the Hicksian Compensating Variation (CV) are derived. It 
was found, therefore, that preference uncertainty cannot be suitably taken into 
account in environmental valuation by generalizing the preference ordering to be 
fuzzy. The direct assessment of the degree of preference uncertainty as 
performed by the ad hoc procedures described in chapter 2 is not suited, either, 
since such statements can hardly be considered to be valid. Instead, an approach 
to take uncertainty into account more indirectly is suggested here by asking 
questions that are expected to be closely related to uncertainty but that do 
prevent respondents from having to admit that they are uncertain. These 
questions form part of the approach to assess the bounded rationality of 
respondents. 
The empirical part of this study focuses on the investigation of four 
fundamental research questions relating to the rationality of response behavior in 
the context of the CVM. First, and most generally, it is to be determined whether 
a response behavior exhibiting an "economy of cognition", i. e. the use of 
strategies of limited information processing, is actually observed in CVM 
responses. In order to answer this question, a suitable instrument for measuring 
such behavior is needed. Hence, the second research question focuses on the 
development of empirical instruments to classify strategies of limited 
information processing and measure the degree to which respondents employ 
these strategies. Third, the relationship between the use of these strategies and 
the responses to the WTP elicitation question in a CVM survey is to be 
analyzed. In this context the tentative hypothesis is made that WTP is positively 
related to the degree of analytical information processing. This hypothesis is 
motivated by the fact that often environmental benefits pertain to non-use values 
and are, thus, not always obvious to average people. Discovering the relevance 
of such benefits for people's living situations may require rather deep thought 
processes. Also, it is hypothesized that respondents classified as analytical 
information processors are less susceptible to produce biased responses since 
they may be more aware of their preferences. The fourth and final research 
question aims at deriving recommendations for the improvement of future CVM 
survey designs based on the results of this empirical survey. 
The development of the empirical instruments for measuring the degree of 
bounded rationality in the practical CVM survey conducted here is based on 
existing and validated psychological scales regarding individual differences in 
people's cognitive characteristics. Various psychologists have found individual 
differences in information processing styles in empirical studies and have 
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developed instruments for an assessment of such differences. One of these 
instruments, the rational experiential inventory (REI) developed by Epstein et al. 
( 1996) is adopted here from which suitable survey instruments to be included in 
CVM questionnaires are developed. In the study conducted here, two different 
but related approaches to measure these cognitive characteristics are taken: the 
first instrument focuses on the determinations of people's general cognitive 
dispositions, i. e. their tendencies to employ more intuitive versus more 
analytical information processing, the second instrument elicits directly whether 
respondents in the survey have made use of specific strategies of information 
processing. This instrument also includes two indirect questions concerning 
preference uncertainty. In order to investigate the hypotheses stated above, 
therefore, two separate questions are constructed: the task independent question 
based on the REI for the assessment of cognitive dispositions and the task 
dependent question for the assessment of specific information processing 
strategies. 
These two separate sets of question items were included in a broad empirical 
CVM study aiming at an assessment of the economic value of an improvement 
of tap water and environmental quality in a suburban area in northern Thailand 
(cf. Ahlheim et al. 2007). The study was conducted in the subproject Fl.2 of the 
Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 564 "Research for Sustainable Land Use 
and Rural Development in Mountainous Regions of Southeast Asia". Using 
factor analytical procedures it is found that the respondents of this CVM survey 
can indeed be classified into different cognitive types of information processing 
and decision making both on the levels of general cognitive dispositions and of 
the specific strategies used. It is further shown using the first set of questions 
developed from the REI and adapted to the context of CVM studies that in 
addition to the two processing types postulated by the dual-process models the 
heuristic thinking style can be further divided into three categories: ( 1) 
respondents feeling comfortable with relying on their intuitions and experiences 
(intuitive-experiential type), (2) respondents being cautious and feeling 
uncomfortable when under time pressure (cautious type) and (3) respondents 
with an aversion of effortful information processing in general (cognitive miser 
type). A shortened version of this task independent question based on only 5 
items of the original 31-item REI is able to replicate the two-factor structure 
distinguishing between intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational information 
processing styles. 
The task dependent set of question items was analyzed separately for the 
respondents answering the dichotomous choice (DC) question format and for 
those answering the payment card (PC) format. For the DC respondents a three-
factor structure is revealed where the first type of processing and decision 
making is characterized by feeling uncertain due to limited information and time 
(uncertain type), the second shows a clear tendency for effortful processing 
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making use of the full set of the available scenario information (analytical type) 
and the third seems to rely only on particular pieces of information considered 
crucial while ignoring the other aspects (elimination of aspects type). The 
dataset of the PC respondents generated a four-factor structure where in addition 
to the types mentioned above one separate and independent strategy of limited 
information processing seems to be to attribute equal importance to all elements 
of the CVM scenario. 
As expected a number of systematic relationships between the types of 
information processing and responses to the WTP question are found, both for 
the DC and the PC question formats. The intuitive-experiential types exhibited a 
significantly negative effect on stated WTP for both question formats whereas 
the analytical-rational type is significantly positively related with WTP only for 
the DC format. This finding confirms the expectation stated above. Moreover, 
the response to the PC elicitation question is significantly negatively related 
with the cautious type which confirms the expectation that respondents feeling 
uncertain to some extent in a CVM interview tend to choose a lower interval on 
the payment card. It is rather surprising, however, that no systematic 
relationships with WTP are found for the task dependent information processing 
types. It would at least have been expected that an increased feeling of 
uncertainty as measured by the respective question items would result in lower 
WTP statements for both question formats. This lack of explanatory power of 
the task dependent factors is, therefore, rather unexpected and sheds doubt on 
the validity of those factors. 
From these results it can be concluded that the cognitive dispositions of 
respondents as measured by the measurement instrument of bounded rationality 
developed here have explanatory power for WTP in addition to the usual socio-
economic and attitudinal characteristics of the sample respondents and, 
therefore, play an important role in this CVM study. A first explanation of the 
observed significant relationships is that preferences for water quality and 
environmental goods in this CVM scenario are systematically lower for 
respondents relying primarily on their intuitions and higher for those 
approaching decision problems more analytically. The important question, 
however, is why these preferences regarding environmental goods as assessed 
by the monetary welfare measure WTP ( as an empirically observable 
approximation of the Hicksian CV) should be lower than average for the 
intuitive information processors and higher than average for the analytical-
rational information processors. This question cannot be answered here 
conclusively but the observed significant relationships between the cognitive 
factors and WTP and the lack of significance for many other personal variables 
that characterize these types of respondents indicates that it is indeed the type of 
information processing that is responsible for the differences in WTP in this 
study. 
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As could be shown, analytical-rational information processing was 
significantly related to higher levels of education and income, higher approval of 
tax financing of public goods, also for the environment, a low importance of 
money and to relatively high degrees of worries regarding public goods. All of 
these characteristics are expected to be potentially related to an increased WTP, 
while in this study only the level of education was shown to have significant 
explanatory power as a single variable. It remains open for debate, however, 
whether people are better educated and have a higher income, for example, 
because they show a higher level of analytical skills or vice versa. Nevertheless, 
a respondent's tendency for analytical information processing seems to subsume 
all these personal characteristics and, at the same time, shows to be the most 
powerful explanatory factor for the observed higher WTP. The same argument, 
albeit pointing to the opposite direction, is true for the intuitive-experiential 
cognitive factor. Therefore, the a priori hypothesis that in this study analytical 
information processing leads to an increased consciousness of personal 
relevance of the scenario elements as opposed to more intuitive and thus 
superficial processing still seems to be a good candidate for explaining the 
systematic differences in stated WTP between those cognitive types. Further 
research, however, is needed for a confirmation of this hypothesis in other 
valuation studies. 
Finally, it was investigated whether certain types of information processing 
are particularly susceptible to procedural biases in CVM like the social 
desirability effect or the starting point and range biases. However, the prior 
expectation that higher degrees of dispositions of analytical-rational processing 
exhibit lower tendencies for the mentioned biases are not confirmed. Instead, it 
is observed that the more respondents are cautious as classified by the respective 
factor scale of TIF3 the lower the tendency for a starting point bias in the DC 
format. This finding provides evidence that the widely found starting point bias 
in the DC format should not be considered a genuine feature of this question 
format but that it depends crucially on the cognitive disposition of the 
respondents. At the same time, however, the hope must be abandoned that the 
starting point bias in the DC format could be overcome by encouraging 
respondents to employ more analytical information processing. Respondents' 
susceptibility to take the starting bid as an anchor point for their WTP response 
seems, therefore, deeply rooted in their minds. The analogous effect in the PC 
format, the range bias, could not be detected in this study, not even for the less 
analytical respondents. These results, therefore, lead to the first recommendation 
for future CVM surveys to be very careful in using the dichotomous choice 
elicitation format and only to employ it if it can be assured that respondents are 
sufficiently certain regarding their preferences for environmental goods. In 
practice, however, this will rarely be the case so that the payment card format 
clearly appears to be the format of choice for future CVM surveys. 
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Furthermore, it is shown that within the task dependent factors the 
"elimination" type who bases his WTP statement only on the most important 
pieces of information and neglects the others is particularly susceptible to the 
social desirability effect, both for the DC and the PC formats. This result is 
interesting since, as opposed to the starting point bias, the full dataset of DC or 
PC responses did not show this effect so that the significantly biasing influence 
of the presence of an interviewer would not have been detected. Analyzing 
CVM responses w. r. t. cognitive factors, therefore, provides additional 
information for testing the validity of the responses. From these findings it can 
be recommended that, whenever possible, the opportunity to provide the WTP 
statement confidentially should be provided. 
In conclusion, the research conducted in this study has developed a detailed 
methodology to analyze respondents' rationality in CVM surveys where the 
central focus is the type of information processing used in the course of the 
interviews. This focus which is based on a conceptual framework of modem 
cognitive psychology allows to assume a more comprehensive perspective on 
response behavior in environmental valuation interviews than the often adopted 
concentration on the numerous procedural biases. The systematic relationships 
between the main cognitive characteristics of respondents and stated WTP 
highlight the explanatory power of this perspective in this particular empirical 
CVM study. It is recommended, therefore, that future surveys adopt this 
methodology for an analysis of boundedly rational information processing. 
However, for the time being future surveys should focus on the task independent 
framework for the analysis of bounded rationality of respondents since it was 
shown that respondents' general cognitive dispositions are decisive for their 
response behavior. The current version of the task dependent framework, in 
contrast, produced mostly no or implausible results and needs further refinement 
in order to be applicable in standard CVM surveys. 
The results of this survey in northern Thailand demonstrate that a large part of 
the respondents conform to the basic assumptions of bounded rationality since 
strategies of limited information processing were widely adopted for the 
evaluation of the CVM scenario. It can be concluded, therefore, that full 
rationality of respondents is mostly not assured in practice. Rather, the results 
highlight the necessity to take greater efforts to induce respondents to invest 
more cognitive resources and process the provided information more 
analytically when evaluating the personal relevance of a CVM scenario. In order 
to achieve such a deeper evaluation it is proposed here to employ methods of 
participatory questionnaire design using focus groups or participatory 
respondent groups. It has already been demonstrated by Ahlheim et al. (2007) 
that the interaction among respondents of a survey during group sessions lead to 
an intensive process of information acquisition and evaluation from which 
highly useful insights for the design of an appropriate valuation scenario can be 
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gained. The results of the present study and the first experiences obtained from 
the participatory groups stress the necessity to adopt a perspective on rationality 
that is more in line with the limited way humans actually process information 
and take decisions. For the design of CVM surveys, especially of the proposed 
environmental change scenario, more effort must be made to take into account 
that respondents search for ways to economize on cognitive resources during 
such interviews. The results obtained using this newly developed methodology 
for analyzing the consequences of bounded rationality in CVM interviews have 
pinpointed the key factors that are responsible for the observed shortcomings of 
CVM response behavior and have shown some first guidelines for their 
reduction in future environmental valuation surveys. 
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7 Appendix 
7.1 Survey questionnaire 
Economic benefits of an improvement of the Mae Rim 
tap water supply 
Sawwadee krablkah! 
INT: Please start the interview with an open conversation with the respondent. In this 
conversation, please introduce yourself and, at the appropriate situation in the conversation, 
mention all the information given in the following text to the respondent. You may either read the 
text exactly as given to the respondent, or you may use this information in an open 
conversation: 
MChiang Mai University and the University of Hohenheim in Germany are doing research together 
with the Mae Rim Water Works to examine the possibilities for an improvement of the water 
supply in Mae Rim. This survey serves to explore the possibilities and the wishes of the 
population regarding such an improvement. Your household has been randomly selected out of all 
the customers of the Water Works. We kindly ask you to answer the following questions so that 
your opinion can contribute to build a better tap water supply system in this region. This 
interview will last approximately 20 minutes.· 
First, we would like to ask you some general questions regarding your daily Next 
water use. 
1-1 For which purposes do you use the water from the Mae Rim Water Works? 
INT.: Please check one number per line. Yes No 
A Bathing 01 02 
B Dish washing 01 02 
C Laundering 01 02 
D House-cleaning 01 02 
E Gardening 01 02 
F Car washing 01 02 
G Cooking 01 02 
H Drinking 01 02 if "no": 1-2 
I Do you treat the water before drinking? 01 02 
it "no": 
1-2 
How do you treat it? 
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J By filtering 01 02 
K By boiling 01 02 
L By adding chemicals 01 02 
1-2 For how many years have you been connected to 
[D the water system of the Mae Rim Water Works? 
years 
1-3 Do you experience problems with the MRWW system like e. g. low pressure, 
interruption of water supply for several hours per day or for entire days? Please 
specify with the help of the scale how frequently each of these problems 
occurs. 
INT.: Please present the scale and check never rarely some- often very 
one number per line. times often 
1 2 3 4 5 
A Low pressure 1 2 3 • 5 
B 
Interruption of water supply for 
1 2 3 • 5 several hours oer dav 
C 
Interruption of water supply for 
1 2 3 • 5 entire davs 
1-4 What is your average monthly water bill for 
the water delivered by the Mae Rim Water 
I I I I I Works? 
Baht 
1-5 Do you also have a village water system in your village? Yes .......... 01 
No .......... 02 1-10 
1-6 Are you connected to this village water system? Yes ........... 01 
No ....••••••• 02 1-10 
1-7 For which purposes do you use the water from the village water system? 
INT.: Please check one number per line. Yes No 
A Bathing 01 02 
B Dish washing 01 02 
C Laundering 01 02 
D House-cleaning 01 02 
E Gardening 01 02 
F Car washing 01 02 
G Cooking 01 02 
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I Do you treat the water before drinking? 01 02 
if "no" 
: 1-8 
How do you treat it? 
J By filtering 01 02 
K By boiling 01 02 
L By adding chemicals 01 02 
1-8 What is your average monthly water bill for 
the village water system? 
I I I I I Baht 
1-9 For how many years have you been 
[TI connected to the village water system? 
years 
1-10 Do you have installed a water supply system of your Yes ......... 01 
own which you use. for example a ground water well or 
pump etc. No ......... 02 1-13 
1-11 For which purposes do you use the water from your own water system? 
INT.: Please check one number per line. Yes No 
A Bathing 01 02 
B Dish washing 01 02 
C Laundering 01 02 
D House-cleaning 01 02 
E Gardening 01 02 
F Car washing 01 02 
G Cooking 01 02 
H Drinking 01 02 
if ·no": 
1-12 
I Do you treat the water before drinking? 01 02 
if ... no": 
1-12 
How do you treat it? 
J By filtering 01 02 
K By boiling 01 02 
L By adding chemicals 01 02 
1-12 How many years ago have you established your 
[TI own water system? 
years ago 
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1-13 Do you have installed a water storage tank system? Yes ····················· 01 
No ..................... 02 
2 Now let's talk about your drinking 
water. 
2-1 Which is the primary source of MRWW water ................................... 01 
drinking water in your house or 
Village water system 02 3-1 apartment? ....................... 
Own system ................................... 03 3-1 
INT: Please check only one of the Bottled water delivered to your 
house/apt. 04 3-1 possibilities. ...................................... 
Bottled water bought in the store ....... 05 3-1 
Other .............................................. 06 
3-1 
Which? 
2-2 What are the reasons for choosing your primary source of drinking water? 
Please select up to three most important reasons for your choice. 
INT.: Please present list and check the stated reasons, three at X 
most!. 
A All other sources are hazardous to my health. 
B It has the best quality. 
C It tastes better than the others. 
D It is the cheapest source. 
E It is more convenient than the other sources. 
F I have always used this source. 3-3 
3-1 How would you characterize the quality of the very poor ................... 01 
drinking water from your primary source? Please 
poor 02 specify with the help of the scale. ························ 
just o.k. ................... 03 
INT: if the respondent doesn't know, circle "6" good ........................ 04 
excellent ................... 05 
do not know .............. 06 
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3-2 What are the reasons for choosing your primary source of drinking water? 
Please select up to three most important reasons for your choice. 
INT.: Please present list and check the stated reasons, three at X 
most!. 
A All other sources are hazardous to my health. 
B It has the best quality. 
C It tastes better than the others. 
D It is the cheapest source. 
E It is more convenient than the other sources. 
F I have always used this source. 
3-3 How much money do you spend on average 
per month on bottled drinking water? I I I I I Baht 
4 Now we would like to talk about the MRWW service and the water quality 
4-1 How would you characterize the service of the very poor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 01 
MRWW, for example the response to complaints 
poor ••••.••.•••••..••...•••• 02 
and problems, promptness of repairs and so on? 
Please specify with the help of the scale. just o.k. • ••••••..•.••••.••• 03 
good •••••.••..••••••.•••.••• 04 
excellent . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 05 
4-2 How would you characterize the overall quality of very poor . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 01 
the water of the MRWW water system? Please 
poor •••••••.••...••.•••••.•. 02 specify with the help of the scale. 
just o.k. ................... 03 
INT.: if the respondent doesn't know, circle "6" good ···················· .. ·· 04 
excellent ..•................ 05 
do not know .............. 06 
4-3 Have you ever drunk the MRWW water? Yes ......................... 01 
No .......................... 02 
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4-4 We would like to know your opinion regarding some specific characteristics of 
MRWW water. When you currently think about drinking the MRWW water 
how worried are you about these characteristics using the following scale? 
INT.: Please present the not little some- quite very 
scale and check one worried worried times worried worried 
number per line. at all 
worried 
1 2 3 4 5 
A Taste , 2 3 4 5 
B Color , 2 3 4 5 
C Odor , 2 3 4 5 
4-5 When you currently think about drinking the MRWW water how worried are 
you about getting the following diseases? 
INT.: Please present the not little some- quite very 
scale and check one worried worried times worried worried 
number per line. at all 
worried 
1 2 3 4 5 
A Diarrhea , 2 3 4 5 
B Kidney stones , 2 3 4 5 
C Cancer , 2 3 4 5 
4-6 Have you or has somebody in your family ever Yes ..................... 01 
become ill from the MRWW water? 
No ····················· 02 
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Chiang Mai University, the University of Hohenheim and the Mae Rim Water Works MRWW are 
currently surveying water users' interests in the progrem "Drinkable Tap Water-Clean Stream·. 
What is the idea of the program? 
The idea is that all MRWW customers should enjoy an uninterrupted supply of tap water which 
is also drinkable. 
How can this idea be achieved, what needs to be done? 
"Drinkable Tap Water-Clean Stream• consists of two main programs which are the improvement 
of the MRWW distribution system and an improvement of upstream water quality as the source 
of the MRWW water. INT.: Show photograph card (see below) 
Why are these improvements necessary? 
An improvement of the MRWW distribution system is necessary because of frequent pollution 
with biological pollutants in the area due to broken pipes in the distribution system. Biological 
pollutants might cause diarrhea or other diseases. The broken pipes are also responsible for 
frequent interruptions of water service which occur in some parts of Mae Rim. 
An improvement of upstream water quality is necessary to ensure that MRWW receives good 
water for treatment and distribution to the households. There are two main problems regarding 
the upstream water quality: the first is the red color of the water which occurs often in the rainy 
season and the second is the contamination with pesticides which might lead to severe health 
damages like for example cancer. The red color of the water is caused by soil erosion in the 
uplands of the Mae Sa valley. Pesticides in the water are an immediate consequence of their 
high use in the uplands of the Mae Sa valley. As you can see from this map, your tap water 
originates exclusively from the rivers of the Mae Sa valley. INT.: Show map of the watershed 
(see below) 
How is the program implemented? 
The program "Drinkable Tap Water-Clean Stream" should be implemented in the following way: 
First, the pipe system should be mended and maintained so that biological pollution and 
interruption of water supply would stop. Second, an effective soil conservation program should 
be implemented so that soil erosion would be stopped in the uplands. Third, pesticide use in the 
uplands should be reduced for example by employing a more adapted and targeted pest control 
system. 
Who will carry out the proposed measures? 
MRWW will carry out the improvements of the water distribution system. Chiang Mai University 
will carry out the measures that lead to an improvement of upstream water quality. This will be 
done in cooperation with the upstream communities and farmers. 
Do only MRWW water users benefit from the program? 
If these proposed measures were carried out benefits for the whole population of Mae Rim 
would result. For example, this program would also reduce the contamination of fruits and 
vegetables with pesticides. Also, the accumulation of pesticides in the surrounding ecosystems 
would be stopped so that future harm to plant and animal life will be prevented and the health 
of future generations will not be threatened by these pesticides. Therefore, from the proposed 
measures the whole population of Mae Rim and future generations in this area would benefit. 
Who will guarantee that the program really works out? 
MRWW will test the tap water quality regularly at the households and will post the test results 
immediately in each affected community of Mae Rim. There will be a responsible person at 
MRWW that you can contact for any questions and problems you might have regarding the tap 
water supply. 
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Scenario brochure: photograph card given to respondents during scenario 
presentation, translation from Thai language 
Drinkable Tap Water - Clean Stream 
Broken pipes in the MRWW 
water distribution system 
frequently cause pollution with 
biological pollutants in the 
area. Biological pollutants can 
cause diarrhea or other 
diseases. The broken pipes are 
also responsible for frequent 
interruptions of water service 
which occur in some parts of 
Mae Rim. Therefore, it is 
necessary to repair and 
improve the MRWW water 
distribution system. 
The red color of the tap water often occurs in the rainy season. It is caused by soil 
erosion in the uplands of the Mae Sa valley. The Mae Sa river transports the red 
soil particles in the water to Mae Rim where it affects the color of your tap water. 
Therefore, it is necessary to reduce soil erosion in order to improve upstream 
water quality so that a good quality of tap water in the downstream areas of Mae 
Rim is ensured. 
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Pesticides in the water are 
an immediate consequence 
of their high use in the 
uplands of the Mae Sa 
valley. Contamination of the 
tap water with pesticides 
might lead to severe health 
damages like for example 
cancer. An improvement of 
upstream water quality will 
also ensure the reduction of 
pesticide contamination in 
the tap water. 
On this map the area 
marked with light gray lines 
are those areas where water 
from the Mae Sa river is 
used for household tap 
,m,,Ullli water. As you can see your 
household's tap water 
originates exclusively from 
the rivers of the Mae Sa 
valley and, therefore, your 
tap water is influenced by 
the effects of soil erosion 
and pesticide application 
mentioned above. 
219 
Oliver Frör - 978-3-631-75515-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 03:56:05AM
via free access
5 Now we would like to know how important the elements of the described 
program are for yourself. Please answer the following questions using the scale. 
INT.: Please present the scale not not so fairly important very 
and check one number per line. important important important important 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 
A 
no interruptions of water 
1 2 3 4 5 
service 
B 
no biological pollutants in 
1 
the tap water 
2 3 4 5 
C 
no pesticides in the tap 
1 2 3 4 5 
water 
D clear color of the water 1 2 3 4 5 
E 
less soil degradation in 
1 
the uplands 
2 3 4 5 
no accumulation of 
F pesticides in the 1 2 3 4 5 
ecosystems 
G 
less pesticides in fruits 
1 
and vegetables 
2 3 4 5 
H 
reduced health threats for 
1 
future generations 
2 3 4 5 
WTP Elicitation question 
Note: Four different versions of the WTP elicitation question are presented here, 
the versions are used alternatively in the interviews. For the bid design in 
the DC question format and the two different PC bid ranges see table 7-1 . 
Version 1: Dichotomous Choice question format (non-anonymousl 
6a Since these measures are costly their financing has to be 
secured before such a program can be implemented. 
Therefore, it is intended to increase the water fee for the tap 
water supply for the next five years to get the program 
started. 
Yes ............. 01 7 
If, as a consequence, your water bill increased by altogether 
50 Baht per month for the next five years, would you No .............. 02 6b 
support this program? 
................... /other/ 7 
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6b If instead the monthly water bill increased by only 25 Baht, Yes ............. 01 
would you then be willing to support this program? 
No .............. 02 
Version 2: Dichotomous Choice question format (anonymous) 
6a Since these measures are costly their financing has to be secured before such a 
program can be implemented. Therefore, it is intended to increase the water fee 
for the tap water supply for the next five years to get the program started. 
I will now give you a sheet of paper so that you can answer the following 
question anonymously, just like in an election. When you have marked your 
answer, please fold it and put it into this box. 
(INT: Hand the respondent sheet for question 6a) 
The question reads as follows: If, as a consequence, your water bill increased y 
by altogether 50 Baht per month for the next five years, would you support this 
program? N 
6b Here is a second sheet with another question that I am supposed to give you. 
(INT: Hand the respondent sheet for question 6b) 
The question you are asked to answer is: 
If instead the monthly water bill increased by only 25 Baht, would you then be 
willing to support this program? Please check "Yes• or "No• and put the sheet 
into this box. y 
Of course, if you have already answered "Yes· in the previous question, then 
just check "Yes• again. N 
Version 3: Payment Card question format (non-anonymous) 
6 Since these measures are costly their financing has to be secured before such a 
program can be implemented. Therefore, it is intended to increase the water fee 
for the tap water supply for the next five years to get the program started. 
We would now like to ask you how much money your household would be 
willing to contribute to the program. Please, select from the following list the 
highest increase in your monthly water bill you would be wUling to tolerate for 
the next five years if the improvements described above were realized. 
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Version 4: Payment Card question format (anonymous) 
6 Since these measures are costly their financing has to be secured before such a 
program can be implemented. Therefore, it is intended to increase the water fee 
for the tap water supply for the next five years to get the program started. 
We would now like to ask you how much money your household would be 
willing to contribute to the program. I will now give you a sheet of paper so that 
your choice is kept completely confidential. 
Please, select from the list on the sheet the highest increase in your monthly 
water bill you would be willing to tolerate for the next five years if the described 
improvements were realized. 
When you have marked your answer, please fold it and put it into this box. 
Payment Card bid intervals (large version} 
A 0 Baht J 61 - 70 Baht s 281 - 340 Baht 
B 1 - 5 Baht K 71 - 85 Baht T 34 1 - 400 Baht 
C 6 - 10 Baht L 86 - 100 Baht u 401 - 470 Baht 
D 11 - 15 Baht M 101 - 1 20 Baht V 471 - 550 Baht 
E 16 - 20 Baht N 121 - 150 Baht w 551 - 700 Baht 
F 21 - 35 Baht 0 151 - 1 80 Baht X 701 - 1000 Baht 
G 36 - 40 Baht p 181 - 210 Baht y 1001 - 1400 Baht 
H 41 - 50 Baht Q 211 - 240 Baht z 1401 - 2000 Baht 
I 51 - 60 Baht R 24 1 - 280 Baht AA greater 2000 Baht 
7 Did you find it difficult to make a decision very easy ........................... 01 
about your contribution to the improvements? quite easy ........................ 02 
Please give your answers using the following 
neutral 03 scale. ···················· ......... 
INT.: Please present the scale. difficult ............................ 04 
very difficult ...................... 05 
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8 How true are the following considerations with respect to your decision on the 
amount to contribute to the improvements of tap water supply? Please give your 
answer using the scale. 
INT.: Please present the scale and check not true mostly partly mostly fully 
one number per line. at all not true true true true 
1 2 3 4 5 
I will be able to save money since I 
A don't have to buy bottled water or 1 2 3 4 5 
to use the water filter any more. 
B It is more convenient to get all my 1 
water from the tap. 
2 3 4 5 
My household will not run the risk 
C of becoming ill from the tap water 1 2 3 4 5 
any more. 
I want to contribute to reduced the 
D health risk to the whole population 1 2 3 4 5 
of Mae Rim. 
I never felt at ease with the red 
E color of the tap water and want to 1 2 3 4 5 
contribute to stop it. 
It gives me a good feeling to know 
F that future generations will live in a 1 2 3 4 5 
healthier environment. 
G 
I would like to pay more for this 
1 
improvement but I cannot afford it. 
2 3 4 5 
I have severe doubts that these 
H improvements can be realized as 1 2 3 4 5 
described. 
I think government is responsible 
I for such a program and should pay 1 2 3 4 5 
for it. 
My water costs are already high 
J 
enough. We should receive the 
1 2 3 4 5 
good quality service without 
additional costs. 
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9 We would like to know how you reached your decision. How true are the 
following statements regarding your personal attitude? Please give your answers 
using the following scale. 
INT.: Please present the scale and check not true mostly partly mostly fully 
one number per line. at all not true true true true 
1 2 3 4 5 
A A complex problem is a challenge to 1 
me rather than a nuisance. 
2 3 4 5 
B 
Thinking hard and for a long time 
1 
about something bores me. 
2 3 4 5 
I enjoy doing something that 
challenges my thinking abilities like 
C for example playing chess (or some 1 2 3 4 5 
other typical Thai game that 
requires strategic thinking). 
In a group of friends I generally trust 
D 
the arguments of others without 
1 
always questioning where they 
2 3 4 5 
come from. 
Documentary programs on TV 
E annoy me so that I often switch to a 1 2 3 4 5 
different channel. 
F 
Time is money, so I take decisions 
t 
quickly. 
2 3 4 5 
G I believe in trusting my hunches. 1 2 3 4 5 
H 
My initial impressions of people are 
1 
almost always right. 
2 3 4 5 
I 
I hate to make important decisions 
1 
under time pressure. 
2 3 4 5 
J 
Often, when I take decisions, I don't 
know why but I feel that I'm right. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10 Do you think that the following facilities and institutions should be financed by 
taxes? Please be aware of the fact that all government spending require the 
imposition of taxes to raise the necessary funds. 
INT.: These facl1ities and institutions could be used free of Yes No 
charge if financed by taxes. 
A Libraries 01 02 
B Discotheques 01 02 
C State Railway of Thailand 01 02 
D Swimming-pools,· gyms, sports fields 01 02 
E Schools 01 02 
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F Provincial Electricity Authority 01 02 
G Theaters 01 02 
H Provincial Water Authority 01 02 
I Mass Transit Authority 01 02 
J Thailand Post 01 02 
K Telephone of Thailand 01 02 
We would now like to ask you some more questions about yourself. Since we 
can only ask these questions e small number of households we need these 
socio-economic data in order to generalize the results of these interviews to the 
whole population of Mae Rim. 
11 To what extent do the following statements apply to you? 
Please answer the following questions never rarely some- mostly always 
using the scale. times 
1 2 3 4 5 
A I find it difficult to say "no" if a friend 1 
asks me a favor. 
2 3 4 5 
It gives me a good feeling if I donate 
B 
money for people I do not know 
1 
personally, for example for old people, 
2 3 4 5 
disabled people or orphans 
The increase of my "boon" associated 
C with the donation is very important to 1 2 3 4 5 
me. 
D 
I help other people because they will 
1 
help me when I am in need. 
2 3 4 5 
E 
I donate money because "giving" is 
1 2 3 4 5 
an established habit in our society. 
F 
I promise to do something although I 
1 2 3 4 5 
do not want to do it. 
G 
I give promises and then I do not keep 
1 2 3 4 5 
them. 
H 
I am concerned what other people 
1 
might think of me. 
2 3 4 5 
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12 To what extent do you agree with the following statements? Please answer the 
following questions using the scale. 
INT.: Please present the scale and check one do not do not quite agree fully 
number per line. agree agree agree agree 
at all 
1 2 3 4 5 
Taking care of environmental 
A protection is an important task of 1 2 3 4 5 
government. 
law enforcement concerning 
B environmental management is usually 1 2 3 4 5 
not effective. 
Usually, government's action 
C concerning environmental protection 1 2 3 4 5 
is 'too late'. 
Government should collect more 
D taxes to increase the budget for 1 2 3 4 5 
environmental management. 
13 How would you classify the economic situation very poor ..................... 01 
of your household? 
Please give your answers using the scale. poor ............................. 02 
INT.: Please present the scale. neither rich, nor poor ...... 03 
rich .............................. 04 
very rich ...................... 05 
14 How do you judge the economic situation of your much worse .................. 01 
household in comparison with the average 
households in Mae Rim? a little worse ................ 02 
Please give your answers using the scale. 
average ........................ 03 
INT.: Please present the scale. 
a little better ................. 04 
much better ................. 05 
15 How fair do you consider your household income not fair at all ................ 01 
in comparison with other households' incomes? 
Please give your answers using the scale". not so fair ..................... 02 
INT.: Please present the scale. somewhat fair ............... 03 
basically fair .................. 04 
very fair ....................... 05 
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16 To what extent are the following statements true regarding your personal 
situation? Please answer the following questions using the scale. 
INT.: Please present the scale and check not true not so fairly mostly complete 
one number per line. at all true true true ly true 
1 2 3 4 5 
A I need money to be happy. 1 2 3 4 5 
I usually spend all my income 
B because buying things makes me 1 2 3 4 5 
happy. 
C I like to buy things on installment. 1 2 3 4 5 
D 
I build up savings because I want 
to have security for the future. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I build up savings because I want 
E to leave something for my 1 2 3 4 5 
children. 
F 
Even with more money for myself 
1 
I would not be happier than now. 
2 3 4 5 
17 To what extent are you worried about the following issues? Please give your 
answer using the scale. 
INT.: Please present the scale and check not little some- quite very 
one number per line. worried worried what worried worried at all worried 
1 2 3 4 5 
A About your own economic 1 2 3 4 5 
situation 
B About your health 1 2 3 4 5 
C About the progressive degradation 1 2 3 4 5 
of the environment 
D About peace in the world 1 2 3 4 5 
E About the political situation in our 1 2 3 4 5 
countrv. 
F About the security of your income 1 2 3 4 5 
G About the erosion of moral values 1 2 3 4 5 
among young people 
H About the decrease in social 1 2 3 4 5 
1iustice in our country 
I About corruption 1 2 3 4 5 
J About too many foreigners living 1 2 3 4 5 
in Thailand 
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18 When you think about your decision whether and how much to contribute to the 
proposed tap water improvement program, are the following statements true? 
INT.: Please check one number per line. Yes No 
A I made my decision based on my first feeling about this 01 02 
program right after it was presented to me. 
B I really thought very hard about every single aspect of 01 02 
the program before making a decision of how much to 
pay. 
C The first impression that I had about this program 01 02 
changed on a second thought. 
D I would have liked to have more time for making a 01 02 
decision about my contribution to this program. 
E All aspects were equally important for my decision. 01 02 
F With the given information about the project I found it 01 02 
very hard to make a good decision. 
G There are so many aspects in this project but only a 01 02 
few of them were really relevant for my decision. 
H Even if I had had more time available for thinking about 01 02 
this program I don't think that my decision of how much 
to contribute to it would have been different. 
Now we would like to ask you some personal questions. 
19-1 Do you have at the moment any debts from ... 
INT.: Please check one number per line . Yes No 
A ... the bank or the BAAC? 01 02 
B ... your friends or your family? 01 02 
C ... private money lenders? 01 02 
D ... others such as cooperative or village fund? 01 02 
E ... delayed payments or installment payments? 01 02 
19-2 INT: if at least one of the less than 20000 Baht ........................... A 
questions in 19-1 was Myes" 
ask: 20000 up to less than 50000 Baht ......... B 
What is the level of your 
50000 up to less than 100000 Baht ...... c indebtedness? Please include 
also installment debts. Please 
100000 up to less than 200000 Baht select from the given brackets. .... D 
otherwise continue with 200000 up to less than 300000 Baht ..... E 
question 20-1. 
more than 300000 Baht ...................... F 
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19-3 Are you worried about your debts? Yes ................... 01 
No ................... 02 
20-1 INT.: Please fill in without inquiry male ................ 01 
Sex of the respondent: 
female .............. 02 
20-2 Were you born in Thailand? Yes ................... 01 
No .................... 02 20-4 
20-3 In which province? 
·················································· 
(INT.: please write down) 
20-4 When were you born? Please state the year of 
your birth as Buddhist year. 
I I I I I 
20-5 What marital status do you have? What I am married and live together 
applies to you from this list? with my spouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 01 
INT.: Please present the list. I am married and live separated 
from my spouse •••.•.•••.....•.• 02 
I am not married •••••••••••.•••.• 03 
I am divorced •·•·•••·•·•··••·••••• 04 
I am widowed ..................... 05 
20-6 Do you have children or even Yes ................................... 01 
grandchildren? 
No .................................... 02 
20-7 How many persons are permanently and factually [I] living in your household, including yourself? 
Please consider all the children in the household. Person(s) 
20-8 INT.: ask only households with at least 2 persons. [I] How many persons living in your household Person(sl 
contribute to your household income? 
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20-9 Which is your highest I left the school without certificate ............... 01 
level of education? Please 
give your answers 
according to the list. 
INT.: Please present the 
list. 
20-1 0 What kind of job do you 
do at present? 
INT.: Please present list. 
I have finished 4 th year of elementary school .. 02 
I have finished 6th year of elementary school .. 03 
I have finished 3•• year of secondary school ... 04 
I have finished 6th year of secondary school ... 05 
I have obtained the Technical Education 
Certificate .................................................. 06 
I have obtained the Higher Technical Education 
Certificate .................................................. 01 
I have completed the bachelor degree ............ 00 
I have completed the master degree .............. os 
I have obtained a PhD .................................. 10 
I have a different certificate: . .. . .... ... ............. 11 
(INT.: Please write down) 
Worker I employee ...................................... 01 
Official ....................................................... 02 
Owner or renter of a farm .............................. 03 
Self-employed ............................................... 04 
Trainee, student, pupil .................................. 05 20-12 
Housewife, househusband ............................ 06 20-12 
Retiree, early retirement ............................... 01 20-12 
Unemployed ................ .............. .. ................ 00 20-12 
20-11 Are you employed full-time or part-time? Full-time .................. 01 
Part-time ................ 02 
230 
Oliver Frör - 978-3-631-75515-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 03:56:05AM
via free access
20-12 What is the average net less than 6000 Baht .. . .. .. . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . .. .. .. . A 
monthly income of your 
household altogether? 6000 up to less than 1 0000 Baht . . . . . . . . . . . e 
Please state the sum of 
1 0000 up to less than 20000 Baht wages, incomes from self- ········ C 
employment and pensions 
20000 up to less than 30000 Baht D 
minus tax payments and 
........ 
social security insurance. 
30000 up to less than 50000 Baht ••••••••• E Please also add the income 
from public subsidies, 
more than 50000 Baht .......................... F 
rents, housing subsidies, 
child benefits. and other 
sources of income. 
If you are responsible for the 
support of a part of your family 
not living in your household, 
please deduct this amount. 
Your statement will be treated 
confidentially. 
INT.: Please present the list. 
Thank you very much for answering these questions! 
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7.2 Correlations of socio-economic and attitudinal variables 
with TIF and TDF 
7.2.1 Task independent factors 
Question TIFI TIF2 TIF3 TIF4 
coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. 
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
4-4a Worry about taste of the water .057 .001 -.078 .007 
(. I 05) (.971) (.026) (.839) 
4-4b Worry about the color .080 -.046 -.009 .000 
(.023) (.196) (.791) (.989) 
4-4c Worry about the odor .083 -.014 -.007 .054 
(.019) (.682) (.837) (.127) 
4-Sa Worry about diarrhea .041 -.015 -.041 .041 
(.249) (.679) (.242) (.240) 
4-Sb Worry about kidney stones .032 .026 .006 .058 
(.358) (.469) (.870) (.098) 
4-Sc Worry about cancer .031 .015 -.049 .059 
(.386) (.677) (.)61) (.094) 
Sa Importance: no interruption of water service -.047 -.080 .094 .023 
(.) 90) (.024) LOOS) (.523) 
Sb Importance: no biological pollutants in the water .009 -.024 .148 -.099 
(.801) (.500) (.000) (.005) 
Sc Importance: no pesticides in the water .001 -.008 .157 -202 
(.969) (.815) (.000) (.000) 
Sd Importance: clear color of the water -.076 -.059 .162 -.082 
(.032) (.098) (.000) (.020) 
Se Importance: less soil degradation in the uplands -.027 -.014 .076 -.049 
(.453) (.698) (.032) (.168) 
Sf Importance: no accumulation of pesticides in -.070 .002 .074 -.100 
ecosystems (.048) (.966) (.036) (.005) 
Sg Importance: less pesticides in fruit and vegetables -.019 .013 .102 -.092 
(583) (.711) (.004) (.010) 
Sh Importance: reduced health threats for future .017 .028 .091 -.091 
generations (.637) (.43 I) (.OJ I) (.010) 
7 Difficulty ofresponse -117 -.023 -.055 -.012 
(.001) (.510) (.121) (.736) 
Sa Reason: save money .034 .059 -.032 .017 
(.330) (.094) (.369) (.623) 
Sb Reason: more convenient .014 .070 -.012 -.084 
(.699) (.048) (.741) (.0)6) 
Sc Reason: not become ill -.002 .063 .096 -.117 
(.947) (.074) (.006) (.001) 
8d Reason: increased health of the population .020 .139 .021 -.102 
(.575) (.000) (.549) (.004) 
Se Reason: color of the water -.027 -.079 .104 -.073 
(.448) (.025) (.003) (.037) 
Sf Reason: future generations -.007 .059 .098 -.146 
(.848) (.094) (.005) (.000) 
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Question TIFI TIF2 TIF3 TIF4 
coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. 
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
Sg Reason: I cannot afford to pay more .117 -.033 -.024 .041 
(.001) (.345) (.499) (.242) 
Sb Reason: I have severe doubts concerning the .087 -.054 .059 -.018 
program (.014) (.126) (.092) (.602) 
Si Reason: government is responsible .058 -.014 .058 -.001 
(.098) (.693) (.102) (.971) 
Sj Reason: costs are already high .037 .098 .016 .025 
(.291) (.005) (.643) (.472) 
10a Libraries .037 .119 -.019 -.042 
(.293) (.001) (.588) (.229) 
10b Discotheques .040 .050 -.o78 -.046 
(.256) (.156) (.027) (.196) 
10c State Railway of Thailand .043 -.01 I -.068 -.063 
(.227) (.762) (.052) (.073) 
10d 
Swimming-pools, gyms, sports fields 
.01 I .092 -.086 -.047 
(.751) (.009) (.014) (.180) 
IOe 
Schools 
.010 .015 .022 .008 
(.768) (.672) (.531) (.814) 
IOf 
Provincial Electricity Authority 
-.034 -.065 -.036 .044 
(.336) (.066) (.309) (.209) 
10g 
Theaters 
.014 .104 -.016 .045 
(.696) (.003) (.644) (.201) 
IOb 
Provincial Water Authority 
-.041 -.043 -.086 .099 
(.242} (.218) (.015) (.005) 
IOi 
Mass Transit Authority 
.011 .042 -.032 -.018 
(.761) (.234) (.362) (.602) 
IOj Thailand Post .043 .004 -.031 -.038 
(.226) (.919) (.373) (.286) 
10k Telephone of Thailand .OIi -.014 -.104 -.006 
(.759) (.698) (.003) (.856) 
Ila I find it difficult to say "no" if a friend asks me a .198 -.014 .025 .050 
favor. (.000) (.689) (.486) (.156) 
llb It gives me a good feeling ifl donate money for .145 .052 .181 -.044 
oeoole I do not know oersonallv. (.000) (.136) (.000) (.207) 
lie The increase of my "boon" associated with the .226 -.068 .026 -.063 
donation is verv imoortant to me. (.000) (.053) (.466) (.076) 
lld I help other people because they will help me when .187 .o38 -.133 .069 
I am in need. (.000) (.284) (.000) (.049) 
lie I donate money because "giving" is an established .175 -.086 -.017 -.122 
habit in our societv. (.000) (.014) (.649) (.001) 
llf I promise to do something although I do not want .168 -.008 -.092 .046 
to do it. (.000) (.820) (.009) (.191) 
Ilg I give promises and then I do not keep them. .113 .063 -.148 -.004 
(.001) (.074) (.000) (.904) 
llb I am concerned what other people might think of .050 .072 -.018 -.050 
me. (. I 55) (.042) (.601) (.158) 
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Question TIFl TIF2 TIF3 TIF4 
coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. 
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
12a Taking care of environmental protection is an .081 .041 .086 -.105 
important task of government. (.021) (.242) (.015) (.003) 
12b Law enforcement concerning environmental .Q70 .058 .149 -.074 
management is usually not effective. (.047) (.098) (.000) (.035) 
12c Usually, government's action concerning .123 .048 .157 .011 
environmental protection is 'too late'. (.000) (.170) (.000) (.757) 
12d Government should collect more taxes to increase .066 .117 -.130 -.056 
the budget for environmental management. (.060) (.001) (.000) (.113) 
13 Classify: household richer or poorer than average -.017 .135 .044 -.161 
(.628) (.000) (.211) (.000) 
14 Classify: economic situation better or worse than -.088 .125 .149 -.113 
average (.822) (.000) (.000) (.001) 
15 Classify: consider income fair or unfair .027 .073 .040 -.057 
(.450) (.038) (.216) (. 108) 
16a I need money to be happy. .076 -.054 -.019 .232 
(.032) (.129) (.585) (.000) 
16b I usually spend all my income because buying .073 .135 -.064 .158 
things makes me haoov. (.039) (.000) (.068) (.000) 
16c 
I like to buy things on installment. 
.044 .008 -.093 .052 
(.209) (.820) (.008) (.137) 
16d I build up savings because I want to have security -.004 -.016 .123 -.053 
for the future. 
(.691) (.651) (.000) (. 134) 
16e I build up savings because I want to leave .068 -.078 .002 -.020 
something for my children. (.054) (.021) (.951) (.566) 
16f Even with more money for myself! would not be .040 .148 .004 -.015 
happier than now. (.257) (.000) (.911) (.673) 
17a Worried about own economic situation .140 -.068 -.050 .174 
(.000) (.053) (.152) (.000) 
17b Worried about health .186 -.022 -.031 .022 
(.000) (.528) (.378) (.537) 
17c Worried about progressive degradation of -.034 .103 .100 .004 
environment (.339) (.003) (.004) (.912) 
17d Worried about peace in the world .040 .146 .105 -.026 
(.262) (.000) (.003) (.457) 
17e Worried about the political situation in Thailand .002 .099 .096 -.047 
(.951) (.005) (.006) (.186) 
17f Worried about the security of income .082 -.091 -.052 .168 
(.021) (.010) (.138) (.000) 
17g Worried about the moral values of young people -.026 -.052 .151 -.028 
(.467) (.142) (.000) (.43 I) 
17h Worried about decrease in social justice in .018 .103 .138 -.009 
Thailand (.613) (.004) (.000) (.791) 
17i Worried about corruption .017 .097 .139 -.026 
(.639) (.006) (.000) (.461) 
17j Worried about foreigners .041 .077 .097 -.008 
(.244) (.028) (.006) (.814) 
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Question TIFl TIF2 TIF3 TIF4 
coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. 
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
19-la Debts: bank or BAAC -.033 .036 -.067 -.010 
(.356) (.304) (.057) (.772) 
19-lb Debts: friends or family -.072 .009 .043 .064 
(.042) (.810) (.227) (.071) 
19-lc Debts: money lender .055 -.043 -.016 .074 
(.121) (.227) (.659) (.037) 
19-ld Debts: village fund .014 .065 .017 .034 
(.687) (.067) (.635) (.332) 
19-le Debts: installment payments -.088 .014 .005 .046 
(.829) (.692) (.891) (.190) 
19-3 Worried about debt level -.077 -.118 .122 .130 
(.055) (-.003) (.002) (.001) 
20-1 Sex -.076 .235 -.007 -.076 
(.032) (.000) (.851) (.033) 
20-4 Age .o?O -.055 .008 -.011 
(.051) (.126) (.833) (.754) 
20-5 Marital status .057 -.080 .084 .045 
(.109) (.023) (.016) (.204) 
20-6 Children or grandchildren .029 -.085 -.082 .049 
(.408) (.015) (.019) (.162) 
20-7 Household size .007 -.022 -.036 .061 
(.854) (.541) (.314) (.085) 
20-9 Level of education -.108 .121 .068 -.088 
(.002) (.001) (.056) (.013) 
20-12 Income -.001 .079 .059 -.063 
(.971) (.025) (.096) (.075) 
7.2.2 Task dependent factors 
Pavment Card Dichotomous Choice 
Question TDFl TDF2 TDF3 TDF4 TDFl TDF2 TDF3 
coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. 
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
4-4a Worry about taste of the .081 .107 -.030 .010 .054 .036 -.039 
water (.141) (.054) (.583) (.852) (.252) (.451) (.409) 
4-4b Worry about the color .147 .162 .028 .002 .028 .042 -.019 
(.008) (.003) (.610) (.997) (.560) (.380) (.696) 
4-4c Worry about the odor .120 .083 .035 -.022 .116 .023 -.018 
(.030) (.132) (.532) (.686) (.014) (.625) (.708) 
4-Sa Worry about diarrhea .120 .055 .025 -.049 .075 .011 .012 
(.029) (.323) (.654) (.375) (.115) (.820) (.794) 
4-Sb Worry about kidney .163 .085 -.023 -.029 .071 .028 -.043 
stones (.003) (.122) (.682) (.607) (.135) (.554) (.368) 
4-Sc Worry about cancer .106 .044 .014 .049 .025 .048 .046 
(.055) (.429) (.794) (.376) (.600) (.313) (.331) 
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Pavment Card Dichotomous Choice 
Question TDFl TDF2 TDF3 TDF4 TDFl TDF2 TDF3 
coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. 
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
Sa Importance: no -.032 .069 .072 -.172 -.152 -.070 -.038 
interruption of water (.562) (.212) (.194) (.002) (.001) (.144) (.435) 
service 
Sb Importance: no .062 .009 .105 -.190 -.092 -.083 -.031 
biological pollutants in (.265) (.874) (.058) (.001) (.056) (.083) (.524) 
the water 
Sc Importance: no -.026 .035 .073 -.175 -.053 -.103 -.032 
!pesticides in the water (.645) (.526) (.187) (.002) (.267) (.032) (.507) 
Sd Importance: clear color -.029 .058 .125 -.075 -.051 -.110 -.076 
of the water (.595) (.299) (.024) (.174) (.292) (.022) (.115) 
Se Importance: less soil .026 -.087 .110 -.071 .032 -.067 .054 
degradation in the (.646) (.117) (.049) (.201) (.504) (.164) (.261) 
uplands 
Sf Importance: no -.005 -.130 .040 -.013 -.022 -.045 .090 
accumulation of (.931) (.019) (.472) (.812) (.642) (.352) (.061) 
pesticides in ecosystems 
Sg Importance: less .043 -.117 .103 -.023 -.052 -.032 .104 
pesticides in fruit and (.434) (.035) (.064) (.674) (.276) (.446) (.030) 
vegetables 
Sh Importance: reduced .035 -.020 .073 -.145 .004 -.019 .055 
health threats for future (.526) (.714) (.188) (.009) (.940) (.693) (.254) 
generations 
7 Difficulty ofresponse .259 .194 .051 -.079 .264 .182 -.058 
(.000) (.000) (.359) (.152) (.000) (.000) (.224) 
Sa Reason: save money .012 -.120 .042 -.077 -.045 -.009 .017 
(.823) (.030) (.452) (.163) (.342) (.949) (.726) 
Sb Reason: more convenient -.168 -.088 .091 -.100 .005 -.135 -.072 
(.002) (. I 13) (.100) (.070) (.910) (.004) (.129) 
Sc Reason: not become ill -.089 -.027 .031 -.127 -.041 .022 -.102 
(.108) (.625) (.529) (.022) (.390) (.638) (.032) 
Sd Reason: increased health -.047 -.015 .071 -.043 -.063 -.022 -.103 
of the population (.402) (.789) (.204) (.443) (.186) (.637) (.029) 
Se Reason: color of the .010 -.075 .063 -. 101 -.087 -.059 -.041 
water (.859) (.178) (.255) (.070) (.067) (.216) (.394) 
Sf Reason: future .034 -.127 .056 -.032 -.042 -.073 -.036 
generations (.547) (.022) (.318) (.560) (.375) (.123) (.450) 
Sg Reason: I cannot afford .235 -.121 -.047 .046 .159 .170 .038 
to pay more (.000) (.028) (.400) (.403) (.001) (.000) (.423) 
Sh Reason: I have severe .244 .008 -.045 -.01 I .004 .021 -.060 
doubts concerning the (.000) (.891) (.419) (.840) (.925) (.660) (.208) 
program 
Si Reason: government is .170 -.096 -.083 .026 -.069 -.007 .072 
responsible (.002) (.084) (.136) (.644) (.044) (.887) (.129) 
Sj Reason: costs are already .109 -.019 -.055 .012 .007 .129 -.047 
high (.049) (.726) (.324) (.827) (.883) (.006) (.320) 
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Pavment Card Dichotomous Choice 
Question TDFl TDF2 TDF3 TDF4 TDFI TDF2 TDF3 
coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. 
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
IOa Libraries .051 -.008 .01 I .010 .005 .025 -.119 
(.360) (.882) (.844) (.853) (.915) (.604) (.012) 
IOb Discotheques .034 .026 -.030 .041 .000 .087 .028 
(.540) (.642) (.589) (.465) (.994) (.066) (.552) 
IOc State Railway of -.016 -.111 .022 -.037 .010 .090 .027 
Thailand (.767) (.045) (.698) (.506) (.835) (.058) (.573) 
IOd Swimming-pools, gyms, .064 -.062 .033 .017 .082 -.051 -.026 
soorts fields (.250) (.265) (.547) (. 759) (.083) (.288) (.587) 
IOe Schools .036 -.014 .084 .034 .002 -.079 .119 
(.5 I I) (.794) (.127) (.537) (.960) (.094) (.685) 
IOf Provincial Electricity .076 -.134 .045 .053 -.042 .039 .102 
Authority (.168) (.015) (.412) (.337) (.373) (.408) (.032) 
IOg Theaters -.065 .055 .047 -.007 -.046 .087 -.017 
(.237) (.323) (.399) (.894) (.331) (.067) (.720) 
IOh Provincial Water .049 -.045 .Q38 .103 -.013 .026 .096 
Authority (.377) (.418) (.488) (.063) (.777) (.578) (.043) 
IOi Mass Transit Authority .090 -.145 -.016 .008 .001 -.039 .067 
(. I 06) (.009) (.768) (.890) (.985) (.408) (.158) 
IOj Thailand Post .065 -.068 .031 .024 -.003 .001 .096 
(.238) (.222) (.575) (.670) (.944) (.980) (.044) 
IOk Telephone of Thailand .118 -.082 .030 .073 -.047 .039 .121 
(.032) (.140) (.583) (.190) (.326) (.418) (.010) 
lla I find it difficult to say .061 -.074 .054 -.033 .105 -.171 .014 
"no" if a friend asks me (.270) (.179) (.331) (.554) (.027) (.000) (.761) 
a favor. 
lib It gives me a good .066 -.023 -.Q38 -.079 .108 -.055 -.110 
feeling if! donate money (.235) (.679) (.487) (.151) (.022) (.243) (.020) 
for people I do not know 
!personally. 
lie The increase of my .027 -.019 -.033 -.172 .099 .044 -.003 
"boon" associated with (.632) (.727) (.550) (.002) (.038) (.353) (.947) 
the donation is very 
important to me. 
lid I help other people -.056 .045 -.019 -.027 .012 .015 .120 
because they will help (.315) (.412) (.737) (.620) (.794) (.755) (.01 I) 
me when I am in need. 
lie I donate money because -.007 -.058 -.057 -.106 .066 -.019 .090 
"giving" is an (.896) (.297) (.307) (.056) (.162) (.692) (.057) 
established habit in our 
society. 
llf I promise to do .168 -.059 -.002 .080 .175 .053 .118 
something although I do (.002) (.286) (.967) (.147) (.000) (.267) (.013) 
not want to do it. 
llg I give promises and then .053 .039 -.023 .115 .072 .172 .134 
I do not keep them. (.339) (.484) (.679) (.037) (. 132) (.000) (.005) 
lib I am concerned what .073 .083 .086 .037 .064 -.063 -.003 
other people think of me. (.186) (.135) (.120) (.499) (.178) (.185) (.946) 
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Pavmeot Card Dichotomous Choice 
Question TDFl TDF2 TDF3 TDF4 TDFl TDF2 TDF3 
coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. 
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
12a Taking care of .108 .025 .051 -.065 -.070 -.035 -.102 
environmental protection (.051) (.646) (.360) (.243) (.138) (.462) (.031) 
is an important task of 
!government. 
12b Law enforcement .086 -.066 -.019 -.065 .034 -.057 -.139 
concerning (.120) (.233) (.732) (.239) (.474) (.229) (.003) 
environmental 
management is usually 
not effective. 
12c Usually, government's .080 -.057 .040 -.095 -.019 -.083 -.066 
action concerning (.148) (.306) (.471) (.085) (.687) (.082) (. 165) 
environmental protection 
is 'too late'. 
12d Government should -.012 -.073 -.044 .010 -.046 -.004 -.097 
collect more taxes to (.833) (.190) (.423) (.855) (.337) (.926) (.041) 
increase the budget for 
environmental 
management. 
13 Classify: household .Oil .001 .007 .036 .003 -.024 -.062 
richer or poorer than (.846) (.985) (.897) (.510) (.956) (.613) (.193) 
average 
14 Classify: economic -.032 -.089 .46 .053 -.026 -.087 -.022 
situation better or worse (.557) (. 106) (.403) (.340) (.579) (.066) (.636) 
than average 
15 Classify: consider .018 -.027 .104 .002 .026 -.184 .094 
income fair or unfair (.749) (.62 I) (.059) (.965) (.587) (.000) (.047) 
16a I need money to be .146 .034 -.012 -.079 -.093 .013 .162 
haoov. (.009) (.537) (.831) (.157) (.050) (.790) (.001) 
16b I usually spend all my .121 -.016 .021 -.019 .053 .024 .174 
income because buying (.029) (.778) (.713) (.734) (.262) (.615) (.000) 
things makes me haoov. 
16c I like to buy things on .160 -.106 .083 .096 .141 .077 .169 
installment. (.004) (.056) (.135) (.084) (.003) (.104) (.000) 
16d I build up savings .099 -.052 .086 -.132 .012 -.134 .053 
because I want to have (.074) (.350) (.121) (.017) (.807) (.005) (.263) 
security for the future. 
16e I build up savings .098 .012 .069 -.179 .003 -.023 -.024 
because I want to leave (.080) (.825) (.218) (.001) (.957) (.626) (.61 I) 
something for my 
children. 
16f Even with more money .119 -.012 .002 .092 .185 .013 -.01 I 
for myself! would not be (.032) (.832) (.976) (.099) (.000) (.785) (.812) 
happier than now. 
17a Worried about own .157 -.032 .063 .089 -.009 .122 .076 
economic situation (.004) (.565) (.258) (.108) (.852) (.010) (.I 07) 
17b Worried about health .200 -.078 -.022 .096 -.008 .069 .048 
(.000) (.161) (.687) (.083) (.871) (.147) (.317) 
238 
Oliver Frör - 978-3-631-75515-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 03:56:05AM
via free access
Payment Card Dichotomous Choice 
Question TDFI TDF2 TDF3 TDF4 TDFI TDF2 TDF3 
coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. coeff. 
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
17c Worried about .014 -.165 .095 -.023 -.065 -.076 .016 
progressive degradation (.808) (.003) (.086) (.677) (.170) (.I 10) (.734) 
of environment 
17d Worried about peace in -.020 -. I I 8 -.007 .001 -.037 -.102 -.012 
the world (.716) (.033) (.898) (.983) (.434) (.031) (.798) 
17e Worried about the .021 -.131 .048 .050 -.01 I -.004 -.023 
political situation in (.702) (.018) (.386) (.362) (.811) (.931) (.625) 
Thailand 
17f Worried about the .104 -.052 .001 .081 -.036 .072 .056 
security of income (.060) (.353) (.989) (.145) (.450) (.131) (.240) 
17g Worried about the moral .084 -.094 .106 -.123 .008 -.148 -.044 
values of young people (.130) (.089) (.055) (.027) (.870) (.002) (.349) 
17h Worried about decrease .096 -.118 -.001 -.049 -.028 -.032 .034 
in social justice in (.083) (.033) (.989) (.382) (.552) (.494) (.479) 
Thailand 
17i Worried about corruption .201 -.197 .003 -.048 .067 -.031 .053 
(.000) (.001) (.962) (.386) (.159) (.518) (.261) 
17j Worried about foreigners .o70 -.147 .097 -.066 -.003 -.059 .062 
(.203) (.008) (.079) (.236) (.944) (.216) (.I 91) 
19-la Debts: bank or BAAC .062 .033 -.001 .o70 -.001 .092 -.034 
(.265) (.554) (.979) (.206) (.979) (.052) (.480) 
19-lb Debts: friends or family .017 .012 .091 .107 -.001 .047 -.045 
(.756) (.835) (.102) (.054) (.989) (.321) (.348) 
19-lc Debts: money lender .010 .123 -.008 .022 .026 .060 -.034 
(.860) (.027) (.890) (.686) (.589) (.212) (.480) 
19-ld Debts: village fund .144 .121 .016 .072 .080 .113 -.044 
(.009) (.029) (.773) (.192) (.091) (.017) (.351) 
19-le Debts: installment .000 -.004 .042 -.023 -.042 .Ill .016 
IPavments (.999) (.937) (.451) (.675) (.377) (.020) (. 740) 
19-3 Worried about debt level .009 .070 .008 .034 .125 .141 .081 
(.890) (.274) (.169) (.598) (.019) (.008) (.131) 
20-1 Sex -.018 -.023 .000 .034 -.013 .003 -.044 
(.748) (.679) (.993) (.327) (.778) (.951) (.352) 
20-4 Age -.027 .143 -.015 -.017 .060 -.029 -.057 
(.625) (.009) (.787) (. 757) (.207) (.543) (.229) 
20-5 Marital status .031 .083 -.037 -.016 -.018 -.oJO -.012 
(.575) (.134) (.508) (.779) (. 705) (.534) (.799) 
20-6 Children or -.017 .056 -.034 .006 .027 -.013 .007 
grandchildren (.759) (.3 I 6) (.536) (.908) (.567) (.783) (.880) 
20-7 Household size -.114 .001 -.079 -.109 -.012 .057 .098 
(.039) (.981) (. 156) (.049) (.799) (.233) (.041) 
20-9 Level of education -.036 -.126 .065 -.088 -.036 -.048 -.004 
(.518) (.023) (.238) (.111) (.443) (.309) (.939) 
20-12 Income -.080 -.078 -.021 -.065 -.089 -.125 .063 
(. I 50) (.162) (.708) (.245) (.064) (.009) (. I 87) 
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